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The Death Penalty-An Obstacle to the 
'War against Terrorism"?] 
Thomas Michael McDonnell* 
September 11 seared our collective memory perhaps even 
more vividly than December 7, 1941, and has evoked a natural 
demand both for retribution and for measures to keep us safe. 
Given the existing statutory and judicial authority for capital 
punishment, the U.S. Government has to confront the issue 
whether to seek the death penalty against those who are linked 
to the suicide attacks or to the organization that sponsored them 
or both. Meting out the death penalty to international terrorists 
involves difficult moral, legal, and policy questions. The 
September 11 crimes were not only domestic crimes, but also 
international ones. The magnitude of these crimes, the killing of 
over 3,000 innocent people, cries out for redress. 
Yet most countries in  the world, including nearly all our 
closest allies, have abolished capital punishment. None o f  the 
1. In my earlier drafts of this Article, I did not put quotation marks around 
"war on terrorism." It has now become clear, however, that this phrase has not only 
become unthinkingly part of the lexicon but is dangerously overbroad. One 
commentator put it aptly: 
Wars have typically been fought against proper nouns (Germany, say) for the 
good reason that proper nouns can surrender and promise not to do it again. 
Wars against common nouns (poverty, crime, drugs) have been less successful. 
Such opponents never give up. The war on terrorism, unfortunately, falls into 
the second category. 
Grenville Byford, The Wrong War, FOREIGN AFF., July 2002, at  34, available at 2002 
WL 2085047. Emergency measures put into effect because of the "war on terrorism" 
may likewise never end, and governmental officials may justify military actions that 
have little to do with our immediate security by invoking such a broad description of 
the threat. 
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four currently operating international criminal tribunals is 
authorized to give a death sentence. In  addition, the advent of 
the suicide bomber turns the deterrence justification for the 
death penalty inside out. Might the death penalty help create 
martyrs rather than discourage similar attacks? Could our 
imposing the death penalty increase support in  the Islamic 
world for a1 Qaeda and other extremist groups? Furthermore, to 
what extent as  a matter of constitutional law and policy, should 
a secondary actor, one who did not kill, but who was a member 
of a terrorist conspiracy, be subject to the death penalty? This 
Article examines these questions in  the context of the Zacarias 
Moussaoui case, the supposed twentieth hijacker, who, on 
September 11, 2001, had been held in  custody for twenty-six 
days. 
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September 11 seared our collective memory perhaps even more 
vividly than December 7, 1941, not only because, like Pearl Harbor, 
the attack on the World Trade Center took us completely by surprise 
or because the burning twin towers collapsed so unexpectedly and 
spectacularly as we watched the horror unfold on our television sets, 
but because the September 11 attacks constitute a virtually 
unprecedented threat to our security and way of life. The attacks 
have thus evoked a natural demand both for retribution and for 
measures to keep us safe. To satisfy these demands, Congress created 
the Department of Homeland Security2 and rushed to pass the 
2. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
Congress passed a spate of measures in response to the September 11 attacks. See 
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Patriot Act.3 The President has taken numerous steps, including, 
among many others, the invasion of Afghanistan, the indefinite 
incommunicado detention of alleged Taliban and a1 Qaeda leaders in 
Guantanamo Bay, the establishment of military tribunals to try those 
and other foreign terrorist suspects a t  some unspecified date,4 the 
incommunicado detention of two U.S. citizens without trial,5 the 
detention of hundreds of immigrants thought to be linked to 
Michael P. O'Connor & Celia M. Rumann, Into the Fire: How to Avoid Getting Burned 
by the Same Mistakes Made Fighting Terrorism in Northern Ireland, 24 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1657, 1705 n.227 (2003) (citing List of  Legislation Related to  September 11 
Attacks, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/homelterrorleg.html (last visited Jan. 22, 
2004)). 
3. U S A  Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). Brought 
about i n  part by  Attorney General John Ashcroft's demand for immediate action, the  
pace of  passage was frenetic: 
Passage o f  the  bill, by  a vote o f  337 to 79, was the  climax of  a remarkable 18- 
hour period i n  which both the  House and the Senate adopted complex, far- 
reaching antiterrorism legislation with little debate i n  an  atmosphere of edgy 
alarm, as federal law enforcement officials warned that another attack could be 
imminent. Many lawmakers said it  had been impossible to  truly debate, or 
even read, the legislation that  passed today. 
Robin Toner & Neil L. Lewis, A Nation Challenged, House Passes Terrorism Bill Much 
Like Senate's, but With 5-Year Limit, N.Y. T I M E S ,  Oct. 13,2001, at B6. 
4. President George W.  Bush, Executive Order: Notice-Detention, 
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens i n  the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001), available at 2001 WL 1435652. Six of the Guantanamo Bay 
detainees, however, may be tried fairly soon, according to Administration Officials. See 
Neil A. Lewis, Threats and Responses: The Tribunals; Six Detainees Soon May Face 
Military Trials, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2003, at Al. T o  date, none of  the Guantanamo 
detainees have been tried. The  Pentagon, however, says it has released a total of 119 
Guantanamo Bay detainees, leaving 610. U.S. Releases 26 Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2004, at A2. 
5. See Hamdi v .  Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 460-61 (4th Cir. 2003); Padilla v .  
Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), remanded, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 
F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (answering certified questions and ruling, inter alia, that 
President, as Commander i n  Chief,  lacked power to  detain U.S. citizens on U.S. soil). 
The  U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari i n  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 
03-6696, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 12 (Jan. 9, 2004). After the  Supreme Court agreed to hear 
his case, the  Pentagon permitted Jose Padilla to  meet with his lawyer. Michael Powell, 
Lawyer Visits 'Dirty Bomb' Suspect, WASH. POST, Mar. 4,  2004, at A10. Padilla had 
been held incommunicado for nearly two years. Id. Two agents listened to the 
conversation conducted with a glass barrier between Padilla and his attorney. Id. The  
meeting was also videotaped. Given the  government's monitoring, his lawyer stated 
that their conversation dealt only with his health and well-being, not legal matters. Id. 
At  about the same time and under similar constraints the Pentagon has allowed Yaser 
Esam Hamdi to  see an attorney after nearly two years o f  incommunicado detention. 
See Lyle Denniston, Supreme Court to Hear Detainee Case to Decide if Suspect i n  'Dirty 
Bomb' Can Be Held, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 21,2004, at A2. 
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t e r r o r i ~ m , ~  the indictment of several suspected terrorists in federal 
court,' and the invasion and occupation of Iraq. 
Unlike our European allies, the United States has relatively 
little experience fighting a private terror organi~at ion.~  Given the 
magnitude of the attacks, we may tend to overreact, which may play 
into the terrorists' hands. Overreaction may also erode our own 
respect for the rule of law and our moral standing both a t  home and 
abroad. This Article deals with a fundamental question, namely, 
whether, as  a matter of law and policy, the federal government 
should use the death penalty against those found to have been 
involved in the September 11 attacks, in particular, and, more 
broadly, against those who belong to or have allied themselves with a1 
Qaeda.s 
Meting out the death penalty to international terrorists involves 
difficult moral, legal, and policy questions. The September 11 crimes 
were not only domestic crimes, but also international ones. The 
magnitude of these crimes, the killing of over 3,000 innocent people, 
cries out for retribution. Yet most countries in the world, including 
nearly all of our closest allies, have abolished capital punishment.1° 
None of the four currently operating international criminal tribunals 
6.  See Center for National Security Studies v. Department of Justice, 331 F.3d 
918, 921 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting that in  course of  post-September 11 investigation, 
government interviewed over 1,000 persons, detained 700 for violation of immigration 
laws, 134 on federal criminal charges, and undisclosed number as material witnesses); 
see also Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, A Year of  Loss, Ch. 3: Treatment of 
Immigrants, Refugees, and Minorities, at http://www.lchr.org/us~lawllossfloss~ch3a. 
h tm (last visited Jan. 22, 2004). 
7. See Indictment, United States v .  Goba, 220 F.  Supp. 2d 182, 184 (W.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 21, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.comlhdocsldocs/terrorisdusgoba 
102102ind.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2004) (charging six individuals with conspiring to 
aid terrorist organization, namely, a1 Qaeda); Matthew Purdy & Lowell Bergman, An  
Unclear Danger: Inside the Lackawanna Terror Organization, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 
2003, at 1, 37 (noting that six of these "sleeper" cell defendants pleaded guilty to lesser 
charges but stating that apparently FBI agent i n  charge of case did not consider 
defendants terrorists, but perhaps potential terrorists); The Nation in  Brief, WASH. 
POST, May 22, 2003, at A36 (noting seventh person was indicted for participation i n  
"sleeper" a1 Qaeda cell i n  upstate New York); see also Indictment, United States v .  
Battle, No. CR 02 399HA @. Or. Oct. 3, 2002) (charging four individuals with 
conspiring to levy war against United States and with conspiring to  prove support and 
resources to a1 Qaeda), available at http://news.findlaw.comlhdocsldocslterrorisd 
usbattle100302ind.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2004); United States v .  Abdullah, No. 01 
CR 3240-W (May 12, 2002); Philip Shenon, Threats and Responses: The Law; 6 Persons 
Charged under Broadly Worded Act, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,2002, at A17. 
8. See Jonathan Stevenson, How Europe and America Defend Themselves, 
FOREIGN AFF., Mar-Apr. 2003, at 75. 
9. This Article does not address the question of whether to use the death 
penalty in  war crimes tribunals in  Iraq. See Susan Dominus, Their Day in Court, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Mar. 30, 2003, at 30. See generally, Capt. R. Peter Masterson, The Persian 
Gulf War Crimes Trials, 1991 ARMY LAW 7 (1991). 
10. See Carol S. Steiker, The Law and Politics of the Death Penalty, 81 OR. L. 
REV. 97, 97 (2002). 
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is authorized to impose a death sentence.ll In addition, the advent of 
the suicide bomber turns the deterrence justification for the death 
penalty inside out. Might the death penalty help create martyrs 
rather than discourage similar attacks? Could our imposing the death 
penalty increase support in the Islamic world for a1 Qaeda and other 
extremist groups? Furthermore, to what extent as  a matter of 
constitutional law and policy, should a secondary actor, one who did 
not kill, but who was a member of a terrorist conspiracy, be subject to 
the death penalty? 
This Article examines these questions in the context of the 
Zacarias Moussaoui case, the supposed twentieth hijacker,12 who, on 
September 11, 2001, had been held in custody for twenty-six days. 
This Article thus first deals with criminal liability imposed not on the 
actual perpetrators, but on accomplices and co-conspirators, 
secondary rather than primary actors. After the facts and allegations 
against Moussaoui are set forth, Part I of this Article analyzes the 
U.S. law of conspiracy applicable here. Part I1 examines the 
constitutional questions posed by imposing a death sentence on 
Moussaoui as  a co-conspirator. Part I11 discusses the policy and 
international ramifications for the United States if we execute 
Moussaoui or a1 Qaeda and Taliban terrorists after trying them either 
in civilian courts or by military tribunals. 
A. Facts and Allegations against Zacarias Moussaoui 
Zacarias Moussaoui was indicted on December 11, 2001, by the 
Grand Jury in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia for conspiring to carry out the September 11 attacks.13 
Acting as  his own attorney, he attempted to plead guilty on July 18 
and July 25, 2002.14 After the Court's questioning apparently made 
him realize he was unwilling to admit to the charges, he withdrew his 
11. See, e.g., Nora Demleitner, The Death Penalty in  the United States: 
Following the European Lead? 81 OR. L. REV. 131, 143-44 (2002). 
12. Some federal officials are now saying, however, that they no longer think 
that  Moussaoui was in fact the twentieth hijacker. See Susan Schmidt & Dan Eggen, 
A1 Qaeda Effort to Enter U.S. in  August 2001, WASH. POST, Nov. 6,2003, at Al, A23. 
13. Indictment, United States v .  Zacarias Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va.  
Dec. 11, 2001), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/l:Ol-cr-O04551 
DocketSheet.htm1. The indictment charged h im with the following offenses: (1) 
conspiracy to commit acts o f  terrorism transcending national boundaries; (2) conspiracy 
to  commit aircraft piracy; (3) conspiracy to destroy aircraft; (4) conspiracy to use 
weapons of mass destruction; (5) conspiracy to  murder U.S. employees; and (6) 
conspiracy to destroy property. Id.; see also David Johnston & Philip Shenon, A Nation 
Challenged: The Government's Case: Man Held Since August Is Charged With Role in  
the September 11 Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at Al. 
14. Philip Shenon, Terror Suspect Changes Mind on Guilty Plea, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 26, 2002, at Al. 
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guilty plea.16 The Justice Department is seeking the death penalty in 
his case.16 
Zacarias Moussaoui was born in France of Moroccan parents on 
May 30, 1968.17 He obtained a masters degree from Southbank 
University in Great Britain.ls He was living in London before coming 
to the United States on February 23, 2001.19 The indictment alleges 
that in April 1998, Moussaoui "was present a t  the a1 Qaeda-affiliated 
Khalden Camp in Afghani~tan ."~~ 
Upon arriving in the United States, Moussaoui allegedly 
declared having a t  least $35,000 in cash to U.S. Customs. Three days 
later, he opened a bank account in Norman, Oklahoma and deposited 
"approximately $32,000 [in] cash."21 For the next four months he 
attended the Airman Flight School in Norman.22 
On June 20, 2001, Moussaoui allegedly purchased flight deck 
training videos for the Boeing 747 Model 400 and the Boeing 747 
Model 200 from "the Ohio Pilot Store."23 Two of the September 11 
hijackers had allegedly purchased the same training videos from the 
same store, three months earlier.24 On July 29 and 30, less than ten 
15. Id. 
16. Department of Justice, Statement by Attorney General Ashcroft, Justice 
Department to Seek Death Penalty in Moussaoui Case (Mar. 28, 2002), at  
http://www.usdoj.gov/opalpr/2002/ March 102-ag186.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2004); 
see also Philip Shenon & Neil Lewis, U.S. To Seek Death Penalty for Moussaoui in 
Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,2002, a t  A20. 
17. Second Superseding Indictment, United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455- 
A, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, fi 13 (E.D. Va. July 2002), available a t  http://notablecases.vaed. 
uscourts.gov/l:01-cr-00455/docs/66826/0.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2004). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 77 41-42. After growing up in France, Moussaoui moved to London to 
pursue his masters degree and had been living there for seven years. MICHAEL GRIFFIN, 
REAPING THE WHIRLWIND 246-47 (rev. ed. 2003). He was asked to leave the Brixton 
Mosque for preaching holy war. Id. a t  247. A French investigative judge suspected one 
"Zacarias" as being an Algerian a1 Qaeda paymaster, attempted to interview Moussaoui, 
and have his apartment searched, but the British refused. Id. 
20. Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 17, 7 13. CBS reported that 
Moussaoui traveled to Chechnya in 1997. GRIFFIN, supra note 19, a t  248. He is 
reported as  twice visiting in September and October 2003 the Khallad operation center 
in Malaysia, the base for the attack on the U.S.S. Cole. Id. a t  248. On the second trip 
he reportedly stayed with Yazid Sufaat, a former Malaysian army captain who 
supported the Taliban. Id. Sufaat gave him a letter of introduction, stating the 
Moussaoui was a marketing executive for Infocus Tech, a computer company, and had 
a salary of $2,500 per month. Id.; see also JASON BURKE, AL QAEDA, CASTING A SHADOW 
OF TERROR 206 (2003). Moussaoui then traveled back to London, had a visit from bin 
al-Shibh, then traveled to Afghanistan by way of Pakistan and returned to London on 
February 7,2001. GRIFFIN, supra note 19, a t  278. After a couple of weeks in London, he 
took off for the United States, flying into Chicago and amving in Norman, Oklahoma 
on February 26,2001. GRIFFIN, supra note 19, a t  248. 
21. Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 17,nq 42-43. 
22. ~ d .  144. 
23. ~ d .  1 53. 
24. zd. 11 45,53. 
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days after purchasing the B-747 training videos, Moussaoui allegedly 
made several phone calls from public telephones to a number in 
Duesseldorf, Germany.z5 On August 1 and 3, Ramzi bin al-Shibhz6 
allegedly wired "approximately $14,000 to Moussaoui, first from 
Duesseldorf and then from Hamburg, germ an^.^' Less than two 
weeks earlier, Bin al-Shibh allegedly wired money from Germany to 
one of the September 11 hijackers in F l ~ r i d a . ~ ~  Al-Shibh allegedly 
shared an  apartment in Germany with Mohamed Atta, said to be the 
mastermind of the September 11 attacks.z9 
Ten days after receiving the second wire transfer, Moussaoui 
started training on Boeing 747 flight simulators a t  the Pan Am Flight 
Academy in Minneapolis, M i n n e ~ o t a . ~ ~  He paid the Academy the 
balance due, $6,800, in cash.31 One of his flight instructors suspected 
Moussaoui of terrorism when Moussaoui "repeatedly proved himself 
incapable of understanding basic flying techniques but still insisted 
on learning how to fly a 747, the largest commercial jet."3z The flight 
instructor made repeated calls to the FBI until finally, three days 
later, on August 16, 2001, Moussaoui was arrested for immigration 
 violation^.^^ He allegedly told FBI agents that he was taking flying 
lessons for pleasure and never mentioned the September 11 plot.34 
25. Id. 7 63. 
26. Id. 7 64. 
27. Id. 7 65. Apparently, al-Shibh received the money from Mustafa Ahmed al- 
Hawsawi, also known as "Sheikh Sayeed," a "known associate of  bin Laden." GRIFFIN, 
supra note 19, at 251. Ahmed was also apparently at least the conduit if not the source 
of  the $35,000 i n  cash Moussaoui brought with him to the United States. Id. 
28. Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 17, f 21. 
29. Id. f 14; see also Desmond Butler, Threats and Responses: Intelligence; 
Germans Were Tracking Sept. 11  Conspirators as Early as 1998, Documents Disclose, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2003, at A10. Al-Shibh was arrested in  Pakistan the following 
year. Desmond Butler, Threats and Responses: Investigations; Germans i n  U.S. With 
Data On a Top Qaeda Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2002, at A20 (noting that al-Shibh 
was arrested earlier that month, September 2002). 
30. Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 17, f 70. 
31. Jim Yardley, Nation Challenged: The Conspiracy Charge; E-Mail Sent to 
Flight School Gave Terror Suspect's 'Goal', N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at Al. Moussaoui 
had previously paid $1,500.00 of  the $8,300.00 tuition by Visa card. Id.; see also 
Indictment, supra note 13, 7 72. 
32. Philip Shenon, A Nation Challenged: the Suspect, Flight School Warned 
F.B.I. of Suspicions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21,2001, at B1; Yardley, supra note 31. 
33. Christopher Drew, After the Attacks: The Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2001, 
at A4. 
34. Government's Response in  Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike 
Government's Notice to  Seek the Penalty of Death at 21, United States v. Moussaoui, No. 
01-455-A, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13326 (E.D. Va.  July 11, 2002), available at 
http://news.findlaw.commdocs/docs/do~~lm0u~~aoui~usmoussaouiO51002gvrspl.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2004). On August 26, French informed the FBI of Moussaoui's links to a1 Qaeda. 
GRIFFIN, supra note 19, at 256. 
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Moussaoui has been in custody ever since. He had been incarcerated 
for twenty-six days when the September 11 attacks occurred.35 
After September 11, an  intensified FBI investigation revealed 
that he had the telephone number of al-Shibh in Germany.36 In his 
various attempts a t  confession, Zacarias Moussaoui has admitted in 
open court to being a member of a1 Qaeda and being loyal to Osama 
bin Laden.3' He might have applauded on seeing the collapse of the 
World Trade Center Towers on television while he was in custody.38 
He denies, however, being the so-called twentieth hijacker or being 
"directly involved with the September 11 attacks.39 
B.  Court Proceedings and Sanctions 
Because of Moussaoui's somewhat erratic behaviour the district 
court conducted a hearing into his competency to stand trial.40 U.S. 
District Court Judge Leonie M. Brinkema ultimately concluded that  
Moussaoui was competent to stand trial and to represent himself.41 
He did so,42 and in the process made damaging admissions, affirming 
35. After Moussaoui's arrest, the 19 hijackers in the words of one commentator 
went into "high gear," possibly suggesting that they feared the operation would abort. 
Id. at  257. 
36. Coleen Rowley, a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent in the Minneapolis 
office criticized FBI Headquarters for failing to approve a request to seek a search 
warrant of Moussaoui's computer before September 11 or to give credence to a n  
Arizona FBI report that together might have warned officials of the September 11 
attacks. Dan Eggen & Bill Miller, FBI Flaws Alleged By Field Staff Moussaoui Probe 
Lapses Blamed on Headquarters, WASH. POST, May 24,2002, a t  Al.  
37. Shenon, supra note 14. 
38. Rick Linsk, Terror Suspect at  End of Road, CENTREDAILY.COM, Sept. 10, 
2002, available a t  http://www.centredaily.com/mldlcentreda~4038932.htm (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2004) (noting that Los Angles Times initially reported jailer said 
Moussaoui cheered upon learning of September 11 attacks, but story has since been 
contradicted). See Bob Drogin & Josh Meyer, After the Attack; The Investigation, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 17,2001, a t  A4. 
39. Shenon, supra note 14. He also stated that while he might be a member of 
a1 Qaeda, "it doesn't mean I'm on the plane," an apparent reference to the September 
11 hijacked airliners. Id. 
40. There is evidence of some degree of mental illness in other members of 
Moussaoui's family. See Susan Dominus, Everyone Has a Mother, N.Y. TIMES 
MAGAZINE, Feb. 9,2003, a t  37. 
41. Moussaoui told his lawyers that he would refuse to submit to a psychiatric 
examination. Transcript of Motion Hearing Before Hon. Leonie M. Brinkema, U.S. 
District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia a t  44, United States v. 
Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11087 (E.D. Va. Apr. 22, 2002), 
available at  http://cryptome.org/usa-v-zm-042202.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2004). 
42. Judge Brinkema has subsequently revoked her order that  permitted 
Moussaoui to represent himself. Order, United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A, slip 
op. (E.D. Va. Nov. 3, 2003), available a t  http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/l:Ol-cr- 
00455/docs/69412/0.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2004). Judge Brinkema stated that  she 
took this step to bar Moussaoui from representing himself, because of his frivolous 
motions and contemptuous language. Id. 
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his loyalty to Osama bin Laden, possible knowledge of the September 
11 attacks, and apparent close ties to other top a1 Qaeda leaders.43 In 
addition, Judge Brinkema granted his motion to have access to al- 
Shibh, but the government appealed.44 The government argued that 
Moussaoui does not have the right to a videotaped deposition of al- 
Shibh, asserting national security grounds.45 The prosecutor stated, 
in oral argument before the Fourth Circuit, that al-Shibh '8uries this 
defendant," but whether that means that al-Shibh's alleged 
statements to the government implicate Moussaoui in the September 
11 attacks is unclear.46 
The Fourth Circuit dismissed the Justice Department's appeal, 
concluding that the district court's requiring the government to 
permit a videotaped deposition of a1 Shibh was not a "final order."47 
By a vote of seven to five, the Fourth Circuit en banc refused the 
Justice Department's request to consider the panel's decision.48 The 
government initially decided to defy the district court order to 
arrange a videotaped deposition of al-Shibh, an order later expanded 
to require the same of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Abu 
Z ~ b a y d a h . ~ ~  On September 25, 2003, the government took the 
unusual step of joining in the defense motion to dismiss the 
43. Moussaoui has admitted being loyal to Osama bin Laden. Philip Shenon, 
Threats and Responses: The Courts; Justice Dept. Warns of  Risk to Prosecution and 
Security, N.Y. TIMES, June 4,  2003, at A21. In court papers, he wrote, " I  will be 
delighted to  come back one day to blow myself into your new W.T.C. i f  ever you rebuild 
it." Philip Shenon, A Nation At W a c  The Terrorist Suspect; Man Charged i n  Sept. I I 
Attacks Demands That Qaeda Leaders Testify, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2003, at B12. He 
also referred t o  Mohammed Shaikh Khalid, whom U.S. and Pakistani forces captured 
i n  Pakistan as 'Top Mujahid Brother Mohammed" and called another of  the captured 
a1 Qaeda leaders, Abu Zubaydah, "Fl]y  commander Zubaydah." Id. Mohammed Shaikh 
Khalid is reported to  be the  chairman of a1 Qaeda's military committee and 
mastermind of  the September 11 attacks. YOSRI FOUDA & NICK FIELDING, 
MASTERMINDS OF TERROR 12, 173 (2003). Moussaoui also stated, " I  have certain 
knowledge about September 11, and I know exactly who done it. I know which group, 
who participated, when i t  was decided. I have many information." Government's Brief 
at 11, United States v. Moussaoui, No. 03-4792 (4th Cir. fded Oct. 31, 2003) (quoting 
record at 2JAU223), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/moussaou~ 
usmouss102403gbrf.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2004). 
44. See Jerry Markon, Moussaoui Prosecutor Fights Ruling, WASH. POST, June 
13,2003, at A9. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. Transcript of  Oral Argument at 23, United States v. Moussaoui, 333 
F.3d 509 (4th Cir. June 3, 2003) (Nos. 03-4262, 03-4261). See also Government: A1 
Qaeda Witness 'Buries' 9/ 11 Defendant Moussaoui, at http:l/www.cnn.com/2003ILAWI 
06/13lmoussaoui.tria1 (last visited Feb. 4, 2004). 
47. See Moussaoui, 333 F.3d at 514. 
48. United States v. Moussaoui, 336 F.3d 279,279 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
49. Philip Shenon, U.S. Will Defy Court's Order in  Terror Case, N.Y. W E S ,  
July 15, 2003, at A l .  
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i n d i ~ t m e n t . ~ ~  A district court judgment dismissing the case would be 
a "final order," clearing the way for a government appeal to the 
Fourth C i r ~ u i t . ~ ~  
Rebuking the government, however, Judge Brinkema denied the 
motion to dismiss, and sanctioned the government as  follows: (1) the 
government may not seek the death penalty, and (2) the government 
may not a t  trial attempt to tie the defendant to the September 11 
attacks.52 The court reasoned, among other things, tha t  the death 
penalty requires that a defendant have played a substantial role in 
bringing about the death of the victims of September 11 and that the 
government's depriving the defendant of witnesses that  might show 
he played little or no role in those attacks violated his rights under 
federal statutory and constitutional law.53 The government is 
appealing the Fourth Circuit ruling.54 If the government is ultimately 
unsuccessful, i t  may move the case into a military tribunal.55 
50. Philip Shenon, In Maneuver, U.S. Will Let Terror Charges Drop, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2003, a t  Al. The government had hoped that that the district court 
would have dismissed and that the Fourth Circuit court would have rejected Judge 
Brinkema's conclusion that Moussaoui has a right to a video-taped deposition of the 
key a1 Qaeda captives. If the Fourth Circuit affirms the dismissal, however, the Bush 
Administration has indicated that they will treat Moussaoui as  an "enemy combatant'' 
and try him in a military tribunal. 
51. Id. 
52. United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A, slip op. a t  9-13 (E.D. Va. Oct. 2, 
2003), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/l:Ol-cr-OO455/docs/69264/O.p~ 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2004); see also Order, United States v. Moussaoui, Crim. No. 01- 
455-A, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2003), available at http://notablecases. 
vaed.uscourts.govll:01-cr-00455/docs/69267/O.p (last visited Jan. 26, 2004); Philip 
Shenon, Judge Rules Out a Death Penalty for 9 /11  Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2003, a t  
Al. 
53. Id. 
54. Philip Shenon, U.S. to Appeal Ruling on 9 /11  Terror Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 8, 2003, a t  A28. The government apparently considered but rejected moving 
Moussaoui's case to a military tribunal a t  this time. Id. 
55. Id. The Justice Department, however, is concerned that  allies may be even 
more reluctant to extradite a1 Qaeda suspects if Moussaoui's case is transferred to a 
military tribunal. See Philip Shenon, A Nation at War, Terrorism Suspect: Man 
Charged in Sept. 11 Attacks Demands that A1 Qaeda Leaders Testify, supra note 43. See 
also Desmond Butler, German Judge Orders a Retrial for a 9 /11  Figure, N.Y. TIMES 
ABSTRACTS, Mar. 5, 2004, 2004 WL72408997, a t  *1 (German appellate court ordering 
new trial for Mounir el-Motassadeq, "the only person successfully prosecuted for 
involvement in Sept. 11 terrorist attacks," because, inter alia, the United States 
refused to permit Bin al-Shibh to testify). 
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11. UNDER FEDERAL LAW, I S  MOUSSAOUI CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR 
CONS PI RING^^ TO COMMIT THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS? 
To conspire with another, an  actor must agree that "they or one 
or more of them" will commit a criminal offense or that the actor 
"agrees to aid such other persons in the planning or commission of 
such crime."57 Generally, to be a conspirator, the actor must have the 
specific intent to commit the criminal offense.58 Thus, the actor's 
mere knowledge that  members of a conspiracy may commit a n  offense 
is not enough; the actor must have a stake in the outcome and have 
the purpose that  the offense be committed in order to be a member of 
the c o n ~ p i r a c y . ~ ~  On the other hand, once an  actor becomes a member 
56. I am indebted to the following case book authors for their insights and case 
selections concerning conspiracy law and doctrine: George E. Dix & M. Michael Sharlot 
[CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2002)l; Professors Sanford H. Kadish & 
Stephen J .  Schulhofer [CRIMINAL AW AND ITS PROCESSES, CASES AND MATERIALS (7th 
ed. 2001)]; Wayne R. LaFave N O D E R N  CRIMINAL AW CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 
2001)l. 
57. MODEL PENAL CODE jj 5.03(1) (1962). 
58. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 434-35 (3d ed. 2001). In 
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
defined the offense of conspiracy a s  follows: 
(1) that the defendant agreed with at  least one other person to commit an 
offense; (2) the defendant knowingly participated in the conspiracy with the 
specific intent to commit the offenses that were the objects of the conspiracy; 
and (3) that during the existence of the conspiracy, at  least one of the overt acts 
set forth in the indictment was committed by one or more of the members of the 
conspiracy in furtherance of the objectives of the conspiracy. 
United States v. Salemeh, 152 F.3d 88, 144 (2d Cir. 1998). 
59. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997) ("A conspirator must 
intend to further an endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy all of the elements of a 
substantive criminal offense, but it suffices that he adopt the goal of furthering or 
facilitating the criminal endeavor."); see also Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 181 (1994) (citing United States v. Peoni, 
100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938), and Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 
(1949)), superseded inpart,  15 U.S.C. jj 7%. Judge Posner noted that: 
To infer membership from knowledge would erase the distinction between 
conspiring on the one hand, which means joining an agreement, and aiding and 
abetting on the other, which means materially assisting a known-to-be-illegal 
activity in the hope that i t  will flourish to the benefit, pecuniary or otherwise, 
of the aider. 
In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 288 F.3d 1028, 1035 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Irwin, 149 F.3d 565, 
569-70 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that Learned Hand's formulation for aider and abettor 
liability has been generally accepted) (citing Nye & Nissen, 336 U.S. 613 (quoting 
Peoni); United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1227 (7th Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1235 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Falcone, 109 
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of the conspiracy, offenses that are reasonably foreseeable and 
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy can be imputed to the 
actor even if he or she did not necessarily intend to commit or even 
know about the offense in question.60 
Justice Frankfurter summarized the classic rationales for the 
crime of conspiracy: 
[Clollective criminal agreement-partnership in crime-presents a 
greater potential threat to the public than individual delicts. Concerted 
action both increases the likelihood that the criminal object will be 
successfully attained and decreases the probability that the individuals 
involved will depart from their path of criminality. Group association 
for criminal purposes often, if not normally, makes possible the 
attainment of ends more complex than those which one criminal could 
accomplish.61 
I t  would have been impossible for a single individual to bring 
down the Twin Towers. In combating a criminal organization, be it 
the Mafia or a1 Qaeda, traditional conspiracy law and RICO 
conspiracy law62 are major weapons in the prosecutor's arsenal. 
Given the "greater potential threat" to society posed by a 
F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1940) (Hand, J.); Peoni, 100 F.2d a t  402 (Hand, J.); People v. 
Lauria, 251 Cal. App. 2d 471, 475 (1967); MODEL PENAL CODE 5 5.03(1) (1995). For a 
lucid discussion of Falcone and the seminal Supreme Court case pointing in the 
opposite direction, see Direct Sales Co. u United States, 319 U.S. 703, 709 (1943) and 
United States v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283, 285-89 (7th Cir. 1992). 
60. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946). The Pinkerton 
doctrine is controversial, however. Although the federal courts have embraced it, the 
Model Penal Code and several states have rejected it. See ALA. CODE 3 13A-2-23 & 
Commentary (1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 515-2 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE 5 12.1-03- 
Ol(c) (1999); State v. Stein, 27 P.3d 184, 187-89 (Wis. 2001); Woods v. Cohen, 844 P.2d 
1147, 1148 (Ariz. 1992); State v. Small, 272 S.E.2d 128, 135 (N.C. 1980); 
Commonwealth v. Stasiun, 206 N.E.2d 672, 680 (Mass. 1965); MODEL PENAL CODE, 
5 2.06 cmt. 6(a) (1985); Peter Buscemi, Note, Conspiracy: Statutory Reform Since the 
Model Penal Code, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1122, 1151 (1975); infra notes 86-89 and 
accompanying text. 
61. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.) 
Cjustifying the double criminality aspect of conspiracy that permits punishing a 
defendant both for the completed target offense and for the conspiracy to commit the 
target offense). But see Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law, 1 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J .  1, "3 n.12 (1992) (citing Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the 
United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 414 (1959) (stating that none of Frankfurter's 
rationales have been empirically demonstrated)). The Model Penal Code and some 
states have rejected this double criminality aspect of conspiracy law. See MODEL PENAL 
CODE 5 1.07(1)@) (1962). But see Neal Kumar Kaytal, Why it Makes Sense to Have 
Harsh Punishments for Conspiracy, LEGAL AFF., Apr. 2003, a t  44 (advocating Pinkerton 
as necessary weapon against dangers of group activity and as means to compel 
cooperation of minor actors). Although most often used against defendants who have 
completed the target offense, the crime of conspiracy is also employed to stop criminal 
activity a t  the early planning stages long before criminal liability for attempt or for the 
target offense attaches. Marcus, supra. 
62. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. 
$ 5  1962-68 (1970). 
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sophisticated terrorist group like a1 Qaeda, federal prosecutors (and 
military tribunals) will almost certainly and routinely resort to 
conspiracy law when prosecuting such 0ffende1-s.~~ 
Conspiracy doctrine is vague and can be adapted to the needs of 
the p r o ~ e c u t o r . ~ ~  The conspiracy can be defined broadly or narrowly. 
For example, the conspiracy could be defined narrowly as the 
nineteen hijackers and others bereinafter the "in-group 
conspirators"], who worked with them and who specifically intended65 
to hijack the four civilian airliners and to crash them into the Twin 
Towers, the Pentagon, and possibly Capitol Or the conspiracy 
could be defined broadly to include those who joined a1 Qaeda and 
who follow Osama bin Laden's f ~ t w a h , ~ '  authorizing the killing of 
63. Conspiracy is certainly a n  appropriate tool when dealing with an 
organization like a1 Qaeda. See Marcus, supra note 61, at  42. 
64. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). The conspiratorial agreement need not be formally proven. Iannelli v. 
United States, 420 U.S. 770, 778 n.10 (1975) (Powell, J.) ("The agreement need not be 
shown to have been explicit. It  can instead be inferred from the facts and 
circumstances of the case."). 
65. If the cell system deliberately kept conspirators in the dark about the 
details of the conspiracy, the "willful blindness" doctrine might be invoked to satisfy at  
least a 'lmowingly" mens rea. See infra notes 138-49 and accompanying text. 
66. Apparently, the White House was rejected as a target for "navigational 
reasons"; the capitol building was much larger and easier to target. FOUDA & FIELDING, 
supra note 43, a t  127-28. 
67. The fatwah issued by Osama bin Laden and the leaders of Jihad groups in 
Egypt, Pakistan, and Bangladesh states a s  follows: 
[T]o kill Americans and their allies, both civil and military, is an individual 
duty of every Muslim who is able, in any country where this is possible, until 
the Aqsa mosque [in Jerusalem] and the Haram mosque [in Mecca] are freed 
from their grip, and until their armies, shattered and broken-winged, depart 
from all the lands of Islam, incapable of threatening any Muslim. 
BERNARD LEWIS, THE CRISIS OF ISLAM xxiv-xxvii (2003) (quoting the 1998 fatwah issued 
by Osama bin Laden and other fundamentalist leaders) (emphasis added); see also Abbas 
Amanat, Empowered through Violence: The Re-inventing of Islamic Extremism, in THE 
AGE OF TERROR 43 (Strobe Talbott & Nayan Chanda eds., 2001) (noting that in 1996 
when Osama bin Laden arrived in Afghanistan he issued a fatwah, calling "upon all 
Muslims to kill Americans as a religious duty"). For a good summary on Osama bin 
Laden and al Qaeda, see Pierre Conesa, Background to Washington's War on Terror: A1 
Qaida, The Sect, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Jan. 2002, available at 
http://mondedip1o.com/2002/01/07sect?vars+zacarias+moussaoui (last visited Feb. 4, 
2004). See also Al-Qa'ida (the Base), available at  http://www.ict.org.il/inter-terl 
orgdet.cfm?orgid=74 (last visited Feb. 4, 2004). A "fatwah" is defined as  "a generic term 
for any legal decision made by a Mufti [an Islamic judge] or other Islamic religious 
authority, but, because of the particular context in which the West became familiar with 
the word, it is sometimes erroneously thought to mean 'death sentence."' Nadine 
Gordimer, A Letter, with Love, to Salman Rushdie, THE TORONTO STAR, Feb. 14, 1992, at 
A23, available at  1992 WL 6525312 (quoting THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NEW WORDS); 
see also FOUDA & FIELDING, supra note 43, a t  9 (defining fatwah as "religious decree"). 
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Americans, civilians and military alike.68 Even if this class of 
conspirators hereinafter the "out-group conspirators"] knew nothing 
of the September 11 attacks beforehand, such attacks were arguably 
reasonably foreseeable and committed in furtherance of this 
conspiracy to kill Americans. Thus under the Pinkerton doctrine,69 
this broader class might likewise be criminally responsible for 
conspiring to carry out the attacks. 
Moussaoui has admitted to being a member of a1 Qaeda. He also 
engaged in a series of activities that parallel those of the nineteen 
hijackers. Some reports indicate that al-Shibh, who provided 
logistical support and money to the hijackers, has asserted to 
government interrogators that  Moussaoui was going to be used only 
as a backup.70 If Moussaoui knew he was serving as a backup, a 
stand-in if something happened to one of the other hijackers, then 
Moussaoui could be criminally liable not only as  a conspirator but as  
an  accomplice in that he would have agreed to commit the target 
offenses and, assuming he agreed to be available if needed, he would 
have encouraged and thus aided and abetted the nineteen hijackers 
and others involved in the c ~ n s p i r a c y . ~ ~  If none of the nineteen 
hijackers were aware of Moussaoui's alleged willingness to serve as a 
backup, then a t  common law, Moussaoui may not be deemed to be an  
aider and abettor.72 Under this factual scenario, he would still, 
however, be part of the in-group conspiracy. 
Moussaoui claims, however, that  he had nothing to do with the 
September 11 attacks. Moussaoui's standby attorneys filed a motion, 
asserting that al-Shibh would characterize Moussaoui as  "'a 
problematic and unstable hanger-on who could never be trusted to be 
68. The Justice Department apparently is adopting a broader theory o f  
conspiracy, for the prosecutor argued before the Fourth Circuit as follows: 'There is  no 
suggestion i n  the indictment that everything was directed at September 11 . . . and 
once September 11 passed, the conspiracy dissolved and everybody went home and 
they satisfied their obligations. This  was an ongoing conspiracy . . . for years that 
involved killing Americans." See Transcript o f  Oral Argument at  23, United States v .  
Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509 (4th Cir. June 3, 2003) (Nos. 03-4262, 03-4261); Government: 
A1 Qaeda Witness 'Buries'9/11 Defendant Moussaoui, supra note 46. 
69. Pinkerton v .  United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946); see supra notes 50-68 
and infra notes 70-90 and accompanying text.  
70. Jeffrey Markon, Moussaoui Defense Claims He Was Supposed to Help in  
Later Action by a1 Qaeda, ASIAN WALL ST. J., May 15, 2003, at A8. 
71. I f  Moussaoui were deliberately kept i n  the dark about his possible role, the 
doctrine of willful blindness might be employed to  establish that he acted "knowingly." 
See infra notes 138-49 and accompanying text.  
72. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 516 (2003) ("An 
undisclosed intention to  render aid i f  needed will not suffice, for i t  cannot encourage 
the principal i n  his commission o f  the crime."). But see MODEL PENAL CODE 
$ 2.06(3)(a)(ii) (1962) (including "attempts to  aid" as sufficient to satisfy actus reus for 
complicity). 
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a participant in any significant undertaking by a1 Qaeda."'73 Based on 
this motion, the district court concluded that Moussaoui "has made a 
significant showing that [text omitted by the court] . . . would be able 
to provide material, favorable testimony on the defendant's behalf."74 
If Moussaoui was not a part of the September 11 in-group 
conspiracy, he could, however, be found guilty of conspiring as part of 
the larger out-group conspiracy. He has admitted to being a member of 
a1 Qaeda and now claims that he was training for a different mission.75 
He also admitted being loyal to Osama bin Laden.76 He thus 
presumably shares Osama bin Laden's objective that U.S. civilians as 
well as  military personnel be killed.77 Even if he did not know of the 
September 11 attacks beforehand, he could arguably be found guilty 
under a Pinkerton rationale, namely, that those attacks were 
reasonably foreseeable and carried out in furtherance of the a1 Qaeda 
conspiracy to kill A m e r i c a n ~ . ~ ~  
Imposing criminal liability for the September 11 attacks under 
this latter theory is troubling, however. Traditionally under Anglo- 
Saxon jurisprudence an individual is criminally responsible only for 
crimes the individual has personally committed, has aided and 
abetted, or has conspired to commit.79 A1 Qaeda is estimated to have 
had from 4,000 to 10,000 members as  of September 11, 2001.80 
Taking Pinkerton to its logical conclusion supports imposing liability 
on any then active members of a1 Qaeda for the crimes of September 
11 even if these members never agreed to, participated in, or knew of 
73. Terrorist Attack Aftermath: U.S. Appeal in Moussaoui Case Dismissed, 
FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, June 26, 2003, at 521B3, available in  LEXIS, 
News Group File. 
74. United States v .  Moussaoui, No. CR. 01-455-A, 2003 WL 21263699, at *4 
(E.D. Va .  Mar. 10, 2003). The redacted text presumably refers to  Ramzi bin al-Shibh. 
75. Markon, supra note 70, at A8. 
76. See supra note 43. 
77. See LEWIS, supra note 67 and accompanying text (setting forth the fatwah 
issued by Osama bin Laden). 
78. Presumably, even as only a member of  the out-group conspiracy, Moussaoui 
would be aware of  the other previous, alleged a1 Qaeda attacks. See infra notes 145-46 
and accompanying text. 
79. "But i t  is repugnant to our system of  jurisprudence, where guilt is generally 
personal to the defendant . . . to impose punishment, not for the socially harmful 
agreement to  which the defendant is a party, but for substantive offenses i n  which he 
did not participate." KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 56, at 693 (quoting People v. 
McGee, 399 N.E.2d 177, 181-82 (N.Y. 1979)) (emphasis added). 
80. See Political Islam and the United States, a Winding Road to War, Oct. 3, 
2002, available at http://www.Northadams.com/advocate/story7825.html (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2004). The FBI estimates that 15,000 people received training at a1 Qaeda's 
camps i n  Afghanistan, but not all of them joined a1 Qaeda. See Noam Scheiber, The 
Way We Live Now: 2-16-03: Number in  the News, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 16, 2003, at 
12. But see BURKE, supra note 20, at 13 (stating that as o f  September 11, a1 Qaeda had 
about 100 "hard core" members used to train and organize those who came to Afghan 
camps and who inspired others from other allied fundamentalist Islamic groups). 
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the attacks and did nothing, other than join a1 Qaeda, to further 
them. Although some lower federal courts have suggested that  the 
Pinkerton rule should not be imposed on minor actors in a 
c o n ~ p i r a c y , ~ ~  the U.S. Supreme Court has never so held. 
Furthermore, those courts have not come up with any clear 
distinction between minor and major actors. 
Some have defended Pinkerton on the ground that i t  increases 
the risk of joining any c o n s p i r a ~ y . ~ ~  Furthermore, Pinkerton, a t  least 
theoretically, encourages conspirators to keep an eye on each other: 
"Pinkerton forces conspirators to monitor each other, which in turn 
begets suspicion and thus even more m o n i t ~ r i n g . " ~ ~ a s t l y ,  Pinkerton 
has been defended as  a n  important weapon against complex criminal 
organizations: 
[Tlhe ever-increasing sophistication of organized crime presents a 
compelling reason against abandonment of Pinkerton . . . . Empirical 
evidence has repeatedly demonstrated that those who form and control 
81. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 851 n.27 ( l l t h  Cir. 1985). 
Although our decision today extends the Pinkerton doctrine to cases involving 
reasonably foreseeable but originally unintended substantive crimes, . . . [olur 
holding is limited to conspirators who played more than a 'minor' role in the 
conspiracy, or who had actual knowledge of at  least some of the circumstances 
and events culminating in the reasonably foreseeable but originally unintended 
substantive crime. 
Id. (emphasis added). The Aluarez court also identified two kinds of Pinkerton cases: 
first where the substantive crime is also 
one of the primary goals of the alleged conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. 
Luis-Gonzalez, 719 F.2d 1539, 1545 n.4 ( l l t h  Cir. 1983) (involving conspiracy 
to possess with intent to distribute marijuana; substantive crime of possession 
of marijuana); United States v. Harris, 713 F.2d 623, 626 ( l l th  Cir. 1983) 
(involving conspiracy to distribute cocaine; substantive crimes of possession 
and distribution of cocaine); United States v. Tilton, 610 F.2d 302, 309 (5th Cir. 
1980) (involving conspiracy to commit mail fraud; substantive crime of mail 
fraud). 
Aluarez, 755 F.2d a t  850 n.24. The second kind of Pinkerton case is where the 
substantive crime is 
not a primary goal of the alleged conspiracy, but directly facilitates the 
achievement of one of the primary goals. See, e.g., Shockley v. United States, 
166 F.2d 704, 715 (9th Cir. 194) (involving conspiracy to escape by violent 
means from federal penitentiary; substantive crime of first degree murder of 
prison guard), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 850 (1948); United States v. Brant, 448 F. 
Supp. 781, 782 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (involving narcotics conspiracy; substantive 
crime of possession of firearm during commission of felony). 
Aluarez, 755 F.2d a t  850 n.24. The Aluarez court asserted that Pinkerton liability is 
appropriate in either category "because the substantive crime is squarely within the 
intended scope of the conspiracy." Id. Here, the September 11 attacks are presumably 
"one of the primary goals" of a1 Qaeda and thus within "the scope of the conspiracy." 
82. See, e.g., Kaytal, supra note 61, a t  44. 
83. Id. 
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illegal enterprises are generally well insulated from prosecutions, with 
the exception of prosecutions predicated upon the theory of conspiracy. 
To preclude uniformly their exposure to additional sanctions, 
regardless of the circumstances, for the very crimes which sustain their 
illegal ventures, would have the most unfortunate and inequitable 
 consequence^.^^ 
The "ever increasing sophistication" of terrorists threatens public 
safety far more than organized crime. Consequently, given the 
dangers that  a large organization such as a1 Qaeda presents to 
civilians and civilian objects in our open society, there is arguably all 
the more reason to retain, if not expand, the Pinkerton doctrine. 
As one prominent defense attorney stated, however: 
[ q h e  Pinkerton doctrine permits the government to hold a defendant 
criminally responsible for all reasonably foreseeable acts of co- 
conspirators regardless of actual knowledge, intent or participation. 
Thus, if the government cannot prove a defendant's guilt [ofl various 
substantive charges, it need only convince the jury of the defendant's 
guilt of conspiracy to secure convictions on the otherwise unsupportable 
substantive charges.85 
The drafters of the Model Penal Code rejected Pinkerton, explaining 
that  "there appears to be no better way to confine within reasonable 
limits the scope of liability to which conspiracy may theoretically give 
rise."86 Pinkerton has been applied broadly, but its application to 
conspiracies as  large as a1 Qaeda appears unprecedented. As one 
noted commentator put it, "Such [Pinkerton] liability might be 
justified for those a t  the top directing and controlling the entire 
operation, but i t  is clearly inappropriate to visit the same results 
upon the lesser participants in the c~nspiracy."~' 
The crimes of September 11 are the worst ever committed on 
U.S. soil. The principle of retribution and just desert cries out for 
severe punishment for those responsible. On the other hand, a1 Qaeda 
is apparently a loose network of extremist Islamic  organization^.^^ To 
make every individual associated with that network criminally 
responsible for the heinous crimes of September 11 would go too far, 
straining the very principle set forth above.89 Even without 
84. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 56, a t  692 (quoting Peter Buscemi, 
Note, Conspiracy: Statutory Reform Since the Model Penal Code, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 
1122, 1152-53 (1975) (quoting Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kenney)). 
85. See Paul Marcus, supra note 61, at  7 (quoting Jeffrey Weiner, President of 
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers). 
86. MODEL PENAL CODE 5 2.06 cmt. 6(a) (1962). 
87. LAFAVE, supra note 72, at  527. 
88. See infra notes 204-07 and accompanying text. 
89. But see United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998). That case 
arose out of the trial of the 1993 World Trade Center bombings. Two of the defendants 
there argued that there was insufficient evidence to show that they had agreed to 
commit the bombing. They also asserted that Pinkerton was being used without 
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considering Pinkerton liability, such individuals would, however, be 
subject to significant terms of i m p r i s ~ n m e n t . ~ ~  
111. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON 
ACCOMPLICES AND CONSPIRATORS 
If Moussaoui were found guilty of conspiring to hijack airplanes 
and to crash them into the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, would 
sentencing him to death violate the C o n s t i t ~ t i o n ? ~ ~  The U.S. 
sufficient evidence that  they were members of  the underlying conspiracy. T h e  Second 
Circuit rejected these arguments, noting first that the evidence supported that  two 
defendants conspired to  bomb buildings and vehicles i n  the United States. The  
government did not have to  show that the defendants agreed to bomb the  World Trade 
Center: ' T h e  government is not required to  demonstrate that the defendant agreed to 
all of the conspiracy's objectives, as long as the defendant shared 'some knowledge of 
the [conspiracy's] unlawful aims and objectives."' Id. at 147 (citations omitted). As 
members of t he  general conspiracy to  bomb buildings and vehicles i n  t he  United States, 
there was sufficient evidence for the jury to  find them guilty of  the bombing under a 
Pinkerton rationale. Id. at 147-48. The government i n  the Moussaoui case could make 
the identical argument. Even i f  Moussaoui knew nothing about the September 11 
attacks or did nothing to further them, his conduct here that so parallels tha t  o f  the 
September 11 hijackers could be considered part of a general conspiracy t o  bomb 
buildings using airliners as missiles. A jury could then find h im  guilty o f  conspiring to  
carry out the attacks under a Pinkerton rationale. 
90. Cf. Position o f  the  Government W i t h  Respect to  Sentencing Factors and 
Government's Sentencing Memorandum, United States v .  Lindh, No. 02-37A, 227 F.  
Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. Va .  Sept. 27, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/ 
hdocs/docs/lindh/uslindh92602psentmem.pdf (last visited June 30, 2003) (defendant 
pleaded guilty t o  aiding terrorist organization and other crimes and received 20-year 
sentence). 
91. A preliminary issue that  the parties have already litigated before trial is 
whether defendant Moussaoui, assuming he is found guilty o f  one or more capital 
offenses, is death eligible under the  Federal Death Penalty Act o f  1994. As a threshold 
matter, the Act requires that  the  government prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that  
defendant: 
(A)  intentionally killed the  victim; 
(B) intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury that resulted i n  the  death of 
the victim; 
(C) intentionally participated i n  an  &, contemplating that the life of a person 
would be taken or intending that lethal force would be used i n  connection 
with a person, other than one of the participants i n  the offense, and the 
victim died as  a direct result of the act; or 
(D) intentionally and specifically engaged i n  an'act o f  violence, knowing that 
the act created a grave risk of death to a person, other than one o f  the 
participants i n  the offense, such that participation i n  the act constituted a 
reckless disregard for human life and the victim died as a direct result of  
the act[.] 
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Supreme Court has recognized that the Eighth Amendment is not 
locked into the mores of the eighteenth century when the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights were written. The Court considers 
the "evolving standards of decency of a maturing society" to 
determine the Eighth Amendment's reach.92 Eschewing a subjective 
approach, the Court has adopted a majoritarian one to identify the 
current "evolving standards." Examining so-called "objective factors 
to the maximum possible extent," the Court first reviews the 
enactments of Congress and the state legislatures and then 
prosecutorial decisions and jury verdicts.93 The Court also considers 
the extent to which the punishment comports with the principles of 
deterrence and retributive justice.94 
18 U.S.C.A. $ 3591(a)(2) (1994) (emphasis added). Aside from these threshold 
requirements, the government must satisfy the jury that at  least one aggravating 
factor exists and outweighs any mitigating factors. See id.; 18 U.S.C.A. $ 3592 (1994). 
Since defendant Moussaoui was in custody on September 11, he neither 
"intentionally killed nor "intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury." Thus neither 
(A) nor (B) apply. The government contends, however, that defendant Moussaoui is 
death eligible under provisions (C) and (D). This argument depends on reading "act" as  
including "conspiracy." The government argues that the agreement is the actus reus of 
conspiracy and thus the offense of conspiracy should be considered tantamount to a n  
"act" for purposes of the statute. The defense argues that act is not synonymous with 
offense and that an agreement to commit a crime alone fails to satisfy the act 
requirement. At least one Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that Congress 
drafted these two subsections to codify the Supreme Court's holdings in Enmund v. 
Florida and Tison u. Arizona, the major, relevant Eighth Amendment cases analyzed in 
detail below. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 792 (1982); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 
(1987). 
[Slection 3591(a) does not set forth a list of aggravating factors, but, on the 
contrary, serves a gatekeeping function. Section 3591(a) codifies the command 
in Enmund, 458 U.S. a t  797, and Tison, 481 U.S. at  157, to limit the imposition 
of the death penalty to those murderers who both undertake felony 
participation and demonstrate at  least reckless indifference to human life. 
United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 355 (5th Cir. 1998). A full discussion of the 
statutory issue is beyond the scope of this Article. Discussion is focused on the closely 
related question as to whether a death sentence under this statute passes 
constitutional muster. 
92. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910); see also Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-02 (1958). 
93. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002). In Atkins, the Court 
recognized the primacy of objective evidence, such as legislative enactments and jury 
verdicts, in determining "evolving standards of decency." Id. The Atkins court, however, 
noted that ultimately the responsibility for interpreting the Eighth Amendment was 
the Court's and i t  could bring to bear its subjective judgment. Id. a t  313. The Court 
applies a somewhat different proportionality review to non-capital cases. See, e.g., 
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (upholding against constitutional attack life 
sentence under three strikes statute for defendant whose last strike was shoplifting 
three golf clubs). 
94. Atkins, 536 U.S. a t  318-19 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183(1976) 
and Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)). 
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Since constitutionally reviving the death penalty in Gregg v. 
Georgiag5 in 1976, the Supreme Court has narrowed the instances in 
which an accomplice or co-conspirator to a capital crime may be put to 
death. Ruling in two felony murder cases,96 the Court has required 
that the Government show at least that the secondary actor was a 
"major particip[antIH in the underlying felony and that he or she 
intended to kill or exhibited a reckless indifference to human life.97 In 
the first case, Enmund v. Florida,98 the defendant was a getaway 
driver, but there was some evidence that he planned the robbery. He 
and his two co-defendants stopped at  a farmhouse so they could rob 
the occupants, an elderly couple. Upon hearing her eighty-six-year- 
old husband shout out, his seventy-four-year-old wife got their 
shotgun and shot one of the co-defendants in the arm. They, in turn, 
shot and killed both the husband and the wife. Enmund was a few 
hundred feet away, waiting by the car, but was charged with felony 
murder, convicted, and sentenced to death. 
Reversing the death sentence, the Supreme Court held that the 
actor must have intended to kill and have played a major role in the 
killing.99 In Enmund, the Court noted that only eight jurisdictions 
permitted death sentences for accomplices to felony murder, and all 
but three required such a defendant to be shown to have a culpable 
mental state.loO The Court then held that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibited executing an actor "who aids and abets a felony in the 
course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not 
himself kill, attempt to kill or intend that a killing take place or that 
lethal force will be employed."lo1 
95. Gregg, 428 U.S. a t  176. In Gregg, the Court concluded that the guided jury 
discretion death penalty statute there passed constitutional muster, thus approving 
the reinstatement of the death penalty after, in effect, declaring all death penalty 
statutes unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Gregg, 428 U.S. 
a t  169. 
96. Enmund, 458 U.S. 802 (5 to 4); Tison, 481 U.S. a t  157 (5 to 4). 
97. Tison, 481 U.S. at  157. The composition of the Court has changed since 
Tison, apparently moving in a more pro-death penalty direction. In Tison, Justice 
O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Scalia, White and Powell joined. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion, 
which was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. Justice Stevens joined parts I to 
IV-A of Justice Brennan's dissent. Since Tison, Justices Ginsburg, Souter, Thomas, 
Breyer, and Kennedy have replaced retiring Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, 
White, and Powell. The first three of these retiring justices expressly found the death 
penalty to be unconstitutional in all cases. None of their replacements and no current 
member of the Supreme Court have reached that conclusion. 
98. See Enmund, 458 U.S. a t  782. 
99. Id. a t  797. 
100. Id. a t  789-91. 
101. Id. a t  797, 798. One commentator has noted that the decision could be 
interpreted to have set forth a still vaguer standard. See David McCord, State Death 
Sentencing for Felony Murder Accomplices Under the Enmund and Tison Standards, 32 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 843, 850-51 (2000) (criticizing Court for also stating that culpable mental 
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Writing for the four dissenters, Justice 0'Connorlo2 argued that 
the Court had miscounted the number of states that authorize 
imposing capital punishment on accomplices to felony murderers.lo3 
She also read the Florida Supreme Court decision, upholding the 
death penalty, as  leaving undisturbed the trial court's finding that 
defendant did not play a minor role.lo4 She argued that contemporary 
standards reflected in jury determinations and legislative enactments 
did not preclude the imposition of the death penalty for accomplice 
felony murder or that such a sentence would be disprop~rt ionate. '~~ 
Five years later in Tison v. Arizona,lo6 the Court upheld the 
death penalty imposed on two sons whose father (and his cellmate) 
actually carried out the killings.lo7 In that case, their .father was 
serving a life sentence for murdering a prison guard in a previous 
escape attempt. Bringing to the prison an arsenal of guns hidden in 
an ice chest, the Tison sons helped their father escape once again 
(along with his cellmate, another convicted murderer). After the car 
in which they were fleeing broke down, one of the sons flagged down 
the car of a family. While both sons were some distance away, the 
father and his cellmate killed all four members of the family, 
including a two-year old. The sons' father later perished in the desert. 
The Tison sons were charged with felony murder, convicted, and 
sentenced to death.los 
The two sons argued that under Enmund the state had to show 
that they intended to kill the family members. The Arizona Supreme 
Court claimed that the Tison sons had intended to do so, but its 
language indicated that  that court had concluded that the sons only 
foresaw that the death of innocents was probable.log Now writing for 
the five-member majority, Justice O'Connor limited Enmund, 
reasoning that the sons' reckless indifference in helping their father, 
state of actor includes his "anticipat[ing] that lethal force would be used"). This phrase 
could be construed to mean a culpable mental state of "recklessly" rather than 
"intentionally." Id. 
102. Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist joined Justice 
O'Connor's dissent. 
103. Justice O'Connor wrote that "23 States permit a sentencer to impose the 
death penalty even though the felony murderer has neither killed nor intended to kill 
his victim." Enmund, 458 U.S. a t  822 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice White wrote 
the majority opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens. 
104. Id. a t  809 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
105. Id. a t  826-27. Given the conflicting findings of the trial court and the 
Florida Supreme Court, and the revised standards established by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, she would have, however, remanded for a new sentencing hearing to determine 
whether all the facts in that case warranted the death penalty. Id. at  827. 
106. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 137 (1987). 
107. Id. a t  158. 
108. The cellmate was also sentenced to death. Id. 
109. Id. a t  142-43. 
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whom they knew to be capable of murder, satisfied the Eighth 
Amendment.llo The two Tison sons, who were "major" participants in 
the underlying felony,lll stood in contrast to Enmund whose "own 
participation in the felony murder was so attenuated and since there 
was no proof that Enmund had any culpable mental state, the death 
penalty was excessive retribution for his crimes."l12 Affirming the 
Tisons' death sentences, the Court then held that "major participation 
in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to 
human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability 
requirement."l13 
Writing for the dissenters, Justice Brennan114 observed that the 
majority failed to follow Enmund.l15 As in Enmund, no evidence in 
Tison suggested that the Tison sons intended to cause the death of 
the victims. The dissent noted that the father's killing the family was 
"spontaneous" while the sons were some distance away fetching water 
for the family members.l16 The majority stressed that the sons did 
nothing to stop the killing, but there was evidence suggesting that 
the sons could not do anything a t  that  point.l17 The dissent also 
criticized the majority for offering examples of arguably unintentional 
killings such as "the who tortures . . . the robber who shoots 
someone" not caring in either case whether the victim lives or dies.l18 
The problem with these examples is tha t  they focus on the primary 
party, the actor who kills or tortures. There, the Tison sons did not 
kill anyone; their father did.llg Lastly, in counting the number of 
110. Id. a t  151-53. 
111. Id. 
112. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (citations omitted). 
113. Tison, 481 U.S. a t  158. In Tison, however, the majority also noted that 
reckless indifference may rise to the moral equivalence of intentional wrongdoing: 
[Slome nonintentional murderers may be among the most dangerous and 
inhumane of all-the person who tortures another not caring whether the 
victim lives or dies, or the robber who shoots someone in the course of the 
robbery, utterly indifferent to the fact that  the desire to rob may have the 
unintended consequence of killing the victim as  well as  taking the victim's 
property. This reckless indifference to the value of human life may be every bit 
as  shocking to the moral sense as  an "intent to kill." 
Id. a t  157. On the other hand, if the defendant orders another to kill, the defendant has 
the intent to kill and satisfies Enmund-Tison regardless of the degree of actual 
participation in the killing. See Stringer v. State, 454 So. 2d 468, 478-79 (Miss. 1984). 
114. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined Justice Brennan's 
dissenting opinion. Tison, 481 U.S. a t  159. 
115. Id. a t  162-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
116. Id. a t  165-66. 
117. Id. a t  166 n.6. 
118. Id. a t  169 (emphasis in original). 
119. Furthermore, the examples that the majority gives are arguably examples of 
intentional killings that have been committed without premeditation or deliberation, the 
mens rea required in many states for first-degree murder. Id. at  169 n.9. On the other 
hand, the actor who intentionally commits serious bodily harm may do so without an 
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states that would permit executing felony murder accomplices who 
lack an intent to kill, the majority failed to take into account those 
states that have abolished the death penalty. When one does so, the 
dissent noted, approximately three-fifths of U.S. jurisdictions reject 
the majority's position.120 
The dissent appears to have the stronger argument. If the Tisons 
acted with reckless indifference, however, i t  is hard to argue that 
Enmund did not act with reckless indifference also. Granted, carrying 
out a prison escape and a kidnapping probably presents a greater risk 
of harm to innocent people than does an  armed robbery. However, 
Enmund knew his accomplices were armed with deadly weapons. 
Embarking on a robbery of an  individual in his rural dwelling is 
pregnant with the possibility, if not probability, of violence. 
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor concluded in Enmund, that defendant 
there was not a minor actor, presumably meaning he was a major 
actor in the underlying robbery, a t  least for capital sentencing 
 purpose^.'^' 
Enmund did, however, appear to play a lesser role in the robbery 
than the Tison sons did in the prison escape and in the kidnapping of 
the family. The Tison sons were present a t  the murder scene whereas 
Enmund, although close by, was not. The Tison sons heard their father 
considering what to do with the family. The sons could have attempted 
to dissuade him from killing and, later after the shots were fired, could 
have tried to render aid to the victims. (At least one of the victims 
apparently survived for some time after the shooting.)122 The sons 
responded by doing nothing, except fleeing with the killers. 
intent to kill. Such an actor has traditionally been considered a second-degree murderer 
and thereby exempt from the death penalty. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 56, 
at  396. Certain felony murderers even after Pennsylvania created degrees of murder in 
1794 have been considered subject to the death penalty. See id. (quoting seminal 
Pennsylvania murder statute of 1794, which became model murder statute for U.S. 
states, 
[A111 murder, which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in 
wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or 
which shall be committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate any 
arson, rape, robbery or burglary shall be deemed murder in the first degree 
[and thereby punishable by death] . . . .") (emphasis added). 
State v. Bohlen, 690 S.W.2d 174, 176 @to. Ct. App. 1985). 
120. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 175 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
121. See supra note 104. 
122. Tison, 481 U.S. at  141. 
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The question is what these rulings123 might foretell about the 
current Supreme Court's disposition to uphold a death penalty for 
Zacarias Moussaoui, should a jury find him guilty of conspiracy and 
sentence him to death.124 The factual allegations in the indictment 
show that Moussaoui engaged in many of the same activities that  the 
actual hijackers did, but which are not greatly incriminating in 
themselves. He arrived in this country with $35,000 in cash. He 
signed up for flying schools; he purchased flight videos on the 
operation of the Boeing 747; he took a commercial flying course in 
which he operated Boeing 747 flight simulators. He purchased a knife 
(as Atta apparently did). Three pieces of evidence more directly link 
Moussaoui to a1 Qaeda and the hijackers: (1) He admitted in open 
court to being a member of a1 Qaeda and being loyal to Osama bin 
Laden; (2) Moussaoui allegedly received terrorist training in 
Afghanistan; and (3) Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the alleged coordinator of 
the September 11 attacks, wired Moussaoui money.lZ5 
If the government is able to prove all the allegations in the 
second superseding indictment, a jury could conclude that  Moussaoui 
was a member of the "in-group" conspiracy. The parallel conduct that  
Moussaoui engaged in goes beyond the merely coincidental. That 
evidence plus his admissions and his allegedly receiving funds from 
123. See also Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 (1986) (noting that Enmund 
rule that "a person who has not in fact killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a 
killing take place or that lethal force be used" is "substantive limitation on sentencing" 
and may be applied not only by jury, but also by appellate court reviewing case). 
124. The Court could certainly refuse to grant certiorari. If the government 
ultimately transfers Moussaoui's prosecution to a military tribunal, the Court might 
not have jurisdiction to hear the case. Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 459-60, 
476-77 (4th Cir. 2003) (rejecting on separation of powers grounds habeas corpus 
petition of U.S. citizen, captured with Taliban in Afghanistan, but later brought to 
military base in Virginia where held as  "enemy combatant" without charges, without 
trial, and without access to counsel), cert. granted, No. 03-6696, 2004 WL 42546 (U.S. 
Jan. 9, 2004); A1 Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1141-42 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(rejecting habeas corpus claim of "next friends" of Taliban and a1 Qaeda Guantanamo 
Bay detainees principally on ground that they were beyond the territorial jurisdiction 
of the United States), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003). Moussaoui, however, was 
arrested in the United States and is being tried in the United States, so his case might 
be distinguishable from Odah and Hamdi should the Supreme Court affirm those 
cases. 
125. Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 17, 11 29, B1; Governments 
Response to Standby Counsel's Memorandum Regarding Rule 11 Considerations, Crim. 
No. 01-455-A (2002) a t  #13-14, available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docsl 
moussaoui~usmouss72502grsprll.pdf. Al-Shibh apparently roomed with Mohamed 
Atta and wired money to Marwan al-Shehhi, one of the hijackers of United Airlines 
Flight 175, which they crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center. 
Moussaoui also allegedly lied to FBI agents.when being questioned upon his arrest. See 
supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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Ramzi bin-al-Shibh probably meets the minimal sufficiency standard, 
if not more, to show he was a member of that conspiracy.126 
On the other hand, Moussaoui might not have been a member of 
the "in-group" conspiracy (but he was unquestionably a member of 
the "out-group" conspiracy). His admissions show he was a member of 
a1 Qaeda, but the allegations (even if proved to be true) in the second 
superseding indictment do not overwhelmingly demonstrate that he 
was a member of the in-group conspiracy. The indictment does not 
allege that  he was the twentieth hijacker. He might have been 
training for another operation.12' So far, despite his admissions, 
Moussaoui claims he had nothing to do with the September 11 
attacks: "I was not directly involved with these people," Moussaoui 
told the district court.12s He apparently does not want to die a 
martyr's death by poison injection.lZ9 
Since Gregg, the Supreme Court has yet to deal with the 
question of imposing the death penalty on an actor indicted for 
conspiracy only, not for carrying out the underlying offense or for 
being present a t  the time of the killings or for ordering the killings or 
for playing a major role in them.130 The two felony-murder 
126. If admitted and found credible al-Shibh's alleged statements that 
Moussaoui was to serve as a "back-up," would, as  indicated earlier, probably make him 
an accomplice and certainly a member of the in-group conspiracy. See supra notes 70- 
72 and accompanying text. The Government apparently is not going to use al-Shibh as 
a witness. 
127. See David Johnston & Philip Shenon, Evidence Against Suspect from 9/11 
Is Called Weak, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2002, at  A8 (some investigators speculating that 
he may have been training for different operation, such as using crop dusters to spray 
chemical or biological weapons). Moussaoui himself now claims that he was training for 
another operation outside the United States. See Markon, supra note 70. 
128. Shenon, supra note 14. 
129. Id. Even if Moussaoui were involved with the "in-group conspiracy" say as  a 
back-up, he might not have known about his designated role. Bin Laden claimed that 
al-Qaeda kept the September 11 conspirators in the dark about the operation until the 
last minute: "~oussaou i ' s  and Hani Hanjour's] isolation [from the 'operational axis'] 
may have been designed to insulate them in the event that the Hollywood and San 
Diego cells were destroyed and they were needed to replace the protagonists on short 
notice." GRIFFIN, supra note 19, at  253. 
130. The instructions define conspiracy as  follows: 
What the Government must prove is that the defendant, Terry Lynn Nichols, 
and a t  least one other person, did knowingly and deliberately arrive a t  some 
type of a n  agreement that they, and perhaps others, would use a weapon of 
mass destruction against the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma 
City and the persons in it by means of some common plan or course of action as  
alleged in Count One of the indictment. Proof of such a common understanding 
and deliberate agreement among two or more persons, including the defendant 
now on trial, is the key element of the charge of criminal conspiracy. 
Mere presence a t  the scene o f .  . . an alleged transaction or event, or mere 
similarity of conduct among various persons and the fact that they may have 
associated with each other and may have assembled together and discussed 
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accomplice cases that  the Court has ruled on do suggest, however, 
how the Court might rule in Moussaoui's case, should it  grant 
certiorari. 
A. The In-Group Conspirator Who Knew about the September 11 
Attacks and  Played a Major Role in the Conspiracy 
If the evidence shows that Moussaoui directly participated in the 
September 11 conspiracy, he would be death-eligible under current 
constitutional interpretation.131 Assume hypothetically that A, an  a1 
Qaeda member, had purchased the airplane tickets for one or more of 
the hijackers and had known about the plan to hijack and crash the 
airliners. A would thus have intended to commit, among other crimes, 
mass m ~ r d e r . l 3 ~  Assume that, like Moussaoui, A was not present a t  
the murder scene, an  important distinction between the Tisons and 
E n m ~ n d . l ~ ~  Yet, those cases dealt with imposing the death penalty on 
common aims or interests, do not necessarily establish proof of the existence of 
a conspiracy. Also, a person who has no knowledge of a conspiracy, but who 
happens-happens to act in a way which advances some object or purpose of 
the conspiracy does not thereby become a conspirator. 
But a person may join in an agreement or understanding, as  required for 
conviction, without knowing all the details of the agreement or understanding, 
- - 
and without knowing who all the members are. Further, it is not necessary that 
a person agree to play any particular part in carrying out the agreement or 
understanding. A person may become a member of a conspiracy even if that 
person agrees to play only a minor part in the conspiracy, as long as  that 
person has an understanding of the unlawful nature of the plan and voluntarily 
and intentionally participates in it as something he wants to bring about. 
Court TV Casefiles, The Oklahoma City Bombing Trial Transcripts, Terry Nichols, Dec. 
16, 1997, http://www.courttv.com/a1~hive/casefiles/oHahomd~chtranscriptdl2l6pm. 
html (last visited June 24,2003). 
131. He would thus have intended that innocents be killed and would have 
actively participated in causing such a result, thereby satisfying Enmund, not to mention 
Tison. But see Defendant's Reply to Government's Response in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Strike Government's Notice of Intent to Seek a Sentence of Death, United 
States v. Moussaoui, Crim. No. 01-455-A, at  *3 n.2, 282 F. Supp. 2d at  480 (E.D. Va. May 
10, 2003) (arguing that more would be required for death penalty under Enmund-Tison), 
available a t  http://news.findlaw.co~d~sId~s/moussaousmouss51502dthpopp.pdf. 
132. See Indictment, supra note 13, setting forth the crimes Moussaoui has been 
charged with. Presumably for federal jurisdictional reasons, he is not charged with 
conspiring to murder all the victims, only U.S. employees who were killed in the 
attacks. He is charged, however, with conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction. 
Id. The ticket hypothetical was suggested by the defense in papers submitted in reply 
to the government's motion in opposition to the defense motion to preclude the death 
penalty. See Defendant's Reply to Government's Response in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Strike Government's Notice of Intent to Seek a Sentence of Death, supra note 
131 a t  *7. 
133. Cf. Fairchild v. Norris, 21 F.3d 799, 803-04 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 
U.S. 1146 (1995) (concluding that petitioner who, with accomplice, kidnapped and 
raped victim was death eligible under Tison even though he was not present when his 
accomplice who petitioner knew to be armed killed victim, because petitioner's behavior 
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accomplices to felony murder, an  unintentional homicide. Here the 
indictment charges that defendant conspired with others to commit 
capital crimes that  presuppose that the conspirators intended to kill 
innocents. The defendant's mens rea would be considerably greater 
than the Tisons' (he would have acted intentionally whereas they 
acted extremely recklessly), probably making up for the lack of 
personal presence a t  the scene of the crime. Furthermore, the Tisons 
acted extremely recklessly towards a few individuals, mainly prison 
guards and four members of the family. A, in this hypothetical, 
intended to kill a t  least a hundred, if not hundreds of innocent people. 
Purchasing the tickets would probably be enough to make him a 
"major participant," especially given the magnitude of the intended 
loss of life, satisfying both Enmund and T i ~ 0 n . l ~ ~  
On the other hand, there appear to be a t  least three other 
possibilities. Moussaoui might not have directly participated in the 
conspiracy, but he might have known about the planned attacks.135 
Or he might have participated in the in-group conspiracy, but have 
been deliberately kept in the dark about the nature and object of that 
conspiracy. Or he might not have known about the planned attacks, 
but was here on another operation and thus presumably shared the 
general aim of a1 Qaeda that any Americans, including civilians, 
should be killed.136 Would imposing the death penalty under any of 
these circumstances be constitutional? 
constituted "reckless indifference" to human life). But see State v. Carlson, 48 P.3d 
1180, 1183 (Ariz. 2002) (reducing sentence from death to life imprisonment without 
parole, because, among other reasons, defendant, convicted as co-conspirator, was not 
present a t  murder and would not necessarily know that killer would carry out murder 
in cruel and heinous manner, one of aggravating circumstances for death penalty). 
134. For an excellent discussion of the meaning of "major participant," see 
McCord, supra note 101, a t  875-88. A relevant question here is whether being a backup 
would render Moussaoui a "major participant." If the other 19 were told or it was 
implicitly known that Moussaoui or others would serve as a backup, it might encourage 
the 19 to go forward. They would realize that the organization was completely behind 
them, and perhaps that  their personal honor would be questioned if, for some reason, 
they did not or would not complete their mission. If the backup were immediately 
available and this availability were also known to one or more of the 19, a backup 
might be seen as  playing more than a minor role. On the other hand, if the backup was 
not aware of his or her playing any such role and was just engaged in training 
activities in the United States, it would be hard to characterize the backup's role as  
major. If the 19 hijackers were unaware of the presence of a backup, then his existence 
would not have encouraged them. Under that scenario, the backup would probably not 
satisfy the test for accomplice liability, at  common law. See supra notes 61-63 and 
accompanying text. 
135. See Government's Brief, supra note 43, at  *11. 
136. See Amanat, supra note 67, at  43 (explaining that in 1996 when Osama bin 
Laden came to Afghanistan he issued a fatwah, "call[ing] upon all Muslims to kill 
Americans as a religious duty"); Bin Laden Reportedly Leaves Afghanistan, 
Whereabouts Unknown, Feb. 13, 1999, at http://www.cnn.com1WORLDlmeast/9902113/ 
afghan.binladen/index.html. One of the problems with the law of conspiracy is that i t  
Heinonline - -  37 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 380 2004 
DEATH PENAL N 
B. The Out-Group Conspirator Who Did Not Know about 
September 11 
Let us deal with the last hypothetical first. Restated, the 
question is whether being a member of the "out-group" conspiracy, 
perhaps numbering in the hundreds if not thousands, is enough to 
permit the death penalty to be imposed absent evidence that  the 
defendant aided or actively participated in the in-group conspiracy to 
carry out the September 11 attacks.13' This first requires a n  
examination of the mens rea and later actus reus. 
Although research has not revealed another case in which the 
Supreme Court relied on the ostrich or willful blindness doctrine138 to 
justify the death penalty, the Court might employ this doctrine to 
satisfy the culpability requirements for imposing the death penalty 
on accessories for murders carried out by others. Assume for a 
moment that Moussaoui was in a cell separate from the September 11 
hijackers. In organizations like a1 Qaeda, cells are often set up so that  
members of one cell do not know members of other cells, and 
sometimes members of one cell do not know all the members of the 
same Presumably, cell members are aware of the 
does not clearly distinguish between major and minor participants and that the 
minnows may be caught in the same net as the sharks and are often subject to severe 
punishment. See United States v. Alvarez, 625 F.2d 1196, 1197 (5th Cir. 1980) (en 
bane) (reversing panel decision and reinstating marijuana sale conspiracy conviction of 
menial who had merely nodded to undercover agent). See also Marcus, supra note 61, 
a t  32 ("Punishment for the completed conspiracy crime has always been stiff."). But see 
Kaytal, supra note 61, a t  44. 
137. See Appendix, Tables 1 and 2. 
138. Judge Richard Posner, of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, explained the confusing doctrine of willful blindness: 
[Notice] just what is i t  that real ostriches do (or a t  least are popularly supposed 
to do). They do not just fail to follow through on their suspicions of bad things. 
They are not merely careless birds. They bury their heads in the sand so that 
they will not see or hear bad things. They deliberately avoid acquiring 
unpleasant knowledge. The ostrich instruction is designed for cases in which 
there is evidence that the defendant, knowing or strongly suspecting that he is 
involved in shaky dealings, takes steps to make sure that he does not acquire 
full knowledge or exact knowledge of the nature and extent of those dealings. 
See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 56, a t  223-24 (quoting United States v. 
Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 128-29 (7th Cir. 1990)) (emphasis in original). 
139. Cf. Nasra Hassan, An Arsenal of Believers, Talking to the Human Bombs, 
THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 19, 2001, a t  36. In discussing Palestinian suicide bombers, 
Hassan writes a s  follows: 
Generally, each cell consists of a leader and two or three young men. . . . Each 
cell is tightly compartmentalized and secret. Cell members do not discuss their 
affiliation with their friends or family, and even if two of them know each other 
in normal life, they are not aware of the other's membership in the same cell. 
Only the leader is known to both. Each cell, which is dissolved after the 
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organizational policy to keep knowledge of other cell members to a 
minimum. The cell structure not only operates to protect the 
organization from penetration, but also arguably operates as  a regime 
of willful blindness. By agreeing to be an  active member of a1 Qaeda, 
the member agrees to blind himself or herself to the acts of other cell 
members. Willful blindness can substitute for knowledge.140 So active 
a1 Qaeda members are arguably willfully blind to the crimes 
committed by members from other cells and thus have the necessary 
mens rea (they acted "knowingly") to find the defendants not only 
guilty of the substantive offenses committed by other members of the 
conspiracy, but also death-eligible under Enmund-Tison.141 
The Model Penal Code adopts the majority common law position 
that knowing the object of the conspiracy is not necessarily enough to 
satisfy the mens rea requirement for conspiracy.142 The actor must 
act "purposely," intending for the object of the conspiracy to be 
ac~omp1ished. l~~ The willful blindness doctrine might not permit the 
government to show purpose. Nevertheless, there is authority for the 
proposition that  knowledge alone is sufficient when the object of the 
conspiracy is a serious felony, like murder.144 Furthermore, 
[suicide] operation has been completed, is given a name from the Koran or from 
Islamic history. 
Id.; see also FOUDA & FIELDING, supra note 43, a t  119 (quoting Ramzi bin al-Shibh, 
apparent coordinator of September 11 attacks) (describing how the attacks were 
organized: "[Ilt is in short, a process of lining the cells to one another. . . ."). 
140. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700-01 (9th Cir. 1976); MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 2.02(7). 
141. The government should argue the cell structure fits precisely within Judge 
Posner's definition, namely, that when a1 Qaeda members assent to the cell structure, 
they "deliberately avoid acquiring unpleasant knowledge," (i.e., "knowing or strongly 
suspecting that [they] are involved in shaky dealings, [they] take[ ] steps to make sure 
that [they] do not acquire[] full knowledge or exact knowledge of the nature and extent of 
those dealings," which, in this instance, are terrorist operations carried out by other 
cells). The defense could also argue that 'howledge" alone is not enough to satisfy the 
mens rea of conspiracy. The prosecution must show that the defendant's had the purpose, 
intended that the objects of the conspiracy be carried out. See infra notes 142-44 and 
accompanying text. 
142. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1); see United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 
(2d Cir. 1938) (Hand, J.); infra note 144 (collecting cases on mens rea for conspiracy). 
143. Peoni, 100 F.2d a t  402. 
144. See, e.g., United States v. Fountain, 277 F.3d 714, 793 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(finding ''knowinglf a sufficient culpable mental state for accomplice liability); People 
v. Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628, 634 (Cal. 1967) (suggesting in dicta that a supplier "who 
furnishe[d] equipment which he knows will be used to commit a serious crime may be 
deemed to be a co-conspirator) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Garcia- 
Torres, 280 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that "[a] drug conspirator need not know 
all of the details of the conspiracy, United States v. Nueva, 979 F.2d 880, 884 (1st 
Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 997 (1993), but it is hard to imagine how someone 
furnishing a peripheral service [supplying guns to a killer and kidnapper] to a drug 
conspiracy could be deemed to 'join' that conspiracy unless he knew both that the drug 
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membership in a1 Qaeda with its avowed purpose of killing 
Americans, including civilians, might be deemed sufficient to satisfy 
the "purposely" requirement. 
Members of the out-group conspiracy were presumably aware of 
other crimes carried out by a1 Qaeda, for example, the bombing of the 
U.S.S. Cole and the two embassy bombings in East Africa.145 The 
latter two incidents left hundreds, mostly innocent civilians, dead.l46 
Therefore, members of the out-group conspiracy probably assumed 
that other similar actions were being contemplated by the a1 Qaeda 
leadership, by other cells, or by allied terror groups. 
On the other hand, a1 Qaeda members in the out-group 
conspiracy would not necessarily have known or reasonably have 
foreseen the scale of the September 11 attacks. Imputing intent or 
even willful blindness14' to a1 Qaeda members who knew nothing 
conspiracy existed and that the peripheral service being furnished was designed to foster 
the conspiracy") (emphasis added); United States v .  Gallishaw, 428 F.2d 760, 763 (2d 
Cir. 1970) (noting that  to  convict defendant of bank robbery for loaning a machine gun 
to the primary perpetrators, the  Government "would have t o  show at a minimum that 
he knew that  a bank was to  be robbed") (emphasis added). The  majority rule, however, 
apparently requires a culpable mental state of "purposely," even for serious crimes. See 
KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 56, at 709-10. However, the  government may rely 
on the "slight evidence" rule to  attempt to  link Moussaoui t o  the  September 11 
conspirators. See, e.g., United States v .  James, 528 F.2d 999, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1976). 
Once the existence o f  a common scheme of a conspiracy is shown, slight 
evidence i s  all that  is required to  connect a particular defendant with the  
conspiracy (citations omitted). The  connection may be shown by  circumstantial 
evidence (citations omitted). "A person may be held as a conspirator although 
he  joins the  criminal concert at a point i n  time far beyond the  initial act o f  the  
conspirators. I f  he  joins later, knowing o f  the  criminal design, and acts in 
concert with the original conspirators, he  may be held responsible, not only for 
everything which may be done thereafter, but  also for everything which has 
been done prior t o  his adherence to  the criminal design. . . ." Lile v .  United 
States, 9 Cir., 264 F.2d 278, 281 (1958), quoted wi th  approval in Nelson v .  
United States, 5 Cir., 415 F.2d 483 (1969); Downing v .  United States, 5 Cir., 
348 F.2d 594 (1965). The  fact that a conspirator i s  not present at ,  or does not 
participate in, the  commission o f  any o f  the  overt acts does not, by  itself, 
exonerate him. United States v. Sutherland, 463 F.2d 641, 647 (5th Cir. 1972). 
Id.; see also LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 705 (citing Brent E. Newton, The Antiquated 
Slight Evidence Rule, i n  Federal Conspiracy Cases, 1 J.  APP. PRACT. & PROCESS, 49, 51- 
54 (1999) (criticizing the rule and certain federal circuits for applying it sub silentio 
even after having expressly abolished it)). 
145. See The White House Determined, . . ., WASH. POST, July 25, 2003, at A15, 
available at 2003 WL 56508330. 
146. See Patricia Hurtado, Bombing Case Gets New Judge, NEWSDAY, Jan. 26, 
2002, at A07, available at 2002 WL 2724799 (noting 224 people were killed i n  East 
African embassy bombings and thousands were injured). 
147. The  problem with the doctrine o f  willful blindness is that  it might lower the  
culpable mental state from knowingly to  recklessly and perhaps to  negligently. See 
KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 56, at 222 (citing United States v .  Barnhart, 979 
F.2d 647, 652 (8th Cir. 1992)) (attempting t o  avoid convicting a defendant on the  basis 
o f  a "negligently" mental state by  imposing the following two requirements on courts 
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about the September 11 attacks beforehand might not comport with 
their actual culpability. These other members may be willfully blind, 
but not necessarily to acts of the magnitude of September 11.148 
Under the willful blindness doctrine, however, members of the 
out-group conspiracy may satisfy the mens rea element for the 
imposition of capital punishment on secondary actors. Willful 
blindness, a s  a practical matter, is often tantamount to a "recklessly 
indifferent" culpable mental state.149 The latter mental state is 
precisely that which the Court in Tison identified as the mens rea for 
imposing the death penalty on accomplices. One hopes that the Court 
was in fact imposing the higher mental state of depraved indifference. 
But, even under that standard, one can persuasively argue that an  
actor who joins a known terrorist organization like a1 Qaeda is 
demonstrating depraved indifference to human life.150 
considering whether to instruct on "willful blindness": ( 1 )  defendant must be 
subjectively aware of a high probability o f  illegal conduct; and (2) defendant must 
purposefully contrive not to learn of the illegal conduct). But see KADISH & 
SCHULHOFER, supra note 56, at 224 (citing David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. 
L.J. 957, 962 (1999)), in  which he demonstrates that the "high probability" requirement 
may be easily abused. This is not to  suggest that Moussaoui or the average foot solider 
in  a1 Qaeda possesses a "negligent" culpable mental state. 
148. I t  is possible that those who planned the September 11 attacks and those 
who carried them out had not realized how successful the attacks would be. They might 
not have known or expected that the attacks would bring down the towers. Elisabeth 
Bumiller, A Nation Challenged: The Video; bin Laden, On Tape, Boasts of Trade Center 
Attacks; U.S. Says It Proves His Guilt, N.Y.  T I M E S ,  Dec. 14, 2001, at A l ;  Judith Miller, 
A Nation Challenged: The Mastermind; A Glimpse, Guard Down, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 
2001, at A l .  In that event, they are still responsible for what they had done, given that 
they intended to commit murder and other crimes in the first place. See Harvey v .  
State, 681 A.2d 628, 637 (Md. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that single mens rea may apply to 
additional and unexpected results). 
149. See Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as a 
Criminal Mens Rea, 81 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191, 195 (1990). But see Jonathan 
Marcus, Note, Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness, 102 YALE L.J. 
2231, 2238-40 (1993) (distinguishing recklessness from willful blindness and 
determining that willful blindness essentially constitutes knowledge). 
150. The Model Penal Code defines "depraved indifference murder" as a criminal 
homicide that "is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life." MODEL PENAL CODE 5 210.2(1)@). The  MPC 
defines "recklessly" as "consciously disregard[ing] a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the material element [of the offense] exists or will result from [the actor's] conduct. 
Id. 5 2.02 The  risk must  be of  such a nature and degree . . . and the circumstances 
known to  him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of  conduct a 
law abiding person would observe in  the actor's situation." Id. By joining a known 
violent terrorist organization like a1 Qaeda, an actor would be "consciously 
disregard[ing] a substantial and unjustifiable r i s k  that he or she would be, among 
other things, assisting individuals to kill innocent civilians. Such conduct is "a gross 
deviation" and arguably "manifests extreme indifference to the value o f  human life." Id. 
This assumes that terrorist violence is unjustified under law. A soldier who kills 
during war but who follows humanitarian law, is guilty neither of a war crime nor a 
domestic crime. See Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status after 9/11; Attacks on the 
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Although the out-group conspirators appear to satisfy the mens 
rea requirements, they do not appear to satisfy the actus reus 
element. Tison requires not only that  the secondary actors exhibit 
reckless indifference to life, but also that they be "major 
participant[sIw in the underlying felony. If the actors had nothing to 
do with September 11 conspiracy a t  all, aside from being out-group 
conspiracy members, then the actus reus element would not be met, 
and they would not be death eligible. It is "so attenuated151 to make 
out-group conspiracy members "major participant[sIv in the in-group 
conspiracy resulting in death and destruction when they played no 
role in that conspiracy. Thus, under Enmund-Tison, out-group 
conspiracy members should generally not be death-eligible. 
C. The Out-Group Conspirator Who Knew about the September 11 
Attacks, but Did Nothing to Advance Them 
The same answer should apply to the conspirator who knows 
about the conspiracy, but has done nothing to bring the conspiracy 
about. Mens rea may be satisfied, but active participation is not. Thus 
if Moussaoui knew about September 11, but was here on another 
mission and did nothing to further the September 11 attacks, he 
should not be classified as a major participant. His allegedly lying to 
FBI officials as  to his purpose in taking flying lessons when he was 
arrested and his presumably failing to disclose the September 11 plot 
would not appear to satisfy the major participation element.152 This 
Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 325, 327-28 (2003). Given that the September 11 
attacks constitute crimes against humanity if carried out by a private terror group and 
a war crime if carried out by the Taliban government (or if a1 Qaeda was the alter ego 
of the Taliban government), those responsible for the attacks may not escape the label 
of common criminal, international criminal, or war criminal. See infra notes 179-90 
and accompanying text. But see FOUDA & FIELDING, supra note 43, a t  118 (quoting "al- 
Qaeda Statement" justifying the attacks, for among other reasons, West's and United 
States' establishing Israel, for Israel's killing Palestinians, for supporting allegedly 
corrupt Arab regimes, for supporting India in Kashmir, for the then blockade of Iraq, 
for using military force to keep the natural resource of many Arab states, oil, a t  a low 
price, and for violating Koran regarding tolerance of alcohol, interest, homosexuality, 
adultery, and prostitution). 
151. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text in which the Tison Court 
distinguishes Enrnund. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149, 157 (1987); see also United 
States v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761, 766 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[Dlue process constrains the 
application of Pinkerton where the relationship between the defendant and the 
substantive offense is slight."), vacated on other grounds, 532 U.S. 1036 (1993); United 
States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858, 865-66 (7th Cir. 2000) (relying on Castaneda to find 
unconstitutional application of Pinkerton doctrine). 
152. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing these allegations); see 
also McCord, supra note 101, at  875-78 (offering excellent discussion of meaning of 
"major participant"). The indictment does not allege that Moussaoui knew about the 
September 11 plot before his arrest. 
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certainly does not foreclose criminal liability,153 but it should 
foreclose the death penalty. 
D. The In-Group Conspirator Who Knew Nothing about the Attacks 
but Who Played a Major Role i n  the Conspiracy 
A more difficult question is posed by the a1 Qaeda member who 
knew nothing about the September 11 attacks beforehand, but who 
played an  important role in the conspiracy. For example, assume 
hypothetically that the actor, an  a1 Qaeda member, knew nothing 
either about the planned attacks or about the idea of using civilian 
airliners as  missiles, but purchased the plane tickets on orders of a1 
Qaeda superiors. From the actor's point of view, he or she would be 
carrying out a fairly low-level task of purchasing tickets for what one 
presumably would believe were just routine flights. Yet, the purchase 
of the tickets, as  noted above, played a key role in the conspiracy. Is 
such an  actor death-eligible under Enmund-Tison? 
This issue resembles that which arose in the context of depraved 
indifference murder under the Model Penal Code (MPC). Under the 
MPC, recklessness satisfies the mens rea for voluntary 
m a n ~ 1 a u g h t e r . l ~ ~  Recklessness plus "extreme indifference to the 
value of human life" satisfies the mens rea for depraved indifference 
murder.155 The issue was whether the "plus elements" are tested by a 
subjective standard or an  objective one. Over a strong dissent, the 
New York Court of Appeals concluded that the additional elements 
were tested by an objective standard.156 In that case the defendant 
was thus unable to use his voluntary intoxication to attempt to 
negate the plus elements of extreme indifference to reduce the offense 
from depraved heart murder to involuntary manslaughter 
(manslaughter in the second degree). Given the vagueness of the 
Tison holding, the U.S. Supreme Court could very well follow that 
lead or some similar approach and uphold the death sentence of an 
ostensibly out-group conspiracy member who objectively played a 
major role in the in-group conspiracy, but did not know she was doing 
so. 
153. Cf. Government's Position on Sentencing and Government Sentencing 
Memorandum, United States v. Lindh, Crim. No. 02-37A (E.D. Va .  Sept. 27, 2002), 
available at http://news.findlaw.commdocs/docs/docsflindh/uslindh 92602psentmem.pdf (last 
visited June 30, 2003) (defendant pleaded guilty t o  aiding terrorist organization and 
other crimes and received 20 year sentence). 
154. MODEL PENAL CODE 5 210.3(l)(a) (1980). 
155. Id. 8 210.2(1)@). 
156. People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 707 (N.Y.  1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 
953 (1984). 
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Such a conclusion is disturbing in the death penalty context. 
With the exception of felony murder for some enumerated underlying 
felonies, depraved indifference (depraved heart murder a t  common 
law) traditionally has been second-degree murder and therefore a 
non-capital homicide.15' Secondly, the Supreme Court has noted as  
follows: 
Unless the imposition of the death penalty . . ."measurably contributes 
to one or both of these goals [deterrence and retribution], i t  'is nothing 
. more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and 
suffering,' and hence an unconstitutional punishment." Enmund [v. 
Florida], 458 U.S., at  798 (other citations omitted). With respect to 
retribution-the interest in seeing that the offender gets his "just 
deserts7'-the severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily 
depends on the culpability of the offender.158 
Admittedly, such an  actor is both highly blameworthy and highly 
dangerous. Yet executing such actors for what they believe is the 
carrying out of a low-level function violates the principle of just 
desert.159 
E. The In-Group Conspirator Who Knew About the Attacks, but Who 
Played a Minor Role in  the Conspiracy 
A variant on this hypothetical is the in-group conspiracy member 
who plays a minor role in the conspiracy. Suppose on September 10, 
2001, for example, the actor put up for the night one of the September 
11 hijackers. Suppose this actor is an  a1 Qaeda member who knew of 
the September 11 plot when agreeing to put up the hijacker. 
Presumably such an  actor would be only a minor participant in  the 
conspiracy. Before September 11 the hijackers could easily have 
gotten a hotel room without incurring much risk.160 The analysis is 
the converse of the individual who had no idea she in fact was playing 
a major role. Although mens rea is satisfied for the minor actor, the 
actus reus component, that of being a major participant, is not. So the 
in-group conspiracy member who plays a minor role should not be 
death-eligible. 
157. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 56, a t  396. 
158. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (emphasis added). 
159. Of course, one could attack this position by arguing that the cell structure 
and its accompanying regime of willful blindness thus immunizes a1 Qaeda members 
from the death penalty. To the extent that the willful blindness amounts to reckless 
indifference as opposed to knowing conduct, it should not render one death eligible. 
Admittedly, Tison may very well support the imposition of the death penalty on such 
an actor, one who exhibits reckless indifference to human life but does not know the 
significance of her role. 
160. Mohammed Atta, said to be the "field commander" of the September 11 
terrorists, in fact stayed a t  a Comfort Inn outside of Portland, Maine on this date. See 
FOUDA & FIELDING, supra note 43, a t  142. 
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None of the states or the federal government has dealt with 
crimes of this magnitude. The Timothy McVeigh-Oklahoma City 
bombing case never reached the U.S. Supreme Court. In that 
domestic terrorism case, there was never any question that  McVeigh 
was the primary actor, so that case does not apply here in any 
event.161 His accomplice, Terry Nichols, convicted as a co-conspirator, 
was given life in p r i ~ 0 n . l ~ ~  During World War 11, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the death sentences of eight German spies by a hastily 
convened military t r i b ~ n a 1 . l ~ ~  The death penalty jurisprudence of the 
Court, however, has changed so significantly since World War I1 that 
that precedent is of questionable vitality today.164 Nonetheless, 
Justice O'Connor stated in a speech, that given the events of 
September 11, we would have to expect new limitations on our civil 
liberties.165 The Court's death penalty jurisprudence could evolve 
quickly into one of those 1irnitati0ns.l~~ 
161. Excerpt from Ashcroft Statement on Delaying Execution of Timothy 
McVeigh, N.Y. T I M E S ,  May 12, 2001, at A12. 
162. See Jo Thomas, Oklahoma City Verdict: The Overview; Death Penalty Ruled 
Out as  Nichols Jury Deadlocks i n  Oklahoma Bombing Case, N.Y. T I M E S ,  Jan. 8,  1998, 
at Al. The  State of  Oklahoma, however, recently indicted Nichols and i s  seeking the 
death penalty i n  connection with the Oklahoma City bombing. See Dan Rather, 
Oklahoma City Bombing Co-Conspirator to Stand Trial on State Murder Charges, (CBS 
television broadcast, May 20, 2003), available i n  LEXIS, News Group File. 
163. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 2 (1942). 
164. Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Comment, Military Tribunals and 
Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261 (Spring 
2002). But  see Hamdi v .  Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 476 (4th Cir. 2003) (relying i n  part on 
Ex parte Quirin for the proposition that the courts should defer to  the  Executive i n  
determining the  status of "enemy combatants" captured "in the zone of  active combat"), 
cert. granted, No. 03-6696, 2004 WL 42546 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2004). See also George 
Terwilliger e t  al., The War on Terrorism: Law Enforcement or National Security?, T H E  
FEDERALIST SOC'Y NAT'L SECURITY W H I T E  PAPERS ON TERRORISM, available at 
http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications~errorismilitarribunals.htm; cf. A1 Odah v. 
United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1142-44 (D.C. Cir.) (rejecting attempts o f  foreign 
nationals detained i n  Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to obtain legal review of their detention), 
cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 534 (2003). 
165. Tony Mauro, Court Watch: Court Weighs i n  on Stops at the Border, LEGAL 
T I M E S ,  Dec. 3 ,2001,  at 8. 
166. The  Supreme Court did limit the death penalty i n  one important case last 
t erm and two important cases the previous term. See Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct.  
2527, 2535-37 (2003) (O'Connor, J.) (reversing death sentence on grounds o f  ineffective 
assistance o f  counsel i n  failing to  investigate petitioner's troubled childhood); Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 2434-43 (2002) (finding unconstitutional state death penalty 
statute that  authorizes trial court alone, not jury, t o  determine whether aggravating 
circumstances exist t o  justify imposing penalty of  death); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 321-25 (2002) (finding unconstitutional the imposition o f  the death penalty on 
mentally retarded offenders). Few commentators, however, believe that  the  Court has 
done an  about-face i n  its death penalty jurisprudence. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Supreme Court Decided Crucial Issues, CAL. BAR J., Aug. 2002, at 1, 20 ("There is no 
indication that  these decisions portend the Supreme Court finding the death penalty 
unconstitutional."). Interestingly, however, i n  Atkins, the Court relied i n  part on the 
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IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS OF EXECUTING AL QAEDA MEMBERS 
EVA if the U.S. Supreme Court were to conclude that  executing 
an actor like Moussaoui is constitutional, sound policy considerations 
argue against such executions. This Article will first summarize the 
arguments in favor of imposing the death penalty on terrorists. After 
proposing a definition of terrorism, this Article will discuss 
arguments against imposing the death penalty on politically 
motivated terrorists in general and on the a1 Qaeda terrorists in 
particular. Included here are a constellation of policy questions, 
namely, how the death penalty interferes with an  alternative strategy 
against terrorism; how the death penalty might create martyrs; how 
it  might hinder cooperation with our allies in the war against terror; 
how the death penalty relates to the problem of the so-called "ticking 
bomb terrorist"; and how executing a1 Qaeda members might affect 
U.S. civilians and military in the field. 
A. Summary of Arguments in Favor of the Death Penalty 
Some of the arguments generally advanced in favor of the death 
penalty apply to international terrorists. Chief among these would be 
retribution, both the just desert strand1G7 as well a s  the wild justice, 
revenge strand168 of retribution theory. fil l ing over 3,000 innocent 
people, not to mention the other grave crimes that  the hijackers 
committed, demands retribution.169 Even under the just desert strand 
practice of other countries in determining that the death penalty for defendants who 
suffered from mental retardation violated the Constitution: "Moreover, within the 
world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by 
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved." Atkins, 536 U.S. a t  316 
n.21 (citing Brief for The European Union as  Amicus Curiae in McCarver v. North 
Carolina); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion on 
the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1085, 1129-30 (2002). 
167. This strand attempts to arrive at  "just outcomes; the emphasis is on what 
the offender fairly merits for his crime." Andrew Von Hirsch, Penal Theories, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 659, 666 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998) (emphasis 
added). See also DRESSLER, supra note 58, at  17 (describing this notion of retributive 
justice as "punishment [being] . . . a means of securing a moral balance in the society"). 
168. See Robert Nozick, Retributive Punishment, in READINGS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 196-98 (John Arthur & William Shaw eds., 1984) (distinguishing 
in detail retribution from revenge). 
169. Furthermore, the Islamic countries themselves are strong advocates of the 
death penalty. See, e.g., William A. Schabas, International Law and Abolition of the 
Death Penalty: Recent Developments, 4 ILSA J .  INT'L & COMP. L. 535, 545 (1998) 
(quoting Sudan delegate to Rome Conference to establish International Criminal 
Court, who "described capital punishment as 'a divine right according to some 
religions, in particular Islam"'); Jennifer Cunningham, Frontier Justice is Put on the 
Dock, THE GLASGOW HERALD, June 25, 1997, at  17 (noting Saudi Arabia's practice of 
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as opposed to the wild justice strand, the penalty of death is justified. 
Intentionally taking the life of so many innocents recalls the horrors 
of the Nazi regime.170 The culpability level, a t  least of the active 
conspirators, is a s  high as can be imagined.171 Even i i  suicide 
bombers may not be generally deterred,172 those responsible for the 
September 11 attacks warrant the death penalty: "'The truth is that 
some crimes are so outrageous that society insists on adequate 
punishment, because the wrong-doer deserves it, irrespective of 
whether it is a deterrent or not.""73 , > 
Furthermore, the theories of incapacitation and .sp6&ic 
deterrence would appear to be furthered by the death ~ena1ty . l '~  
Reformation of these offenders is unthinkable. Imposing the death 
penalty would also be justified under the denunciation theory, the 
theory espoused by the French sociologist, Emile Durkheim, that the 
beheading convicted rapists, drug smugglers and murderers); Dominus, supra note 9, 
at 30 and passim. 
170. After World War 11, the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal 
sentenced to death twelve high-ranking members of the Nazi German Regime for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. A number of doctors and SS leaders were 
likewise given the death penalty. See War Crimes Trials, 27 FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 146-47 (1986). 
171. Retribution looks only backward at  what the actor has done: "Even if a civil 
society resolved to dissolve itself. . . the last murderer lying in the prison ought to be 
executed . . . ." DRESSLER, supra note 58, a t  18 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 197-98 (W. Hastie trans., 1887)). The utilitarians, on the other 
hand, look forward to determine whether the punishment will provide "an overall 
social benefit." DRESSLER, supra note '58, a t  16. The arguments that are set forth below 
draw greatly from utilitarian theory. 
172. One could also argue that, although suicide bombers may not be deterred 
by the death penalty, their handlers might be. Cf. Norman L. Green et  al., Capital 
Punishment in the Age of Terrorism, 41 CATH. LAW. 187, 225 (2002) (comments of 
Kenneth Roth) (noting that some of the leaders of a1 Qaeda, including Osama bin 
Laden, himself, seem less than keen on serving a s  suicide bombers). 
173. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 453 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Lord Justice Denning, Minutes of Evidence, Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment, 207 (1949-1953)). 
Because the only genuinely humane, immediate response to atrocities like the 
Washington sniper attacks and Mohamed Atta's airline hijackings-and the 
necessary formal response of a n  organized civil society-is collective fury. 
Along with a controlled but ferocious determination to incapacitate and crush 
the perpetrators as  quickly as  possible. Deep-think analysis can and must wait. 
David Tell, Yes, The Sniper Was a Terrorist, Editorial, 8 WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 4, 
2002 a t  7, 8; cf. Note, Responding to Terrorism, Crime, Punishment, and War, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1233 (2002) (noting that "the resurgence of the death penalty in 
the thirty years since the Supreme Court's ruling in Furman v. Georgia reflects the 
ascendancy of retributive theories of punishment"). 
174. See infra note 253; see also Hirsch, supra note 167, a t  660-61 (describing 
incapacitation as "penal consequentialism"). But given the apparently overwhelming 
number of individuals who are willing to engage in so-called "martyrdom operations," 
incapacitating one offender may do little to stop others. See supra note 139. 
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death penalty serves to "express society's condemnation and the 
relative seriousness of the crime," 175 in this case, the September 11 
attacks.176 
B. Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism 
Despite the strength and appeal of many of the arguments for 
imposing the death penalty on those responsible for the outrage of 
September 11, there are others arguments that should be considered. 
~ l though  the arguments that follow appear grounded in utilitarian 
theory,177 I suspect they ultimately reflect Professor Charles Black's 
observation that the death penalty is an evil, because, among other 
things, "it extinguishes, after untellable suffering, the most mysterious 
and wonderful thing we know, human life; this reason has many 
harmonics . . . 
1. Defining Terrorism 
The term "terrorism" has defied attempts at  definition. Some 
define it as acts of violence by a private organization against the state 
or ~ iv i1 ians . l~~  Others say terrorism largely embraces attacks 
175. DRESSLER, supra note 58, a t  18; Denning, supra note 173, at  207 
("Punishment is the way in which society expresses its denunciation of wrong doing; 
and, in order to maintain respect for law, i t  is essential that the punishment inflicted 
for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great majority of 
citizens for them."). 
176. KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 56, a t  106 (reprinting an excerpt from 
EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DMSION OF LAW IN SOCIETY 62-63 (W.D. Halls trans., 1984)). 
177. See Jeremy Bentham, Cases Unmeet for Punishment, in THE PORTABLE 
ENLIGHTENMENT READER 541 (Issaack Kramnick ed., 1995) (reasoning that 
punishment should not be meted out "3. Where i t  is unprofitable, or too expensive: 
where the mischief i t  would produce would be greater than what is prevented. 4. Where 
i t  is needless: where the mischief may be prevented, or cease of itself without 
it . . . "); see also supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
178. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Crisis in Capital Punishment, 31 MD. L. REV. 
289, 291 (1971); see also Anthony G .  Amsterdam, Capital Punishment, in THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN AMERICA 346,352-53 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1982) ('The plain message of 
capital punishment . . . is that life ceases to be sacred whenever someone with the 
power to take it away decides that there is a sufficiently compelling pragmatic reason 
to do SO."). But see Walter Berns, The Morality of Anger, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
AMERICA, supra, a t  333, 334 ("[Simon] Wiesenthal allows us to see that it is right, 
morally right, to be angry with criminals and to express that anger publicly, officially, 
and in an appropriate manner, which may require the worst of them to be executed."); 
Ernest Van den Haag, In Defense of the Death Penalty: A Practical and  Moral Analysis, 
in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra, a t  332 ("If i t  were shown that no 
punishment is more deterrent than a trivial fine, capital punishment for murder would 
remain just, even if not useful."). 
179. See JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND 
MATERIALS 995, 997 (2000) (quoting U.S. Dept. of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, Mar. 
1989) rmerrorism' is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended 
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animated by racism or colonialism and excludes acts of "struggle" and 
"resistance" carried out by so-called "national liberation movements" 
even if those acts are aimed a t  innocent civilians.1s0 For purposes of 
this Article, I consider crimes of terrorism to mean "war crimes" and 
"crimes against humanity" a s  defined by the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC).lB1 The Rome Statute defines a 
crime against humanity a s  "a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population."ls2 Such attacks are defined 
a s  "a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of [such.) 
acts . . . pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational 
policy to commit such attack."lB3 As of this writing, the ICC has been 
signed by 139 countries and has been ratified by ninety-two 
countries.ls4 Using the ICC definitions accomplishes a two-fold 
objective: i t  draws from a source of law now recognized by the vast 
majority of states as  authoritative, and it  addresses critics' major 
to influence an audience. 'International terrorism' is terrorism involving the citizens or 
territory of more than one country."). For a good discussion of this issue, see BRUCE 
HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 13-44 (1998). 
180. See, e.g., NOAM CHOMSKY & EDWARD S. HERMAN, 1 THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE WASHINGTON CONNECTION AND THIRD WORLD 
FASCISM 6 (1979) (criticizing the terms "terrorism" and "terrorist" as being applied to 
"the use of violence by individuals and marginal groups" while characterizing much 
more favorably "[olfficial violence [by states] which is far more extensive in both scale 
and destructiveness," that is, "wholesale as opposed to retail terror"); Charles 
Krauthammer, The Ball's Still in Arafat's Court, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1988, a t  A23 
(criticizing U.N. Resolutions defining terrorism). 
181. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7.1, U.N. Doc. 
AIConf. 18319 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute], available at http:Nwww.un.org/lawlicc 
lstatutelromefra.htm. 
182. Id. Article 7.l(a) provides as  follows: "For the purpose of this Statute, 'crime 
against humanity' means any of the following acts when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; . . . " Id.; see also Jordan Paust, Threats to 
Accountability after Nuremberg: Crimes against Humanity, Leader Responsibility and 
National Fora, 12 N.Y.L SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 547, 553-54 (1995) (criticizing Article 5 of 
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia statute on ground that its 
definition of crimes against humanity needlessly restricted its scope as compared to 
customary law definition of crimes against humanity). 
183. ICC Statute, supra note 181, art. 7.2(a). The subsection in full states as 
follows: "Attack directed against any civilian population means a course of conduct 
involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any 
civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to 
commit such attack." Id. (emphasis added). Compare the definition of terrorism 
provided by Caleb Carr, a definition that includes state terrorism as well as terrorism 
carried out by non-state actors: "Terrorism . . . is simply the contemporary name given 
to, and the modern permutation of, warfare deliberately waged against civilians with 
the purpose of destroying their will to support either leaders or policies that the agents 
of such violence find objectionable." CALEB CARR, THE LESSONS OF TERROR 6 (2002). 
184. ICC, Ratification Status, available at  http:llwww.un.orgflawlicc/statutel 
romefra.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2004). 
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objection to policies treating state terror and private terror, 
disparately.ls5 
The attacks of September 11 easily satisfy the elements of crimes 
against humanity. By hijacking the four civilian airliners, 
deliberately crashing two of the hijacked airliners into huge civilian 
office buildings, thus murdering all the civilians on the aircrafts and 
murdering thousands of civilians within the buildings, the nineteen 
hijackers and their accomplices committed "multiple" acts "directed a t  
any civilian population." The coordination of the attacks 
demonstrates that the attacks were committed "pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a State or organizational policy." The language 
66 organizational policy"lS6 was expressly intended to include non-state 
actors such as private terror groups.lS7 If a1 Qaeda acted on its own in 
carrying out the September 11 attacks, those responsible in a1 Qaeda 
should be found guilty of crimes against humanity. 
185. See CHOMSKY, supra note 180, at 6;  see also ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY 
TERRORISM WORKS 4-9 (2002). But see Byford, supra note 1, at 34-36 (arguing that a 
simple definition o f  "terrorism" is  impossible to make, that both ends and means 
employed to those ends must be examined to determine whether individuals have 
engaged in  "terrorism"). 
186. See Preparatory Comm'n on the Int'l Criminal Court, Elements of  Crimes, 
U.N. Doc. PCNICC12000/1/ADD.2 (2000), art. 7 ,  available at http:llwwwl.umn.edu/ 
humanrtslinstreeliccelementsofcrimes.html#~ftn36 (last visited Mar. 13, 2003). The 
Final Draft Elements of  Crimes of  the ICC further supports this interpretation: 
"Attack directed against a civilian population" in  these context elements is 
understood to mean a course o f  conduct involving the multiple commission of 
acts referred to in  Article 7 ,  paragraph 1, of the Statute against any civilian 
population, pursuant to or in  furtherance of  a State or organizational policy to 
commit such attack. The acts need not constitute a military attack. I t  is 
understood that "policy to commit such an a t tack  requires that the State or 
organization actively promote or encourage such attack against a civilian 
population. 
Id., art. 7 ,  Intro. (emphasis added); see also James D. Fry, Terrorism as a Crime 
Against Humanity and Genocide: The Backdoor to Universal Jurisdiction, 7 UCLA J .  
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 169, 191 (2002); Paust, supra note 150, at 327. But see William 
A. Schabas, Punishment of Non-state Actors in  Non-International Armed Conflict, 26 
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 907, 924-25 (2003) (arguing that the September 11 attacks do not 
constitute "crimes against humanity" within the definition o f  either the ICC or custom). 
187. Lucy Martinez, Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal Court: 
Possibilities and Problems, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 36 (2002) (citing Mahnoush H .  
Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 22, 
31 (1999)); see also In Re Doherty, 599 F.Supp. 270, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (rejecting 
Great Britain's request to extradite PIRA member charged with attacking a convoy of 
British soldiers in  Northern Ireland, but stating i n  dicta that the political offense 
exception would not protect individuals who placed bombs i n  public places, an act that 
violates international law or acts that would violate the Geneva conventions); cf. In Re 
McMullen, No-3-78-1899 M.G. (N.D. Cal. 1979) reprinted in  Cong. Rec. 16,585 (1986) 
(denying Great Britain's request to extradite Provisional Irish Republican Army 
member and noting that PIRA member's allegedly attacking British military barracks 
did not constitute war crime or crime against humanity). 
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If a state, such as  Afghanistan, sponsored these attacks, then 
those responsible in the Taliban government a s  well a s  any other 
accomplices or conspirators are almost certainly guilty of war crimes 
for carrying out the outrages of September 11.lS8 Restating long- 
established treaty and customary international law, the ICC codifies 
as  a war crime, "intentionally directing attacks against the civilian 
population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct 
part in the hostilities; [and] (ii) intentionally directing attacks against 
civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives."1s9 
Except for the attack on the Pentagon, all the attacks were on 
civilians and civilian objects.lgO 
2. Alternative Strategies against Terrorism 
In the fight against terrorism, we must consider with whom we 
are dealing and the most effective approach for reducing, if not 
eliminating, the threat to our cities and suburbs, facilities, aircraft, 
communications, and, above all, our people. There are more than one 
billion Muslims in the world.lg1 In the Arab world, there are more 
than 200 million people.lg2 Few democracies exist in the Islamic 
188. See Jordan J .  Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting 
fllegality, 23 MICH. J .  INT'L L. 1, 8 n.16 (2001). 
189. ICC Statute, supra note 181, art. 8.2(b) (emphasis added). This full 
subsection, with its prefatory language is as  follows: 
For purposes of this statute, "war crimes" means: . . . (b) Other serious 
violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, 
within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the 
following acts: (i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population 
as  such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities; (ii) 
intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which 
are not military objectives. 
Id. art. 8.2. 
190. To keep the focus on attacks on unequivocally noncombatant civilians, this 
discussion of crimes against humanity does not include the attack on the Pentagon, 
even though civilian employees of the Defense Department died in that attack. 
Furthermore, this is not to suggest that the attack against the Pentagon, aside from 
the manner of making the attack, was not a crime. I t  certainly was a domestic crime 
(actually numerous domestic crimes), and, to the extent that a1 Qaeda was not the alter 
ego of the Taliban and thereby acting as  a state, those who conspired to carry out or 
who aided and abetted the attack are criminally responsible. If the Taliban were the 
alter ego of a1 Qaeda and entered into a state of armed conflict with the United States 
on September 11, 2001, that component of the attack would probably not constitute a 
war crime but seizing and crashing the civilian airliner into the Pentagon would be. 
191. FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA, Islam (2003), available in LEXIS 
Reference File. 
192. FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA, Arabs (2003), available in LEXIS 
Reference File. 
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world;lg3 virtually all of the Arab countries are run by dictators or 
kings, some more despotic than others.lg4 The Arab countries rank 
last in the world in ratings on freedom of the press and other 
freedoms.195 Aside from the lack of individual rights, the standard of 
living has declined in that part of the world for the last thirty 
years.lg6 Nearly fifty percent of the population in the Arab world is 
under the age of twenty-five,lg7 with one-third under the age of 
fifteen.198 In the oil rich countries-the Gulf States, for example- 
"economic wealth has benefited a relatively limited few, and has not 
been distributed to poorer Islamic countries or to their very large 
migrant communities."l99 The young face little chance of climbing out 
of devastating and demoralizing poverty and repressi~n.~oO 
193. The leading one is Turkey, which, unfortunately, possesses one of  the worst if 
not the worst human rights records i n  Europe. See Endemic Torture in  Turkey Must End 
Immediately, (Amnesty International), Nov. 8, 2001, available at http://web.amnesty.org/ 
ai.nsflIndex/EUR440772001?0penDocument&of=COUNTRIES\TKEY (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2003). Turkey's parliament has, however, abolished the death penalty i n  
peacetime, a step that Amnesty International had been urging for decades and which the 
European Union has required as a condition of Turkey's membership. See Turkey: 
Abolition of the Death Penalty Welcomed, (Amnesty International) Aug. 2,2002, available 
at http:llweb.amnesty.org/ai.nsflIndex/EUR44O362OO2?OpenD0~ument&0f=Abolition 
COUNTRIES\TURKEY (last visited Mar. 13, 2003). Whether this also signals that 
Turkey will end its practice of  torture and other human rights abuses remains to be seen. 
194. See LEWIS, supra note 67, at 117-18; see also Fareed Zakaria, The Politics of 
Rage: Why Do They Hate Us?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15, 2001, at 22. 
195. See Zakaria, supra note 194, at 24. 
196. Id. at 25; see also LEWIS, supra note 67, 114-17. Concerning economic 
failure Lewis notes that "Israel's per capita GDP was three and half times that of  
Lebanon and Syria, twelve times that of Jordan, and thirteen and a half times that of  
Egypt." Id. at 117 (citing Arab Human Development Report 2002; Creating 
Opportunities for Future Generations, sponsored by the Regional Bureau for Arab 
StatesNNDP, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development). He discussed the 
intellectual life of the Arab world again quoting the Arab Human Development Report, 
"'The Arab world translates about 330 books annually, one-fifth of  the number that 
Greece translates. The accumulative total of  translated books since the Caliph 
Maa'moun's [sic] time [the ninth century] is  about 100,000, almost the average Spain 
translates in one year."' Id. at 115-16. Even i n  Saudi Arabia, per capita income 
plummeted from $28,600 i n  1981 to  $6,800 i n  2001. Eric Rouleau, Trouble in  the 
Kingdom, FOREIGNAFF. ,  July-Aug. 2002, at 75, 8 5 .  
197. Zakaria, supra note 194, at 22, 32. 
198. Id. 'Today, two i n  five Saudis are under 16 years old. [Saudi Arabia's] 
population has exploded while its economy has stagnated with the result that its per 
capita income has dropped." Michael Scott Doran, Palestine, Iraq, and American 
Strategy, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 19, 28; see also Editorial, The Anger of Arab 
Youth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15,2002, at A22. 
199. Max Taylor & John Horgan, The Psychological and Behavioural Bases of 
Islamic Fundamentalism, 13 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 37, 41 (2001). These 
commentators add that "to many devout Muslims the effects of increased oil wealth have 
been to increase the influence of the West and challenge the social basis of Islam, rather 
than to complement and enhance it." Id. 
200. "Even i f  many terrorists are not directly driven by poverty, the inequities o f  
globalization feed a general anti-Westernism that is a seedbed for Islamism." Michael 
Hirsh, Bush and the World, FOREIGN AFF. Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 18, 28. But see 
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"Throughout the region [the Middle East] [Arab] people have become 
ever more disillusioned with the deeply-entrenched dictatorships in 
their own countries, with the collapse of democratic institutions, 
hollow nationalistic rhetoric, and with their failing economies."201 
Given the failure of economic and political institutions in the 
Arab world, i t  is not surprising that religion has emerged as a major 
force.202 In the Muslim culture, religion and politics are intertwined 
in a way reminiscent of Western Europe before the R e f ~ r m a t i o n . ~ ~ ~  
The fight against terrorism thus needs to embrace the social and 
political reality of the Arab world and the nature of the organization 
we are fighting. 
The available evidence suggests that a1 Qaeda is a network 
rather than a single, unified military organization.204 As one 
commentator has written, "[Hlaving suffered the destruction of its 
DERSHOWITZ, supra note 185, a t  25 (noting that "the vast majority of groups with 
equivalent or more compelling causes-and with far greater poverty and 
disadvantagehave never resorted to terrorism"); FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF 
FREEDOM ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD 138 (2003) (arguing that "[tlhe 
problem is  wealth not poverty" and that unearned income from oil revenues, or, for 
example in the case of Egypt from the Suez Canal and the United States, "relieves the 
government of the need to tax its people-and in return provide something to them, in 
the form of accountability, transparency, and even representation"). 
201. See Amanat, supra note 67, a t  29; see also LEWIS, supra note 67, a t  117-19. 
Given the failure of the economic and political institutions in Islamic countries, their 
people are outraged: "The resulting anger is naturally directed first against their 
rulers, and then against those whom they see as keeping those rulers in power for 
selfish reasons." Id. a t  119. This Article does not discuss economic and political 
measures necessary to enhance human, civil and economic rights in the Arab and 
Islamic worlds. See Peter G .  Peterson, Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism, 
FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2002, a t  74, 75. 
202. A noted scholar of religion, Karen Armstrong, has observed that the 
resounding defeat of the Arab States by Israel in the 1967 war led to a religious revival 
in the Arab States: "After the humiliating defeat of the Arab armies during the 1967 
Six-Day War against Israel in 1967, there was a swing toward religion throughout the 
Middle East." KAREN ARMSTRONG, ISLAM: A SHORT HISTORY 171 (2000). 
203. Id. at  169-73; see also LEWIS, supra note 67, a t  6-8 (noting that "[dluring 
Muhammad's lifetime, the Muslims became a t  once a political and a religious 
community with the Prophet as head of state" and contending that Islam remains 
deeply involved with politics and state power); Taylor & Horgan, supra note 199, at  42 
(noting that one of the central positions of Islamic fundamentalism is "the general 
equation of the state with the implementation of Islam"). 
204. See Diaa Rashwan, Impossible to Fight, AL-AHRAM WKLY., Aug. 8-14, 2002, 
available a t  http:Nwww.weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/598/opll.htm (last visited June 20, 
2003) (observing that Americans had now accepted the European view that "Al Qa'eda 
is actually nothing more than a network and that the violent Islamacist groups have no 
unified command, but communicate and cooperate when i t  suits their different 
purposes."). Al Qaeda was created in the 1980s from three terrorist organizations: '%in 
Laden's circle of 'Afghan' Arabs, together with two factions from Egypt, the Islamic 
Group and Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the latter led by Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, a1 Qaeda's 
top theoretician." See Paul Berman, The Philosopher of Islamic Terror, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Mar. 23, 2003, at  24. 
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sanctuary in Afghanistan two years ago, a1 Qaeda's decentralized 
organization has become more decentralized Another 
commentator has analogized a1 Qaeda to "a holding company run by a 
council (shura) including representatives of terrorist movements."206 
I t  has also been described as the terrorist equivalent of the Ford 
Foundation, providing money and other resources for individual 
terrorists or movements that propose terrorist projects.207 
The nature of the organization suggests the means of combating 
it. Tactically, the United States and its allies must bring to justice 
those responsible for carrying out the outrages of September 11 and 
to defeat those who continue to attempt to terrorize the United 
S t a t e ~ . ~ O ~  Strategically, the United States and its Coalition partners 
must take steps to end support in the Arab and greater Muslim world 
for a1 Qaeda and others who would resort to terrorism.209 The 
205. Jessica Stern, The Protean Enemy, FOREIGN AFF., Ju1.-Aug. 2003, a t  27, 
available at 2003 WL 57276699. Stern adds that a1 Qaeda apparently has put into 
practice so-called "'leaderless resistance,"' a tactic popularized by Louis Beam of the 
Aryan Nations, an American Neo-Nazi group. With the advent of the Internet, leaders 
do not necessarily have to secretly issue orders or to "pay operatives," rather, "they 
inspire small cells or individuals to take action on their own initiative." Id.; see also 
Stevenson, supra note 8, a t  85; Eric Bonabeau, Scale Free Networks, SCIENCE, May 
2003, abstract available at  ~http:Nwww.sciam.comlarticle.cfm?colID=l&articleID= 
000312F5-B86B-1E90-8EA5809EC5880000. 
206. See Conesa, supra note 67. 
207. Scott Peterson, Islamacists Escalate Fight in N. Iraq, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Nov. 22, 2002, a t  1 (quoting James Lindsay of the Brookings Institution); see 
also BURKE, supra note 20, a t  208 (noting that "a1 Qaeda hardcore" rejected volunteers 
who requested martyrdom operations unless they "came up with their own ideas for 
attacks"). A1 Qaeda can also be analogized to joint venture capitalists, ("individuals 
would approach the chief executive and board (bin Laden, Atef et al.) with ideas they 
believed were worthy of support") or a publishing house ("Freelancers would approach 
them with ideas that would sometimes be funded and resourced but often rejected"). Id  
a t  208-09. 
208. See Nicholas Lemann, Letter from Washington, What Terrorists Want; Is 
There a Better Way to Defeat a1 Qaeda?, NEW YORKER, Oct. 29, 2001, a t  36. 
209. See Harold H. Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 
1497-1500 (2003) (criticizing, as  counter-productive, Bush Administration's largely 
unilateralist approach to combating terrorism and Administration's violating 
international law in process); Thomas Carothers, Promoting Democracy and Fighting 
Terror, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2003, a t  84, 97 (criticizing Bush Administration's 
current strategy in handling the war on terror as not paying enough attention to even 
handedly promoting democracy around world). See also Hirsh, supra note 200, noting 
as  follows: 
But a t  the same time, the nature of the terrorist threat demonstrated the 
necessity of bolstering the international community, which is built on 
nonproliferation agreements, intelligence cooperation, and legitimizing 
institutions such as  the UN, as well as a broad consensus on democracy, free 
markets, and human rights. It  also demonstrates the necessity of a values- 
driven foreign policy-and of nation building under multilateral auspices in 
places such as  Afghanistan. 
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decentralized nature. of a1 Qaeda underlines the importance of United 
States' gaining the cooperation and good will not only of governments 
but also of their law enforcement personnel and of individual citizens 
in Arab and other Muslim states.210 In other words, to root out those 
responsible for the attacks and who pose a continuing threat, we need 
a firm, but measured response, simultaneously demonstrating that  
we are not attacking all Muslims or Arabs or applying a .  double 
standard to Muslims or Arabs.211 > 
Id. at  18; O'Connor & Rumann, supra note 2, at  1750-51 (noting that the United States 
is resorting to draconian emergency measures similar to those employed by Great 
Britain in Northern Ireland against the IRA, measures which both failed to enhance 
security or to defeat the IRA. The authors advocate "[dlialogue, cooperation, and 
attention to civil liberties as necessary and effective elements in the strategy to 
eliminate terrorism"); Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, FOREIGN 
AFF., July-Aug. 2002, a t  127, 140 (concluding that "[sltate building trumps terror," 
requires the cooperation of many states, and cannot be done "on the cheap"); cf. Philip 
A. Thomas, Emergency and Anti-Terrorist Powers, 9/11: USA AND UK, 26 FORDHAM 
INT'L L. J. 1193, 1228 (2003) (quoting Christopher Hewitt's extensive study of British 
counter-terrorism measures, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-TERRORIST POLICIES (1984) 
("heavy handed repression is counter-productive")). 
As one commentator has observed concerning how the then impending war in Iraq 
was being viewed by U.S. Muslims and others: 
If 1 percent of that one billion [the world population of Muslims] felt that they 
had sympathy for extremist views, then we are dealing with 10 million people. 
And if 10 percent of those 10 million were a little more active in pursuing those 
extreme beliefs and views, then we are dealing with a potential pool of one 
million people from which extremist groups and terrorists can recruit. 
Michele Norris & Melissa Block, All Things Considered: How a Potential War with Iraq 
Is Being Viewed by American Muslims and Others (Nat'l Public Radio broadcast, Mar. 
14, 2003) (quoting Hussein Hakani of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 
available in LEXIS, National Public Radio Newsfile. 
210. But see Anthony Cordesman, How Should the United States Respond to 
Terrorism, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY FORUM, Nov. 27, 2000, a t  16, at  
www.artitranscripts.com (last visited June 3, 2003) (arguing that "law enforcement 
partnerships are extremely political, extremely limited, often inherently corrupt . . ."). 
Religious terrorists may also be less subject to societal constraints than secular 
terrorists: 
Whereas secular terrorists attempt to appeal to a constituency variously 
composed of actual and potential sympathizers, members of the communities 
they purport 'to defend' or the aggrieved people for whom they claim to speak, 
religious terrorists are a t  once activists and constituents engaged in what they 
regard as  a total war. They seek to appeal to no other constituency than 
themselves. Thus the restraints on violence that are imposed on secular 
terrorists by the desire to appeal to a tacitly supportive or uncommitted 
constituency are not relevant to the religious terrorist. 
HOFFMAN, supra note 179, a t  94-95 
211. See infra note 287 (citing European Court of Human Right's decision in the 
Ocalan case); see also CARR, supra note 183, a t  43 (''This presents us with another 
enduring truth about the tactics of terror [should a State be tempted to respond 
therewith]; they must never be viewed as an expedient or a controllable instrument of 
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Putting it  another way, "[Tlhe first principle of responding to 
unlimited warfare against civilians is . . . not to respond with similar 
behavior."212 Otherwise, we risk inflaming the Islamic world. 
Unfortunately, the invasion of Iraq, a Muslim country (albeit with a 
secular regime) is likely to create such a response.213 Likewise, 
executing members of a terrorist group like a1 Qaeda invites 
retaliation in kind. As one commentator has noted, "[R]eprisal begets 
reprisal."214 We have seen, in other theaters, retaliatory strike 
followed by retaliatory attack from the other side, devolving into a 
vicious cycle of seemingly ever-increasing violence.215 Experience 
suggests that executing a1 Qaeda members would help create such a 
cycle.216 We should adopt, not only with use of our military but also 
policy, one which, after its purpose is served, will simply burn itself out."); Koh, supra 
note 209, a t  1509 (noting that United States joined with the European Union in 
demanding that Turkey not execute notorious Kurdish Terrorist Abdullah Ocalan); 
Richard Falk, A Roadmap for War: A Flawed Debate, Sept. 27, 2002, available a t  
http://www.transnational.org/forum/meet/awedDebate.html (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2003). Cf. LEWIS, supra note 67, at 103-12 (noting that many in Islamic world 
have criticized West and particularly United States for applying double standard to 
Muslims and Muslim states). 
212. CARR, supra note 183, at  231 (emphasis added). 
213. See Iraq War Helped Boost A1 Qaeda, TORONTO STAR, May 20, 2003, a t  A1 
(quoting Paul Wilkinson, head of Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political 
Violence a t  St. Andrew's University in Scotland: "The political masters in U.S. and 
Europe underestimated the extent to which bin Laden would use the war in Iraq as a 
propaganda weapon to rejuvenate the movement and attract more funds."); Steven R. 
Weisman, U.S. Must Counteract Image in Muslim World, Panel Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
1, 2003, a t  A1 (quoting a Bush Administration panel, "[h]ostility toward America has 
reached shocking levels" as a result of the Iraq war and increased tension in the Middle 
East). Many had predicted this outcome: 
A U.S. invasion of Iraq would likely trigger a surge in the already prevalent 
anti-Americanism in the Middle East, strengthening the hand of hard-line 
Islamist groups and provoking many Arab government to tighten their grip, 
rather than experiment more boldly with political liberalization." 
Carothers, supra note 209, a t  93. Don Van Natta Jr.  & Desmond Butler, Threats and 
Responses: Terror Network: Anger on Iraq Seen a s  New Qaeda Recruiting Tool, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2003, at  A1 (noting that officials in the United States, Europe, and 
Africa observed that the then imminent invasion of Iraq caused a sharp increase in 
efforts "to identify and groom a new generation of terrorist operatives" and the officials 
worry that the invasion of Iraq "is almost certain to produce a groundswell of 
recruitment for groups committed to attacks in the United States, Europe and Israel"). 
But see Fouad Ajami, Iraq and the Arabs' Future, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2003, a t  2 
(arguing that the United States need not apologize for its unilateralism and that the 
focus of the invasion "should be modernizing the Arab world). 
214. R.C. HINGORANI, PRISONERS OF WAR 65 (1982). 
215. "[Mleeting the tactics of terror in kind will only perpetuate the cycle of 
terrorist violence . . . . " CARR, supra note 183, a t  23. 
216. See infra notes 237-67 and accompanying text. Note that in obvious 
retaliation for imposing a death sentence on Omar Sheikh, for killing Daniel Pearl, 
nine Pakistani police officers were wounded from four letter bombs sent to the station; 
one police officer lost his hand. FOUDA & FIELDING, supra note 43, a t  70. After receiving 
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with the use of the death penalty, an approach that is most likely to 
gain the cooperation of our allies and most likely to isolate a1 
Qaeda.217 
Achieving our strategic objective requires that we give both the 
fact and appearance of treating any accused Muslim fairly. For 
example after Britain established internment without trial in 
Northern Ireland in 1971 to combat the Irish Republican Army, a 
policy that was largely directed only a t  the Northern Irish Catholic 
community, support for the IRA increased: "The use of internment 
effectively alienated a sizeable minority of the population of Northern 
Ireland and made impossible any cooperation with authorities."218 
If we ultimately use the vague doctrines of conspiracy and of 
willful blindness to impose the death penalty on an actor who did not 
directly participate in the September 11 conspiracy, such an 
execution will be perceived by Muslims as anything but fair. Even if 
the evidence ultimately shows that the individual not only directly 
participated in the planning of the September 11 attacks but also 
played a major role, resorting to the death penalty will likely be 
deemed by Muslims as  unjust.219 
C. Using the Death Penalty to Punish Politically Motivated Terrorists 
1. Creating Martyrs 
Making individuals martyrs by killing or executing them has 
throughout history often advanced the cause of repressed political 
a series o f  death threats, Sheikh's Pakistani prosecutor resigned and is "under constant 
police guard." Id. at 70. 
217. This approach would require: 
[Olbtaining as much specific local information as possible and then, perhaps 
through the use o f  native 'subcontractors,' convincing people that linking their 
future to bin Laden is a bad idea. I t  would have to be a slow, careful, patient 
process that combined punishment o f  specific violent people with the offer of  
rewards for potential allies o f  the West .  None o f  this would alter the strategy of 
attempting to disrupt bin Laden's access to money and electronic 
communications and forestall further attacks. But, for the present, quiet is 
America's friend, killing, of Americans by bin Laden, and of Arab civilians by 
Americans, is bin Laden's friend, because it  draws ordinary people as well as 
combat troops to his side. 
Lemann, supra note 208, at 36 (emphasis added). 
218. O'Connor & Rumann,  supra note 2, at 1680; see also Frontline: British 
Actions [in Northern Ireland] (PBS television broadcast, Oct. 21, 1997), available 
at http:llwww.pbs.orglwgbh/pageslfrontlinelshowsliralconflictrits.html [herein- 
af ter  British Actions] (quoting the  Northern Ireland Chief o f  Police, who described 
the internment policy as "a disaster"). 
219. See infra notes 237-67 and accompanying text. 
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groups. For example, Great Britain's execution in 1916 of all fifteen 
leaders and others involved with the Easter rebellion led to the 
formation of the Republic of Ireland five years later.220 Apparently 
Osama bin Laden was greatly influenced by Sayyid Qutb, a religious 
leader who espoused Salafiyya, the central doctrine of Wahhabishm, 
a "highly regressive monolithic interpretation of Islam."221 Qutb has 
been described as  "the real founder of Islamic fundamentalism in the 
Sunni ~ o r l d . " 2 ~ ~  He called for martyrs to the cause of Islamic 
revolution: "Those who risk their lives and go out to fight, and who 
are prepared to lay down their lives for the cause of God are 
honorable people, pure of heart and blessed of Although he 
had opportunities to flee the country right before his arrest, Qutb 
refused and was executed in 1966 by Egyptian president, Jamal Abd 
a l - N a ~ s e r . ~ ~ ~  
220. The effect of the executions on Irish people was electric: 
[Tlhousands of people who ten days ago were bitterly opposed to the whole Sinn 
Fein movement, and to rebellion, were now becoming infuriated against the 
Government on account of these executions. . . . It is not murderers who are 
being executed; it is insurgents who have fought a clean fight, a brave fight, 
however misguided, and it would be a damned good thing if your soldiers were 
able to put up as  good a fight as  did these men in Dublin-three thousand men 
against twenty thousand with machine guns and artillery. 
TIM PAT COOGAN, THE IRA 88 (2002) (quoting John Dillon of Irish Parliamentary Party 
and noting that there were in fact far fewer than 3000 rebels). Coogan also observed 
that the "indiscriminate roundup of suspects after the rising, had . . . involved so many 
innocent along with the guilty that alienation from Westminster was given a further 
powerful impetus." Id. 
221. See Amanat, supra note 67, a t  36-37. The doctrine of Salafiyya "and its 
articulation by Sayyid Qutb gained an overwhelming currency among Islamic radicals 
in the early 1980s." Id. at  37. An eminent legal scholar has discussed martyrdom in a 
legal context: 
Martyrdom is an extreme form of resistance to domination. As such it reminds 
us that the normative world building which constitutes "Law" is never just a 
mental or spiritual act. A legal world is built only to the extent that there are 
commitments that place bodies on the line. The torture of the martyr is a n  
extreme and repulsive form of the organized violence of institutions. It  reminds 
us that the interpretive commitments of officials are realized, indeed, in the 
flesh. As long as  that is so, the interpretive commitments of a community which 
resists official law must also be realized in the flesh, even if it be the flesh of its 
own adherents. 
Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1604-05 (1986) (citations 
omitted). 
222. ARMSTRONG, supra note 202, at  169; see also Berman, supra note 204, at  24. 
223. Berman, supra note 204, at  33. 
224. Id.; see also ARMSTRONG, supra note 202, a t  170. Anwar a1 Sadat had 
presided at  his trial before Sadat became Egyptian president. Sadat was apparently 
assassinated by Muslims linked to the present a1 Qaeda for, among other things, his 
role against Qutb. See id. 
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Great Britain, Israel, and Germany, all democratic countries 
threatened by terrorist groups, have rejected pleas for reinstatement 
of the death penalty. In the early eighties when British Parliament 
was considering a death penalty bill, James Prior, former Secretary to 
Northern Ireland, wrote to conservative supporters in Parliament, "I 
believe that the execution of terrorists in Northern Ireland would act 
as  a new inspiration for the IRA and other extremists."225 
Conservative British Prime Minister John Major opposed efforts to 
bring back the death penalty in 1990 and 1994. Israeli Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin noted that  Israel had not judicially executed 
"a single terrorist."226 German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt likewise 
fought against those who attempted to reinstate the death penalty 
"during the reign of terror brought by the Red Army faction."227 
Because nineteen hijackers were willing to kill themselves to 
carry out these crimes, the threat of the death penalty, if limited to 
actual perpetrators, is not likely to deter similar actors in the 
future.228 In fact, in a perverse way, the death penalty might actually 
encourage such actors, standing deterrence theory "on its head."229 If 
caught, they can still be martyrs after being executed by the 
government of the United States.230 In fact, executing them may 
225. See Thomas M .  McDonnell, A Potentially Explosive Execution, NAT'L LAW J .  
July 7 ,  1997, at A17. Portions o f  this section are drawn from this op-ed piece that  I 
wrote i n  connection with the Timothy McVeigh execution. 
226. Id. Although neither Great Britain nor Israel has used capital punishment 
against convicted terrorists, some allege that their armed services have carried out 
extra-judicial executions. See COOGAN, supra note 220, at 575-82; For the Sake of 
Democracy, Britain's 'Dirty War' Must be Investigated, IRISH TIMES, May 21, 2003, at 
14; Israel and the Occupied Territories. Israel Must End its Policy of Assassinations, 
(Amnesty International) July 4, 2003, at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ 
ENGMDE150562003 (last visited Aug. 6 ,  2003); Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva 
Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 65, 107-11 
(2003). But see J .  Nicholas Kendall, Israeli Counter-Terrorism, 'Targeted Killings' 
Under International Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1069, 1070 (2002) (arguing that terrorists 
are legitimate military targets, that  "targeted killings" are justified by  self-defense, and 
that such killings do not amount to  prohibited killing by "perfidy"); Louis Rene-Beres, 
On Assassination as  Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Case of Israel, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
321 (1991) (reaching a similar conclusion). Israel has imposed the death penalty only 
once, on Adolf Eichman, the author of the "Final Solution." Attorney General of Israel 
v. Eichmann, Israel, Supreme Court 1962, 36 INT'L L. REP. 277 (1968), available i n  
PAUST ET AL., supra note 179, at 868. 
227. McDonnell, supra note 225. 
228. But see Green et al., supra note 172, at 225 (comments of Kenneth Roth) 
(noting lack o f  enthusiasm that  a1 Qaeda leaders have for serving as suicide bombers 
themselves). 
229. Id. at 194 (comment of David Bruck). 
230. As one noted capital defense attorney stated: 
Having been involved directly, as defense counsel, i n  one o f  the a1 Qaeda 
prosecutions, I can tell you that  i n  the  world o f  martyrdom it doesn't get any 
better than to be captured by  the United States, brought to  New York,  or to  
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elevate such persons to the status of true martyrs, a t  least in Muslim 
eyes.231 Furthermore, a s  one commentator observed, "Terrorism is 
theatre."232 Trial followed by execution in the United States may put 
the potential terrorist and his or her movement on a world stage. 
Witness, for example, the Bali bomber's reaction to his conviction and 
death sentence in Indonesia in August: "Arnrozi," as  he is known, was 
beaming with his both hands giving the thumbs up as  if he had just 
won an academy award.233 His picture appeared in the New York 
The nineteen individuals who carried out the September 11 
attacks intentionally killed not only themselves, but also over three 
thousand innocents. Although we may accurately describe the 
nineteen as  suicidal mass killers, many in the Arab and Islamic 
worlds probably believe that  the nineteen combine martyrdom with 
rebellion and rev0lution.~3~ Thus executing an actor like Moussaoui 
might run counter not only to the Supreme Court's death penalty 
cases but also to a strategic objective, eliminating support in the 
Muslim world for acts of terrorism.236 
Alexandria, Virginia, tried on a world stage, and then ritually put to death by 
the United States. That's the gold standard of martyrdom. For someone who 
considers blowing himself up on a plane to be a good thing, getting executed by 
the United States is as  good as  it gets. 
Id. at  194 (comments of David Bruck). 
231. See LEWIS, supra note 179. 
Those who are killed in the jihad are called martyrs, in Arabic and other 
Muslim languages shahid . . . The Arabic term shahid also means 'witness' and 
is usually translated 'martyr' . . . In Islamic usage the term martyrdom is 
normally interpreted to mean death in a jihad and its reward is eternal 
bliss. . . Suicide, by contrast, is a mortal sin and earns eternal damnation, 
even for those who would otherwise have earned a place in paradise. 
Id. at  38. 
232. HOFFMAN, supra note 179, a t  132 (quoting Brian Michael Jenkins, 
International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, in INT'L TERRORISM AND WORLD 
SECURITY 16 (1975)). 
233. Jane Perlez, Court Decides to Sentence Bali Bomber to Death, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 8, 2003, a t  A8. 
234. Id. 
235. Professor Cover noted a s  follows: 
Martyrdom is not the only possible response of a group that has failed to adjust 
to or accept domination while sharing a physical space. Rebellion and 
revolution are alternative responses when conditions make such acts feasible 
and when there is a willingness not only to die but also to kill for a n  
understanding of the normative future that differs from that of the dominating 
power. 
Cover, supra note 221, a t  1605 (citations omitted). 
236. See infra notes 237-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Aimal 
Kasi execution and an analogous British execution of a supposed American. 
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2. The Kasi Case-Muslim Reaction to a U.S. Execution 
The case of Aimal Khan Kasi suggests how executing politically 
motivated terrorists may influence the Arab and Muslim worlds. 
Apparently "upset" with U.S. air attacks on Iraq and with the Central 
Intelligence Agency's involvement in Muslim countries,237 Aimal 
Kasi, in 1993, opened fire with an AK-47 assault rifle a t  Central 
Intelligence Agency headquarters, intentionally killing two unarmed 
CIA employees as  they were driving to work and wounding three 
others.238 Kasi fled to his native Pakistan on the day following the 
shooting and remained a t  large for four and a half years, traveling in 
Afghanistan and occasionally returning to Pakistan.239 In  1997, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation agents abducted Kasi from his hotel 
in Pakistan and arranged for him to be flown by military aircraft to 
the United S t a t e ~ . ~ ~ o  Presumably because Congress had not 
reinstated the death penalty under federal law as of the time of the 
killings,241 the FBI handed Kasi over to the State of Virginia. He was 
subsequently tried for murder in a Virginia state court, convicted, 
and sentenced to death.242 
Religious and tribal leaders in Baluchistan called on Islamabad 
and Washington to commute the sentence.243 In the days before 
Kasi's scheduled execution by lethal injection, Quetta, a Pakistani 
city with over a million inhabitants and Kasi's hometown, was 
237. Kasi characterized his actions as "'between jihad and tribal revenge,' jihad 
against America for its support of Israel and revenge against the CIA, which he 
apparently felt had mistreated his father during Afghanistan's war against the 
Soviets." Stern, supra note 205, at  27. 
238. Kasi v. Angelone, 300 F.3d 487, 490, 491 (4th Cir. 2002). 
239. Id. a t  491. 
240. Id. Kasi's motives have been described as  typical of those bent on engaging 
in terrorist activities against the United States: 
[Tlhe reasons that drove Kasi to kill are very similar to those commonly used to 
justify anti-American acts of terrorism. Kasi said he was angry about the 
United States' policies abroad, believing that it was bent on destroying 
Muslims. He deliberately targeted the CIA because, in his eyes, it was one of 
the prime instruments of that destruction. 
Iffat Malik, An Uncertain Start, AL-AHRAM WKLY., Nov. 21, 2002, available at 
http:Nweekly.ahram.org.eg/print12002/613/inl.htm (last visited July 15, 2003). But see 
Kasi v. Angelone, 300 F.3d 487, 491 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that in his confession Kasi 
stated he targeted the CIA not only because of his anti-American views, but also 
because he knew CIA workers were unarmed). 
241. Although Congress had enacted a limited death penalty statute in 1988 
dealing with so-called "drug king-pins," i t  did not enact a broad death penalty statute 
until 1994. See The Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. 5 3591 et seq.; see also 
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,21 U.S.C. 5 848(e)-(r) (providing penalty of death for 
drug king-pins under certain circumstances). 
242. Kasi, 300 F.3d a t  490. 
243. Id. 
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"rocked by protests."244 In the day following the execution, Quetta 
was "complete[ly] shut down" by Pakistani authorities.245 The 
protests were echoed in other parts of Pakistan.246 Hundreds of men, 
wearing black armbands, walked behind the ambulance carrying 
Kasi's body upon its arrival in P a k i ~ t a n . ~ ~ '  The Quetta Trade 
Association called for a half-day strike on the day of his funeral 
beca'use, a spokesperson for the Association declared, "A son of 
Baluchistan has embraced martyrdom."248 Apparently, more than 
10,000 people attended his funeral, which was held in a stadium.249 
The U.S. Department of State issued a worldwide warning that  Kasi's 
execution "could trigger retaliatory attacks on the US or on other 
foreign interests overseas."250 On the Friday after Kasi's execution, a 
bomb exploded in the southern Pakistani city of Hyderabad, killing 
two people a t  a bus stop.251 The bomb was reportedly retaliation for 
Kasi's execution.252 
244. Pakistan on Alert After US Execution (BBC News television broadcast, Nov. 
15, 2002), available at http://news.bbc.co.uW2/lo~/south~asia/2480009.stm (last visited 
July 13, 2003). 
245. Pakistan City Mourns Execution (BBC News television broadcast, Nov. 15, 
2002), available at http:Nnews.bbc.co.uW2/lowlsouth~asia/2480327.stm (last visited 
July 13, 2003). 
246. See Pakistanis in  Death Row Protest, (BBC News television broadcast, Nov. 
11, 2002), available at http://news.bbc.co.uW 2/low/south~asid2445307.stm (last visited 
July 13, 2003); see also Pakistanis in Karachi protest the execution of Mir Aimal Kasi i n  
the US, AL-AHRAM WKLY., Nov. 21, 2003, at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/61 
3Iinl.htm. 
247. Carlotta Gall, World Briefing - Asia: Pakistan: Body of Man Executed i n  
U.S. Is Back, N.Y. T I M E S ,  Nov. 19, 2002, at A18; Thousands Receive Aimal Kasi's Body 
as a Hero and a Martyr, DAILY T I M E S  (PAKISTAN), Nov. 18, 2002, available at 
http://www.ummahnews.com/print.php?sid=272 (last visited June 20, 2003). 
248. Id. 
249. Mazhar Abbas, Thousands Mourn Executed Pakistani, I&RICA.COM, 
available at http://www.iafrica.com/newslworldnews~l87519.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 
2004). 
250. See Pakistanis in  Death Row Protest, supra note 246; State Department, 
U.S. Mission to  Pakistan, U.S. Embassy Islamabad, Warden Notice 3/4/2002,  at 
http://usembassy.state.gov/postslpkllwwwhwardenl1212002.html (last visited July 23, 
2003); see also State Department Press Releases and Document, FED. INFORMATION A N D  
NEWS DISPATCH, Nov. 19, 2002, available at 2002 WL 25973321 (press briefing with 
Philip T .  Reeker, Deputy Spokesperson for State Department). 
251. Malik, supra note 240. 
252. Id.; see also Thousand Receive Aimal Kasi's Body as a Hero and Martyr, 
supra note 247. In addition, four U.S. oil company employees were assassinated i n  
Karachi on November 11, 1997, two days after Kasi's conviction, apparently i n  
retaliation. Bill Baskervill, Pakistani who Killed CIA Agents in  '93 is Executed, Appeal 
Rejected; Reprisals Feared, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 15, 2002, at A2, available at 2002 W L  
101983863; see also Oliver Roy, Hazy Outlines of an  Islamist International: 
Fundamentalists without a Common Cause, LE MONDE, Oct. 1998 (Barry Smerin 
trans.), available at http://mondediplo.com/1998/10/04afghan?var~recherche=%22hazy 
+outlines%22 (last visited July 22, 2003). Harakat a1 Ansar, a group with connections 
to the "Afghan camps," claimed credit for the assassinations. Id. 
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Some point out that  refusing to execute terrorists may still lead 
to retaliatory strikes or violent efforts to free them from prison.253 I 
do not claim that  violence would never come from imposing long 
prison terms rather the death penalty,254 but I suspect that the risk 
of violence is likely greater from imposing death, particularly in the 
context of religiously motivated suicide bombers.255 Aside from the 
possibility of retaliatory strikes, as  the Kasi case shows,,,,death 
sentences almost certainly provoke a much greater resentment and 
anger in the community and country, if not, in this case, the Islamic 
world from which the executed individual c0mes.~~6 
3. The Robbins Case-Early U.S. Reaction to a British Execution 
Demonstrating empirically that imposing the death penalty will 
inflame the Islamic world cannot be done. Aside from the Kasi case, 
an  example from our own history does, however, suggest that 
imposing the death penalty on politically motivated terrorists is likely 
to have such an  effect. The outrage that much of the Muslim world 
may feel if we execute members of a1 Qaeda probably resembles the 
outrage much of the United States felt when a U.S. court acceded to 
President John Adams' request to extradite a sailor, Jonathan 
Robbins (also known as  Thomas Nash), to the British in 1799.257 The 
United States having surrendered him, the British took Robbins to 
Jamaica for trial. The day Robbins reached Jamaica, a Thursday, the 
British started his trial for murder and mutiny. On the following 
Monday, they hung him and left him hanging in chains for all to 
see.258 The extradition and execution led to a public outcry, to 
253. See, e.g., William F. Buckley, Jr., String Them Up, NAT'L REV., June 6, 
2003, at  Vol. LV, No. 13, available at http://www.nationalreview.comlbuckley/ 
buckley060603.asp. 
254. For example, a1 Qaeda members have kidnapped western tourists and 
hijacked at  least one airliner for the sole purpose of freeing other extremist 
fundamentalists from prison. See FOUDA & FIELDING, supra note 43, a t  60-63 (noting, 
among other things, that six Western tourists were kidnapped by Kashmiri rebels with 
links to a1 Qaeda in southern Kashmir and were almost certainly killed when Indian 
authorities refused to release 15 jailed Islamists). 
255. Cf. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (recognizing that 
"death is different," specifically stating, "Death, in its finality, differs more from life 
imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two"). 
256. See supra notes 237-254 and accompanying text and infra notes 257-67 and 
accompanying text. 
257. United States v. Robbins, 27 F. Cas. 825 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175). 
258. Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 
YALE L.J. 229, 233-35 (1990). 
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attempts to censure and impeach President Adams, and greatly 
contributed to his defeat by Thomas Jefferson the following year.259 
Robbins was alleged to be the bosun's mate of the ship Hermione, 
a British ship of war.260 Hermione's captain was a Captain Bligh, 
infamous for the harsh measures he adopted in treating his crew. 
After the captain threatened to flog the last topman to reach the deck, 
causing two crewmen in the rush to fall to their deaths, the crew 
m~tinied.~6-l However, the mutineers not only killed the despised 
captain, they killed three lieutenants, the purser, the ship's doctor, a 
midshipman, the boatswain, and a lieutenant of the marines.262 
Robbins apparently played a leading role not only in the mutiny but 
also in the homicides263 The mutineers later sailed the ship to what 
is now Venezuela and surrendered the ship to the Spanish 
authorities, then the enemy of Great Britain.264 
Robbins claimed to be a U.S. citizen and claimed to have been 
impressed into the British Navy.265 With memory of the war of 
independence fresh, many Americans felt that Robbins was a victim 
of British tyranny. Americans apparently never seriously questioned 
his direct complicity in the killing of the captain and his officers. 
Nevertheless, many Americans were apparently appalled by the 
President's role in turning Robbins over to then hated super-power, 
Great Britain, to carry out Robbins' prompt execution. 
Robbins was not a mass murderer, but he was a leader in a 
conspiracy that took nine lives. His apparent guilt did not quell the 
anger that many Americans felt towards Adams and Great Britain. 
The apparent guilt of a1 Qaeda is not likely to quell the anger that 
many Muslims would feel if the current super-power executes a1 
Qaeda members. The Robbins affair resembles the political offense 
exception to extradition, "reflecting [in part] a concern that 
individuals-particularly unsuccessful rebels-should not be 
returned to countries where they may be subjected to unfair trials 
and punishments [usually the death penalty]."266 
259. Id. at 354-61; see also Michael Edmund O'Neill, Article 111 and the Process 
Due a Connecticut Yankee before King Arthur's Court, 76 MAR@ L. REV. 1, 43-44 (1992). 
260. Wedgwood, supra note 258, at 224. 
261. Id. at 236 n.9 (citing Instruction of Lord Grenville to  British Minister 
Robert Liston (Oct. 7 ,  1796), i n  Instructions to the British Ministers to the United States 
1791-1812, 3 Ann. Rep. Am. Hist. Ass'n 122 & n.56 (B. Mayo ed. 1936), reprinted as 
H.R. Doc. No. 13, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941)). 
262. Id. 
263. Id. at 305-06. 
264. Id. 
265. The  evidence the British put forward suggests that  he  was probably Irish 
and that  he probably enlisted. Id. 
266. Quinn v .  Robinson, 783 F.3d 776, 793 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing M. BASSIOUNI, 
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 425 (1974)). Note, however, 
that the political offense exception generally may not be successfully invoked by 
individuals who have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.  See Quinn v .  
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Given the magnitude of September 11 attacks, one could credibly 
argue that the death penalty is a "fair punishment." Yet one could 
make a similar argument about Robbins, particularly in 1799 when 
the death penalty was carried out in a greater percentage of the 
cases. Although the reports suggest that Robbins directly participated 
in the killing of innocents, the political undertones and U.S. notions 
about the right to rebellion help explain Americans' outrage. I t  is 
hard to deny that similar political undertones exist thraughout the 
Islamic world in the context of the current conflict between a1 Qaeda 
and the United States. 
At the time of the Robbins incident, the United States had a 
democratic process Americans could resort to, to channel their 
outrage. Not only was Adams defeated, but no one was extradited by 
the federal government for more than forty years afterwards.267 The 
countries making up the Islamic world, however, generally do not 
possess such a democratic process. There is all the more reason to 
believe, therefore, that Muslim outrage and resentment about such 
executions might be channeled towards extra-legal means and 
groups. 
4. Venue Decision and Its Possible Impact in the Muslim World 
The Justice Department chose the most pro-prosecution venue in 
indicting not only Moussaoui, but also John Walker Lindh, the 
"American Taliban."268 The Justice Department has laid venue in the 
Eastern District Court of Virginia, with generally pro-prosecution 
judges and a conservative jury That district lies within the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the most conservative and pro- 
prosecution of all the federal circuit courts of appeals.270 This decision 
Robinson, 783 F.2d at 799; Eain v .  Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 523 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981). As demonstrated above, those involved with the 
September 11 attacks have committed crimes against humanity, war crimes, or both. 
See supra notes 179-190 and accompanying text. Some o f  Robbins' acts resemble war 
crimes, i f  one analogizes his and his conspirators' treatment of  the captives to 
treatment of prisoners o f  war. Y e t  the  heinousness of his crimes did not apparently 
assuage the  U.S. reaction. Quinn, 783 F.3d at 793. 
267. Wedgwood, supra note 258, a t  361. Professor Wedgwood argues that  
President Adams did not deserve the  reaction he received given a full study o f  the 
actual facts o f  the  case. Id. at 362. 
268. See Indictment, United States v. Lindh, No. 02-37a (E.D. Va .  Feb. 5, 2002), 
available at http://news.findlaw.com~hdocs/docs~indh/us~1indh020502~mp.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2003). 
269. See Don V a n  Natta, A Nation Challenged: The Legal Venue: Compromise 
Settles Debate Over Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at B1. 
270. Philip Shenon, After the War: the Courts; Hearing to Affect Government's 
Ability to Try Terror Suspects i n  Civilian Courts, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2003, at A12 
(noting the  conservative reputation o f  the  Fourth Circuit); John Gibeaut, Prosecuting 
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was not an accident. The government could have laid venue in New 
York, where the overwhelming number of people were killed, but 
reportedly chose the Eastern District of Virginia, because of its 
"strong record of imposing the death penalty."271 New York federal 
juries, on the other hand, had been reluctant to give the death 
penalty in other terrorist cases.272 
The New York Times reported that  the venue decision helped 
Michael Chertoff, then Chief of the Criminal Division of the Justice 
Department, to persuade the Bush Administration to try Moussaoui 
in federal court rather than by military So one could 
plausibly argue that the venue decision was the lesser of two evils.274 
Ironically, however, the Justice Department's choosing this venue 
argues against imposing the death penalty. Selecting the most pro- 
prosecution venue for all the defendants will probably be viewed in 
the Arab and Islamic worlds as  a cynical ploy to deny the accused a 
fair trial. If that district court metes out any death sentences, 
Muslims will likely view the Department's choice of such a venue as a 
veiled attempt to use the justice system to kill the Muslims 
involved.275 In short, the procedural advantages accorded to the 
government in a conspiracy276 may be considered unjust in the Arab 
Moussaoui, 88 A.B.A.J. 36 (2002) (noting the "traditionally conservative" jury pool in 
Virginia). 
271. Shenon, supra note 270, a t  A12. The Pentagon is located in Virginia. In the 
East African embassy bombings case, i t  was later reported that one juror apparently 
misled the district court and refused to consider imposing the death penalty, and 
another juror as the sole Jew on the jury feared retaliation from a1 Qaeda and thus 
refused to vote for the death penalty. Benjamin Weiser, A Jury Torn and Fearful in 
2001 Terrorism Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.  5, 2003, a t  Al. 
272. Id. New York was also reportedly not chosen, because Justice Department 
prosecutors believed that the district court there would probably have granted 
defendant's motion to change venue. Id. 
273. Van Natta, supra note 269. 
274. See Paust, supra note 188, a t  1. The Bush Administration reportedly has 
indicated that they considered transferring Moussaoui to a military tribunal to avoid 
the defendants' carrying on in court. See Philip Shenon & Eric Schmitt, Threats and 
Responses: the 9/11 Suspect; White House Weighs Letting Military Tribunal Try 
Moussaoui, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, a t  A17. 
275. The Justice Department could defend its decision by arguing that using 
civilian courts against terrorists is difficult enough, so the Department must use every 
procedural advantage at  its disposal. Otherwise, the government may be forced to 
engage in self-help or in refusing to use the civilian courts a t  all and transferring all 
these cases to military tribunals. 
276. Professor Johnson concisely explained the weighted advantages that the 
prosecutor obtains when seeking a conspiracy charge: 
Where there is evidence of conspiracy, the defendant may be tried jointly with 
his criminal partners and possibly with many other persons whom he has never 
met or seen, the joint trial may be held in a place he may never have visited, 
and hearsay statements of other alleged members of the conspiracy may be 
used to prove his guilt. Furthermore, a defendant who is found guilty of 
conspiracy is subject to enhanced punishment and may also be found guilty of 
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and Islamic worlds, a t  least when the death penalty is 
D. Might Imposing the Death Penalty Thwart Cooperation from Our 
Allies? 
1. International Cooperation as Essential in  Defeating Terrorism? 
September 11 changed the political and strategic landscape in 
countless ways, but one of the most significant is the recognition that 
the United States needs the help of other countries to fight the war 
against terrorism. A1 Qaeda reportedly has cells in over sixty 
countries.278 To gather intelligence on such a diffused enemy requires 
cooperation from many states.279 To apprehend those individuals 
requires states that are willing to arrest and either prosecute or, in 
some cases, extradite members of the a1 Qaeda conspiracy to the 
United States. Furthermore given the decentralized nature of a1 
Qaeda, i t  requires that individual citizens of these states come 
forward with information about suspected members and activities of 
any crime committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, whether or not he knew 
about the crime or aided in its commission. 
Phillip E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1140 
(1973). 
277. See supra notes 237-67 and accompanying text. 
278. See Dan Balz & Bob Woodward, America's Chaotic Road to War; Bush's 
Global Strategy Began to Take Shape in First Frantic Hours after Attack, WASH. POST. 
Jan. 27, 2002, a t  Al. Note, by the way, that the "surge in recruitment efforts" for a1 
Qaeda has been observed most prominently in Britain, Spain, Italy, and the United 
States. See Van Natta & Butler, supra note 213, a t  1. The destruction of the Afghan 
camps had 
one perverse and unintended effect[:] Terrorists and their supporters who had 
formerly been concentrated in one known place were dispersed to home regions 
and new hideouts like Chechnya, Yemen, East Africa and Georgia's Pankisi 
Gorge. Regional commanders of al-Qaeda, says Rohan Gunaratna, author of a 
leading book on the network, are now 'operating independently of centralized 
control' . . . and no longer depend on anything from bin Laden and his top brass 
except for ideological inspiration. 
World, TIME, May 26, 2003, a t  26. 
279. "In the fight on terrorism, the United States needs cooperation from 
European and Asian countries in intelligence, law enforcement, and logistics." G. John 
Ikenberry, America's Imperial Ambition, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2002, a t  44, 58; see 
also supra note 209 (collecting authorities noting need for international cooperation); 
Sebastian Rotella, THE WORLD 5 Suspects Helped Fund A1 Qaeda, Spain Says, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, a t  A3 (noting that in arresting five alleged a1 Qaeda money 
launderers, the "Spanish investigation involved close cooperation with authorities in 
France, where the Djerba bomber lived, and in Germany. Spanish investigators also 
received assistance from U.S., Tunisian, Swiss and Portuguese law enforcement"). But 
see Cordesman, supra note 210, a t  16 (minimizing the practical worth of such 
cooperation). 
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a1 Qaeda: "The more useful anti-insurgency [and anti-terror] tactic is 
to compete, literally door to door, for people's loyalty (with the coinage 
of loyalty being willingness to inform on one side or the 0ther)."~~0 
The Bush Administration a t  least initially recognized the 
necessity of international cooperation by immediately ordering the 
payment of back dues owed to the United Nations.281 Forming a 
coalition rather than unilaterally attacking Afghanistan likewise is 
consistent with the need to cooperate with other nations of the world 
to stop the menace of terrorism.282 With the invasion of Iraq, the 
Bush Administration seemed intent, however, on reverting to the pre- 
September 11 unilateralist approach to foreign affairs. "In the 
international realm, we seem to believe that our claim to national 
sovereignty allows us to operate unilaterally-America first and 
foremost, not together or in conformity with a global contract 
[comparable to the domestic social contract]."283 Such an approach 
could prove, a t  the very least, counter-productive in the war against 
a1 Qaeda.284 
At a time when we need help from other countries the most, 
retaining the death penalty alienates a growing number of countries 
that have abolished the death penalty or are taking steps to abolish 
or limit it. As of this writing, 112 countries have abolished the death 
penalty in law or in practice, while only eighty-three countries retain 
the death penalty.285 Virtually all of Europe, including many of the 
Soviet Union's former satellite states, have abolished the death 
280. See also Lemann, supra note 208, at 36. 
281. Mike Allen & Glenn Kessler, Bush's Tax Cut Proposal Renews Party 
Differences; Democrats Object to President's Call for Billions in  Tax Relief as Major 
Part of Stimulus Package, WASH. POST, Oct. 7,2001, at A16. 
282. The U.S. forces and planes, however, have carried out the vast majority of  
the attacks. See Pamela Hess, Afghan Terrorist Camps in  Cross Hairs, UNITED PRESS 
INT'L, Oct. 9, 2001, available i n  LEXIS, News Group File. 
283. Benjamin R. Barber, A Failure of Democracy, Not Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 29, 2002, at A19. For an  excellent article detailing the pitfalls of U.S. 
unilateralism, see Harold H .  Koh, On  American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 
1526-27 (2003). Professor Koh asks which fork i n  the international road the United 
States will take: 
Will it be power-based internationalism, in  which the United States gets its 
way, because of  its willingness to exercise power whatever the rules? Or will it 
be norm-based internationalism, i n  which American power derives not just 
from hard power, but from perceived fidelity to universal values of democracy, 
human rights, and the rule of  law? 
284. See supra notes 191-219 and accompanying text; see also Koh, supra note 
283, at 1501. 
285. Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, Amnesty International, Website 
against the Death Penalty, available at http://web.amnesty.org/pagesldeathpenalty 
-index-eng (last visited July 23, 2003). 
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penalty.2s6 All our NATO allies, with the exception of Turkey, have 
done Neither Canada nor Mexico has the death penalty. Of the 
other thirty-three nations in the Western hemisphere, only the 
United States, Guyana, Guatemala, and Belize permit capital 
punishment.288 European countries strongly oppose the death 
penalty.289 As leading proponents of the four currently operating 
international criminal tribunals, the Europeans successfully argued 
for banning capital punishment from the sentencing authority of the 
International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunals 
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone.290 Many abolitionist countries refuse to extradite 
fugitives to death penalty states absent an  absolute assurance that 
the death penalty will not be carried For example, the Home 
286. The 40-member Council of  Europe has required states applying for 
admission to abolish the  death penalty. Russia, Georgia, the Ukraine, Estonia and 
other eastern states are or have already taken steps to do so to gain admission to the 
Council. See Montenegro Abolishes Death Penalty, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 19, 
2002 (noting that Montenegro abolished death penalty to fulfill condition of admission 
to  Council of Europe), available in LEXIS, News Group File. Furthermore, the Council 
of  Europe voted to extend the abolition of the death penalty to  wartime offenses. See 
European States Drop Wartime Exception to Death Penalty Ban, AGENCE FRANCE 
PRESSE, May 3, 2002, available in  LEXIS, News Group File. Protocol No. 13 to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, Concerning the Abolition of the Death 
Penalty in  All Circumstances (Vilnius, May 3, 2002), entered into force, July 1, 2003, 
available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/ju~protl3.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 
2003) (abolishing death penalty in  wartime as well as peacetime). 
287. The Turkish parliament has, however, recently abolished the death penalty 
for offenses committed in  peacetime. See Amnesty International, Turkey: Abolition of  
the Death Penalty Welcomed, at http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/EUR440362002? 
OpenDocument&of=AbolitionCOUNTRIES\TURKEY (last visited Mar. 13, 2003); see 
also Ocalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221199 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 12, 2003) 
(concluding that imposing death penalty on notorious Kurdish terror group leader, 
Abdullah Ocalan, would violate Article 3 of European Convention on Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms, because of unfair trial procedures to which Turkey subjected 
him), available at http:/flegal.aptich/MechanismslEurope/European~Court/Death%20 
Penaltylec-ocalan-12-03-2003.htm. 
288. lan Clarke, Terrorism, Extradition, and the Death Penalty, 29 WM. 
MITCHELL . REV. 783,806 (2003). 
289. Ethan Bronner, Power us. Peace: a Clash of Worlduiews; Trans-Atlantic 
Tension, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 1, 2003, at 4. 
290. Somini Sengupta, African Held for War Crimes Dies i n  Custody of a 
Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2003, at A6. 
291. The Spanish government has indicated it will not extradite suspected a1 
Qaeda members to  the United States absent assurances that the death penalty will not 
be sought. See Rotella, supra note 279, at A3; Europe's Doubts, FIN. T I M E S ,  Dec. 14, 
2001, at 20. In 2001, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled against extraditing two 
Canadian nationals to the United States absent assurances that they will not be 
subject to  the death penalty. United States v. Burns, [2001] S.C.R. 283, 7 143 (Can.). 
See Bruce Zagaris, A. Canadian Supreme Court Rules Suspects Can Be Extradited to 
US  Only With Assurances, Extradition Part IV, 17 INT'L L. ENFORCEMENT REP. 145 
(Apr. 2001), available at LEXIS, Int'l Law Newsletters file; see also Bruce Zagaris, 
Heinonline - -  37 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 4 1 2  2004  
20041 DEA TH PENAL TY 413 
Secretary of staunch ally Great Britain has told U.S. officials that  he 
"would approve extradition [of suspected terrorists] only if the Unites 
States waived the right to impose the death penalty."292 The Supreme 
Court of Canada has taken the unusual step of requiring the Minister 
of Justice of Canada to demand assurances from the United States 
that i t  will not impose capital punishment on Canadian citizens 
whose extradition is ~ o u ~ h t . ~ g ~  Insisting on executing members of a1 
Qaeda could thus deprive us of necessary evidence and, in some cases, 
of the fugitives themselves.294 In short, our closest allies are 
abolitionist states. To the extent that we use the death penalty in the 
war on terror we may find those allies reluctant to cooperate fully 
with 
The threat of  an eventual death sentence for Mr. Moussaoui makes it 
difficult for any European country to determine how far to cooperate with 
the American investigation. Outlawing the death penalty is a condition of  
membership to the 15-nation European Union, and the Council of  
Europe, which embraces more than 40 countries, not only forbids the 
Uruguay Supreme Court Approves Extradition of Suspected Terrorist to Egypt, Counter- 
terrorism Enforcement Cooperation, 19 INT'L L. ENFORCEMENT REP. 303 (Aug. 2003), 
available at LEXIS, Int'l Law Newsletters file, at *1 (noting that Uruguayan Supreme 
Court upheld the extradition of the terrorist suspect "after Egypt agreed not to apply 
the death penalty or life imprisonment"). 
292. U.S. Death Penalty Could Prove Hurdle to Extradition of Terror Suspects 
from Britain, ASSOC. PRESS, Oct. 8, 2001 (statement of  David Blunkett, Home 
Secretary); cf. Bruce Zagaris, British Court Denies U.S. Extradition Request on 
Algerian Pilot in  Alleged Terrorism Conspiracy, 18 INT'L L. ENFORCEMENT REP. 6 (June 
2002) (noting that British judge refused to  extradite Lotfi Raissi, Algerian national, to 
United States on ground that United States failed to provide sufficient evidence that 
Raissi participated i n  September 11 conspiracy by training one of  pilots). 
293. Minister of  Justice v. Burns, 1 S.C.R. 283, 2001 S.C.C. 7 ,  available at 
http://www.canlii.org/cdcaslscc/2001120Olscc7.hmtl; see also The Soering Case, 161 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)  at 217 (1989) (refusing to  extradite German national, accused of 
double murder, to  Virginia on ground that "death row phenomenon" there violated 
Article 3 of European Convention on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms). 
294. See Mohamed Dalvie v. President of  the Republic of S. Mr., 2001 (7) SALR 
685 (CC) (concluding that a1 Qaeda suspect i n  embassy bombings was wrongfully 
deported to United States absent receiving assurances that United States would not 
impose death penalty and ordering that judgment be sent to  U.S. District Court of  
Southern District of  New York where suspect was being tried). Should the U.S. Justice 
Department decide to  move Moussaoui's case out of federal court and into a military 
tribunal, our allies, especially Europeans, might be even more reluctant to extradite a1 
Qaeda suspects to the United States. See Toni Locy, Moussaoui Prosecutors Wary of  
Tribunal, U S A  TODAY, May 14, 2003, at A4. 
295. In dealing with other crises, the United States has given assurances that 
the death penalty will not be sought in  order to obtain certain fugitives. Israel Agrees to 
Extradite Man Sought in  Letter-Bomb Killing, L.A. T IMES,  July 13, 1993, at B10; Keith 
B. Richburg, Court in  France Approves Extradition of U.S. Fugitive, WASH. POST, June 
29, 2001, at A31 (two instances in  which extradition was approved after death penalty 
was taken o f f  table). Whether pursuing the death penalty would hinder the 
interchange of  intelligence and of  other matters remains to be seen. 
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death penalty but also recently decided that it should not apply even in 
wartime.296 
A1 Qaeda, however, appears to be attacking not just the United 
States, but also other western countries. Since September 11, the 
following attacks (among others) linked to a1 Qaeda have taken place: 
(1) In  April 2002, a suicide truck bomb exploded a t  a Tunisian 
synagogue, killing twenty-one people, mostly French and German 
vacationers;297 (2) On October 6, 2002, a speedboat packed with 
explosives crashed into a French oil tanker moored off the Yemen 
coast, piercing both hulls and causing the tanker to dump 90,000 
barrels of oil into the sea;298 (3) Six days later, bombs detonated a t  a 
resort in the Indonesian island of Bali, killing more than 200 
civilians, including eighty-eight A u s t r a l i a n ~ ; ~ ~ ~  (4) On November 28, 
2002, militants attacked an Israeli-owned hotel in Kenya as  well a 
making an attempted missile attack, which "narrowly missed an  
airliner carrying home Israeli vacationers";300 (5) On May 12, 2003, a1 
Qaeda attacked the living quarters of Western workers in Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia;301 (6) On May 16, 2003, suicide bombers 
simultaneously carried out several attacks on civilian targets in 
Morocco, targeting not only Moroccans, but, possibly, Spanish 
nationals as  well;302 (7) On August 5, 2003, a bomb blew up the 
296. Steven Erlanger, Traces of Terroc The Intelligence Reports; Germany 
Disputes Visit of Qaeda Figure, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2002, at A19. 
297. Josh Meyer, Attack i n  Saudi Arabia, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 2003, at A l .  
298. Bill Coffin, Rough Water, 50 RISK MGMNT. MAG., Mar. 3, 2003, at 10 (noting 
that on October 6, 2002, a1 Qaeda terrorists "slammed an explosive laded [sic] 
speedboat" into French oil tanker moored of f  coast of  Yemen, causing i t  to spill oil into 
sea); see also Meyer, supra note 297. 
299. Armozi, the alleged mastermind behind the Bali attacks, said at a news 
conference after his arrest that he regretted the bombings killed so many Australians 
when he intended to target Americans. Death Penalty Sought for Main Suspect in  Bali 
Bombings, KYODO NEWS INT'L, July 8, 2003, available in  LEXIS, International 
Newsletters file. Aside from blowing up  the discotheque, bombs went o f f  inside Patty's 
Irish Pub also i n  Kuta, Indonesia as well as close to  the U.S. consulate i n  Denpasar, 
Indonesia. Alleged Field Coordinator for Bali Bombing Goes on Trial, KYODO NEWS 
INT'L, July 22, 2003, available in  LEXIS, International Newsletter file. 
300. Meyer, supra note 297. 
301. Americans suffered the most casualties in  these attacks carried out by a1 
Qaeda, but  other foreigners also died. Saudis More Open About Recent Attacks Than 
They Were About September 11, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Plus Wires Database. 
Along with eight Americans killed i n  these attacks, seven Saudis, three Filipinos, two 
Jordanians, and one each from Australia, Great Britain, Ireland, Lebanon, and 
Switzerland also died. Donna Abu-Nasr, ASSOC. PRESS, May 15, 2003. 
302. The Asian Wall Street Journal reported, however, that the low-level 
Jordanian a1 Qaeda coordinator of  the Moroccan attacks came up  with the targets. 
Peter Finn, Story of Moroccan Bombers Is Rooted in  Casablanca Slum, ASIAN WALL ST. 
J., June 4, 2003, available at 2003 WL-WSJA 55992014. The a1 Qaeda leadership had 
apparently informed him that they wanted attacks i n  Morocco without specifying any 
targets. Id. He chose targets that had Jewish links or were associated with 
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Mariott Hotel in Jakarta, capital of Indonesia;303 and (8) On March 
11, 2004, ten bombs were detonated on four commuter trains in 
Madrid, killing over 200 people and wounding over 1,400, 
constituting the worst terrorist attack on European soil since World 
War II.304 Although the Spanish government initially blambed ETA, 
the Basque separatist group, the government has arrested, among 
others, three Morrocans, one of whom apparently "dealt closely with 
an  [all Qaeda cell based in Spain . . . ."305 
On November 12, 2002, an  audiotape containing the voice of 
Osama bin Laden was broadcast. On the tape, bin Laden expressly 
names as  targets Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, 
and the United Kingdom.306 Responding to the threat, European 
governments "departed from their relatively circumspect low-key 
approach to terrorism alerts and issued stark warnings about 
planned attacks in Europe."307 
If our allies are also under attack, they might, arguably, not be 
so concerned about our position on the death penalty for accused a1 
Qaeda killers. For example, France and Germany initially refused to 
turn over evidence against Moussaoui to the United States, because 
the Justice Department has sought the death penalty in his case. 
France and Germany, however, later softened their stance and agreed 
to turn over the requested evidence provided it was only used in the 
"guilt phase" of the The change in position, however, might 
'<debauchery''-namely, a Spanish restaurant, a Jewish-owned Italian restaurant, a 
Jewish social club, and the Jewish cemetery. Id. The  Farah hotel was also on the list. 
Id. A1 Qaeda apparently gave the local coordinator $50,000 to $70,000 to  fund the 
attacks. Id. 
303. Jane Perlez, The Attack: Group Linked to A1 Qaeda Seen Behind Jakarta 
Blast, N.Y. T I M E S ,  Aug. 7 ,  2003, at A12 (noting that 33-storey Mariott hotel was "the 
most visibly American building i n  the city"). 
304. Elaine Sciolino, 10 Bombs Shatter Trains in Madrid, Killing 192, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2004, at A l ;  T i m  Golden & Craig S. Smith, Spain Arrests 5 More 
Suspects in  Madrid Bomb Attacks, N.Y. TIMES,  Mar. 19, 2004 (noting that the death 
toll had risen to  202). 
305. Golden & Smith, supra note 304, at A12. There is other evidence that is 
pointing towards individuals who may be linked to a1 Qaeda as responsible for the 
bombings. See id. Furthermore, an  audiotape was broadcast last October, "reportedly" 
i n  the voice of  Osama bin Laden, i n  which he directly threatens Spain. Sciolino, supra 
note 304, at A l .  Spain has been a staunch ally of  the Bush Administration and has 
sent 1,300 troops to Iraq. Id.; see also Richard Norton-Taylor & Rosie Cowan, Madrid 
Bomb Suspect Linked to UK Extremists, T H E  GUARDIAN, Mar. 17, 2004, available at 
2004 WL 56438604 (reporting that a suspect in  the Madrid bombings met an extremist 
Islamist who may have shared a flat with Zacarias Moussaoui in  London). 
306. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Purported Bin Laden Tape Lauds Bali, Moscow 
Attacks, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2002, at A l ;  see also Stevenson, supra note 8; Sciolino, 
supra note 304, at A1 (noting that Osama bin Laden threatened Spain last October). 
307. Id. at 75. 
308. Germany and France announced their change in  position approximately 
two weeks after the Osama bin Laden audiotape was broadcast. Germany had initially 
refused to  provide the evidence needed by the U.S. Justice Department for the 
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have been primarily due not to the urge to fight a common enemy, but 
to U.S. pressure on those two countries, because their governments 
were so outspoken in opposing the U.S. and British plan to invade 
Iraq.309 
To help fight the terrorist threat, the United States and the 
European Union have also recently entered into an  agreement to 
speed extradition of suspected terrorists to and from the United 
States.310 That agreement, however, contains an anti-death penalty 
Moussaoui case, because of  German law and practice of not doing so in  capital cases. 
See Steven Erlanger, Traces of Terror: The Terror Trial; German Chancellor Hopes to 
Release Evidence Soon, N.Y. TIMES,  June 11, 2002, at A26. Apparently, Germany's 
constitutional ban on the  death penalty prohibits handing over any evidence that  
"could lead to a conviction that  results i n  execution." Id. Germany had apparently 
refused to  hand over bank transfers that show that Moussaoui was wired money from 
Ramzi Muhammad Abdullah bin al-Shibh. Id. The transfers apparently have al-Shibh's 
fingerprints on  them. Id. Germany requested assurances that the  death penalty not be 
sought for Moussaoui, but  the  United States rejected that request. Id. France had also 
initially indicated that  i t  would not turn over any evidence on Moussaoui, because the 
United States is seeking the  death penalty. Id. Germany and France, however, 
ultimately agreed to hand over the  requested evidence after receiving assurances that  
the evidence would only be used during the guilt phase of the capital trial and not i n  
the penalty phase. Dan Eggen, U.S. to Get Moussaoui Data from Europe, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 28, 2002, at A19; see also Larry Margasak, U.S. Seeks to Block Moussaoui 
Documents, ASSOC. PRESS, Mar. 27,2003, available at 2003 WL 17302860. 
As Moussaoui's standby attorney pointed out, however, the  jury i n  the  guilt phase 
sits for the penalty phase i f  a guilty verdict is reached. Id. Evidence heard i n  the  guilt 
phase cannot help but  influence t he  jury in the  penalty phase of the  trial. See Bruce 
Zagaris, Germans and French Agree to Give Evidence i n  Moussaoui Case Evidence 
Gathering and International Human Rights, 19 INT'L L. ENFORCEMENT REP. 21, 22 
(2003), available at LEXIS, Int'l Law Newsletter file. The evidence is important to  the  
Government's case: 
[The documents] arguably establish important connections between Moussaoui 
and a1 Qaeda operatives. In particular, documents i n  the possession of  German 
authorities show money transfers from a member of the Hamburg group that 
carried out the  September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks i n  the U.S. In particular, 
they include details of two money transfers that totaled $14,000 from Ramzi 
Binalshibh, a n  alleged member of  the a1 Qaeda cell i n  Hamburg, to  Moussaoui. 
Mr. Binalshibh, who is i n  U.S. custody, has told U.S. authorities that Moussaoui 
was only a backup i n  the September 11 plans, because the a1 Qaeda cells did not 
view him as trustworthy. The  French documents include the  original version of a 
dossier showing Moussaoui's childhood and early adult life i n  southern France, 
including his links with Islamic radicals both there and i n  London. 
Id. at 21 (citations omitted). 
309. See also Stevenson, supra note 8, at 75; cf. Richard Bernstein, Germany 
Offers to Expand Afghan Force of the U.N. Approves, N.Y. T I M E S ,  Aug. 28, 2003, at A5 
(German offer t o  send 250 troops t o  Kabul "seems likely to  help warm relations with 
the United States after Germany's opposition to  the American military action i n  Iraq"). 
310. Agreement on Extradition, June 25, 2003, U.S.-E.U., 2003 O.J. ( L  181) 27, 
Celex No. 203A0719 (01) bereinafter EU-US Extradition Agreement]. But see 
European Convention on  Human Rights, supra note 286 (abolishing death penalty i n  
wartime as well as peacetime). 
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article that the European states can expect to invoke before 
extraditing any individuals to the United States.311 Despite a possible 
growing perception of a threat from a common enemy, the U.S. resort 
to the death penalty resonates deeply within the European 
community and almost certainly affects the degree of cooperation we 
can expect from abolitionist countries in general, from Canada and 
Mexico, and from the citizens and governments of Europe.312 
2. U.S. Violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
The United States has also angered its allies by refusing to 
enforce Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 
particularly in death cases.313 That article requires a state-party to 
311. The capital punishment article provides as follows: 
Where the offence for which extradition is sought is punishable by death under 
the laws in the requesting State and not punishable by death under the laws in 
the requested State, the requested State may grant extradition on the condition 
that the death penalty shall not be imposed on the person sought, or if for 
procedural reasons such condition cannot be complied with by the requesting 
State, on condition that the death penalty if imposed shall not be carried out. If 
the requesting State accepts extradition subject to conditions pursuant to this 
Article, i t  shall comply with the conditions. If the requesting State does not 
accept the conditions, the request for extradition may be denied. 
EU-US Extradition Agreement, supra note 310, art. 13. 
312. Clarke, supra note 288, at  807; see Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent 
Respectnto World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1085, 1130 (2002). 
But see Michael Novak, North Atlantic Community, European Community, NAT'L REV. 
ONLINE, July 24, 2003, at www.nationalreview.com/novak072403.asp (last visited Feb. 
11, 2004) (noting that people of Europe may be in line with people of United States on 
death penalty, but that elites in Europe strongly oppose it). Another commentator has 
observed the following concerning the different attitudes and policies of the United States 
and Europe: 
What distinguishes United States from Great Britain, France and Canada is 
not the percentage of the population that expresses support for the death 
penalty but the intensity of some elements of that support and the distinctive 
political structure that exists to translate sentiment into political action at  the 
state level. 
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 136 
(2003). 
313. Ginger Thompson, Texas Executes Mexican for Murder Despite President 
Fox's Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2002, at  A5. Noting the failure of the Texas police to 
advise the executed Mexican national of his right to consult with the Mexican consul, 
President Vicente Fox complained that "[nlot only was Mr. Suarez Medina deprived of 
his right to the benefit of his country's assistance when he most needed it, but the 
Mexican government was also prevented from providing priority assistance that might 
have influenced the outcome of his trial." Id. As of August 6, 2003, there were 119 
foreign nationals on U.S. death rows. Death Penalty Information Center, Foreign 
Nationals and the Death Penalty in the United States, Jan. 1, 2004, at  
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2003). At least 18 foreign nationals 
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inform "without delay" any foreign nationals whom it arrests of their 
right to consult with their consular official.314 In a string of cases, 
U.S. federal and state courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have 
rejected challenges to the imposition of the death penalty when local 
law enforcement authorities failed to notify foreign nationals of their 
right under the Convention to consult their consular officials.315 The 
have been executed, none of whom apparently received notice of their right to consult 
with a consular official from their country. Id. 
314. Article 36 provides as  follows: 
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to 
nationals of the sending State: . . . (b) if he so requests, the competent 
authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post 
of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is 
arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any 
other manner . . . The said authorities shall inform the person concerned 
without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph. 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, opened for signature, April 24, 1963, art. 
36.l(b), 596 U.N.T.S. 262 (emphasis added); see also U.N. Body of Principles for the 
Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 
431173, U.N. G.A.O.R., 43d Sess. Supp. No. 49, at  prin. 16(2), U.N. Doc. A143149 (1988); 
U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, E.S.C. Res. 663(c), U.N. 
ESCOR 24th Sess., Supp. No. 1, art. 38(1), U.N. Doc. El3048 (1957) (providing 
essentially the same right of consular notification and assistance as Article 36 of the 
Vienna Convention). 
315. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1998) (ruling that since Vienna 
Consular Convention claim was not raised a t  trial in state court, that claim was 
procedurally defaulted); United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 71 (1st Cir. 2000) (rejecting 
challenge under Vienna Consular Convention); United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 
226 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Santos, 235 F.3d 1105, 1107 (8th 
Cir. 2000); United States v. Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 F.3d 1194, 1196 (11th Cir. 2000); 
United States v. Carrillo, 70 F.2d 854, 859 (N.D. Ill. 1999); United States v. Hongla- 
Yamche, 55 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77 (D. Mass. 1999). 
A few state and federal courts have given foreign defendants some limited relief. 
See, e.g., United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(suppressing foreign defendant's statement because police failed to tell defendant of his 
right to speak with consular official from his country); State v. Reyes, 740 A.2d 7, 24-27 
(Del. Super. Ct. 1999) (same). See also United States v. Rangel-Gonzalez, 617 F.2d 529, 
532 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that rights established by Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations are personal to defendant); United States v. Lombrera-Camorlinga, 170 F.3d 
1241 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(concluding that foreign national who is arrested but not informed of his rights under 
Vienna Convention has private cause of action under Section 1983); Valdez v. State, 46 
P.3d 703 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003) (granting Mexican national's petition for post- 
conviction relief, reasoning that while the ICJ's judgment in LaGrand did not mandate 
abandonment of procedural default rules, failure to provide consular notice, along with 
other evidence indicating lack of diligence on part of assigned counsel justified relief 
requested). An Ohio Supreme Court justice noted that the policy ramifications of 
violating the Convention on Consular Relations: 
Our best way to ensure that other nations honor the treaty by providing 
consular access to our nationals is to demand strict adherence to the right to 
consular access for foreigners in our country. . . If the United States fails in its 
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International Court of Justice has ruled that the United States 
violated international law in refusing to notify the defendants of their 
rights under the Vienna Convention and in refusing to stay the order 
of execution pending the outcome of challenges filed by complaining 
states in the ICJ.316 Apparent U.S. disregard of the Convention and 
the ICJ could make our allies not only less concerned about the rights 
of U.S. citizens traveling abroad,317 but also could make them 
somewhat less eager3l8 to help us in the war on terror.319 
responsibilities under the  convention, then other member countries may choose 
to do unto us  as we have done unto them. 
State v .  Issa, 93 Ohio St.  3d 49, 80-81 (2001) (Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting). See 
also William J. Aceves & Bernard H .  Oxman (ed.), International Decision, LaGrand 
(Germany v. United States), 96 AM. J. INPL L. 210, 218 n.48 (2002) (noting that "[iln 
September 2001, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals stayed the execution of  a 
Mexican national, i n  part because of the purported Consular Relations Convention 
violation and the broader implications of  the ICJ's ruling) (citing Okla. Court Postpones 
Execution of Mexican; International Law Cited in  Ruling, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2001, 
at A16). William J. Aceves, LaGrand (Germany v. United States), 96 AM. J .  INT'L L. 
210, 218 n.48 (2002) (citing Okla. Court Postpones Execution of Mexican; International 
Law Cited in  Ruling, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2001, at A16). 
316. La Grand Case (F.R.G. v .  U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 1 (June 27), available at 
ht tp : / /www.ic j -c i j .o rg / ic jwww/idocket / i~ame.h tm (last visited Aug. 1, 2002). 
Note that on February 5, 2003, the Court granted Mexico's request for provisional 
measures against the United States to  stop the pending executions of three Mexican 
nationals who likewise were not provided consular advice. Case Concerning Avena and 
Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), Request for the Indication of  
Provisional Measures, Order, I.C.J. (Feb. 5, 2003), available at http://212.153.43.18/ 
icjwwwlidocketlimuslimusframe.htm; Bruce Zagaris, ICJ Grants Provisional Remedies 
for Mexicans on U.S. Death Row, 19 INT'L L. ENFORCEMENT REP. 148 (Apr. 2003), 
available at LEXIS, Int'l Law Newsletters file, at *1, *3 ("Coming only 18 months after 
the ICJ decision in LaGrand, the decision indicates that opponents of the death penalty 
are gaining momentum i n  international courts."). The Right to Information on 
Consular Assistance in  the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, 
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 16, Advisory Op. 0C-16/99, Ser. A (1999) (reaching same result as 
ICJ in  LaGrancE). The U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution by a vote of 121-1 
endorsing the Advisory Opinion. See Protection of Migrants, G.A. Res. AIRes154, U.N. 
GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc. 16624 (2000) ("[tlaking note o f  the 
decisions of the relevant international juridical bodies on questions relating to  
migrants, in  particular the Advisory Opinion 0C-16/99 issued by the Inter-American 
Court of  Human Rights . . . regarding the right to  information about consular 
assistance within the framework of  due process guarantees"). See generally Declaration 
on the Human Rights of  Individual Who Are Not Nationals of the Country in  Which 
They Live, G.A. Res. 144, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. AIRes140/144 
(1985) (linking consular assistance to  due process). The United States was the only 
country to vote against the resolution. Under the purpose and plain meaning o f  "the 
Supremacy Clause," the LaGrand case is binding on state and federal courts. See U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, 3 2. 
317. Our moral standing to argue for the protection of our nationals when they 
are arrested abroad is compromised by the judicial rejection of the Vienna Convention. 
Note: Too Sovereign but not Sovereign Enough: The U.S. Stales Beyond the Reach of the 
Law of Nations?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2654, 2677 (2003). That standing has further been 
weakened by our apparent unqualified resort to  military tribunals in  virtually all cases 
involving the Taliban and a1 Qaeda. Charles V .  Pena, Blowback: The Unintended 
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The United States is a party to the Convention against Torture, 
which prohibits inflicting "extreme pain or suffering whether physical 
or menta1."324 There are no exceptions to the Torture Conventi0n.~~5 
Under the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), a state may in times of emergency derogate from certain 
obligations to provide civil liberties.326 The Covenant expressly 
prohibits, however, derogation from a state's obligation to refrain 
from""subject[ing] [any person] to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment."327 The United States is also a 
party to the ICCPR.328 
Adam Liptak, Questioning to be Legal, Humane and Aggressive, the White House Says, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,2003, at  A13. "There are a lot of ways short of torturing someone to 
get information from a subject," said one U.S. official. Id. In dealing with other a1 
Qaeda suspects, "[tlhe United States has deprived suspects of sleep and light, kept 
them in awkward positions f& hours and used psychological intimidation or deception 
to confuse and disorient them." Id. The European Court of Human Rights, however, 
declared a similar practice engaged in by the British against IRA prisoners to be 
"inhuman and degrading treatment," but not "torture" within the meaning of Article 3 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 7 167 (1978). 
324. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027, entered into force June 26, 1987 [hereinafter 
Torture Convention]. Concerning the death penalty, the U.S. Senate attached an 
understanding to its advice and consent to the Convention: 
That the United States understands that international law does not prohibit 
the death penalty, and does not consider this Convention to restrict or prohibit 
the United States from applying the death penalty consistent with the Fifth, 
Eighth andlor Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States, including any constitutional period of confinement prior to the 
imposition of the death penalty 
United States Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, CONG. 
REC. S17486-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (U.S. Understanding, II(4)). The U.S. Senate 
also attached a reservation purporting to equate torture to violations of the Fifth, 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution: 
That the United States considers itself bound by the obligation under Article 16 
to prevent "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," only 
insofar as the term "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" 
means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited 
by the Fifth, Eighth, andlor Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States. 
Id. at  I(2). 
325. Article 2.2 of the Torture Convention states as follows: "No exceptional 
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political 
instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture." 
Torture Convention, supra note 324, Art. 11. 
326. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
concluded Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 4.1, 4.2, 993 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967). 
327. Id. a t  4.2. The Torture Convention itself has a similar provision: "NO 
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, 
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A debate has arisen in the United States, however, over whether 
the government should embark on a policy of torture, a t  least when 
dealing with the so-called "ticking-bomb terrorist."329 One noted 
commentator has suggested that, given the stakes, a judicial warrant 
exception allowing torture in such narrow circumstances should be 
created.330 Some additional respected authorities have indicated that 
torture may be justified in "extraordinary  circumstance^."^^^ Otheas 
have pointed out, however, that identification of such "ticking~bomb 
terrorists" is usually difficult, that information provided under 
torture is often unreliable, that such a policy would lead to a slippery 
slope here (if we can torture suspected terrorists, why not suspected 
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a 
justification of torture." Torture Convention, supra note 324, art. 11. 
328. President Bush issued a declaration of national emergency on September 
14, 2001, which would presumably comply with the ICCPR, as a result of the  
September 11 attacks. See Proclamation No. 7463,66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 18,2001). 
The U.S. Senate attached t o  its advice and consent to  the ICCPR a similar reservation, 
namely, equating torture and degrading treatment with a violation under the  Fifth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. U.S. reservations, declarations, and 
understandings, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Reservation I 
(3),  138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). 
329. The  ticking bomb terrorist is generally a recently apprehended terrorist 
suspect who is potentially able "to disclose information that  would prevent an  
imminent and massive terrorist attack." Sung, supra note 322, at 194. 
330. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 185, at 158-59. 
331. John T .  Parry & Welsh S .  White ,  Znterrogating Suspected Terrorists: 
Should Torture Be a n  Option? 63 U .  PITT. L. REV. 743,745 n.8 (2002): 
Symposium on  the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Methods o f  
Investigation of the General Security Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist 
Activity, 23 ISR. L. REV. 141 (1989) (collecting comments by  Alan Dershowitz, 
Sanford Kadish, Michael Moore, and Paul Robinson, all of whom conclude 
torture could be permissible i n  limited circumstances); Steve Chapman, Should 
We Use Torture to Stop Terrorism?, CHI .  TRIB.,  Nov. 1, 2001, at 31; Michael 
James & Peter Hermann, Torture Likely Tool in  Anti-Terror Fight, BALT. SUN, 
Oct. 10, 2001, at 11A (quoting Professor David Powell's claim that 
"[elxtraordinary behavior is necessary under extraordinary circumstances"); 
Jodie Morse, How Do We Make Him Talk?, T I M E ,  Apr. 15, 2002, at 44 (quoting 
Professor Anthony D'Amato's suggestion that  torture may be "required to  save 
lives" in certain cases); Walter Pincus, Silence of  4 Terror Probe Suspects Poses 
Dilemma for FBI, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2001, at A6 (quoting Professor David 
Cole's admission tha t ,  "[ i l f  there is a ticking bomb, it i s  not an  easy issue, it's 
t o u g h ) ;  Jim Rutenberg, Torture Seeps into Discussion by News Media, N.Y. 
TIMES,  Nov. 5, 2001, at C1 (noting a former deputy attorney general argued, "it 
might also be permissible to  transfer terrorist subjects to  other nations with 
different standards o f  interrogation"); Patricia Williams, War and the Law, T H E  
OBSERVER (London), Dec. 2 ,  2001 (discussing former Clinton Justice 
Department official Robert Litt's argument that torture could be used i n  
emergencies even though it is not authorized by law). 
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murderers, rapists, and child molesters?),332 that it would encourage 
other countries to resort to torture, that it violates moral standards 
as well as U.S. and international and that the use of torture 
might so anger the religious and ethnic groups of the tortured 
individuals that torture will only increase terrorism.334 
In Northern Ireland, Great Britain's policy initiated in 1971 of 
subjecting mainly members of the minority Catholic community 
suspected of IRA activity to internment including degrading 
treatment, if not torture, enraged the Catholic community and 
provided the IRA with one of its best recruiting tools.335 Perceived to 
be aimed at  that already discriminated-against minority, the policy 
"undermined British rule in Northern Ireland."336 Given the ethnic 
and religious overtones in the current struggle against a1 Qaeda, 
there is substantial reason to believe that the United States' 
employing an official or unofficial policy of torture will also 
strengthen that organi~ation.~~'  A torture policy may also endanger 
U.S. troops who are attempting to arrest or capture a1 Qaeda 
members. Such a1 Qaeda operatives would have an additional 
incentive to fight to the death rather than lay down their arms.338 
332. Peter Maass, The World: Torture, Tough or Lite; If a Terror Suspect Won't 
Talk, Should He Be Made To? N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,2003, D4. 
333. Sung, supra note 322, at 199-210, See Regina v.  Bartle (the Pinochet case), 
381 I.L.M. 581 (House of Lords, Mar. 24, 1999), i n  JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 653, 655 (2000) ("The jus cogens 
nature of the international crime of torture justifies states i n  taking universal 
jurisdiction over torture wherever committed.") (Browne-Wilkinson, L.J.); cf. Barbara 
Crossette, U.S. Fails in  Effort to Block Vote on U.N. Convention on Torture, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 25, 2002, at A7 (apparently fearing demands for access to  Guantanomo Bay 
detention camp, United States unsuccessfully opposed proposed "optional protocol" to 
Torture Convention "to establish a system of regular inspections o f  prisons and 
detention centers worldwide to check for abuses"). 
334. Crossette, supra note 333. 
335. See O'Connor & Rumann, supra note 2, at 1663, 1679; see also British 
Actions, supra note 218 (noting that "as a result of it [internment], the IRA were able to 
recruit young men i n  scores if not in  hundreds"). 
336. British Actions, supra note 218. 
337. The U.S. record is hardly spotless. Washington apparently has turned some 
terrorist suspects over to countries (such as Egypt, Jordan and Morocco) that do 
torture. Lichtblau & Liptak, supra note 323. I t  is also reported that the United States 
has threatened suspects with their being turned over t o  such countries to  encourage 
these suspects to talk. Id. The New York Times quotes a senior Moroccan intelligence 
official as follows: 
I am  allowed to  use all means i n  my possession i n  interrogating a suspect. You 
have to fight all his resistance at all levels and show him that he is wrong, that 
his ideology is wrong and is  not connected to religion. W e  break them, yes. And 
when they are weakened, they realize that they are wrong. 
Id. 
338. See infra notes 340-51 and accompanying text for a discussion o f  this issue. 
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Furthermore, given the lengthy delays before trial and the lengthy 
appellate process in capital cases, the threat of a remote penalty of 
death is not likely to induce the "ticking bomb terrorist!' to reveal the 
plot. Furthermore, the death penalty could be counterproductive when 
dealing with individuals who are willing to commit suicide to advance 
their group's cause. Thus, the lure of martyrdom by the death penalty 
might actually encourage such persons to refuse to cooperate.339 
2. Placing U.S. Military Personnel and Civilians at Risk 
If individuals associated with a1 Qaeda learn that the United 
States is executing imprisoned a1 Qaeda members, then U.S. 
civilians, military personnel, and federal agents may be a t  greater 
risk. First, if a1 Qaeda captures any Americans, there may be a 
greater chance that  they will be killed.340 Second, if a1 Qaeda 
members know they will face death by execution, they have a strong 
incentive to fight to the death when U.S. military or special agents 
are trying to subdue or arrest them in the field.341 
These policies rest on the same foundation as some basic rules of 
international humanitarian law. The Geneva Conventions that 
protect prisoners of war are based not only on humanitarian 
concerns, but also on pragmatic ones. If state A mistreats the 
captured soldiers of state B, then state B may be inclined to mistreat 
the captured soldiers of A.342 Granted, reciprocity does not always 
339. See supra notes 220-36 and accompanying text. 
340. Green et al., supra note 172, at  219 (Comments of Kenneth Roth, Director of 
Human Rights Watch). Note the statement allegedly made by Daniel Pearl's 
kidnappers: 
The National Movement for the Restoration of Pakistani Sovereignty had 
kidnapped him [Pearl] and was holding him in 'very inhuman [sic] 
circumstances', similar to the way that 'Pakistanis and nationals of other 
sovereign countries were kept in Cuba by the American Army. . . If the 
Americans keep our countryman in better conditions we will better the 
conditions of Mr. Pearl and all the other Americans we capture. 
FOUDA & FIELDING, supra note 43, a t  65 (quoting an e-mail message sent reportedly by 
the kidnappers of Daniel Pearl, the Wall Street Journal reporter). A second e-mail was 
sent threatening the execution of Pearl within 24 hours. Id. Apparently, authorities 
believe that Pearl was already dead by the time that the second e-mail was sent. Id. 
That executing a1 Qaeda terrorists puts Americans and the U.S. military a t  greater 
risk cannot be proved empirically. Furthermore, we cannot accept a t  face value the 
statements made by such individuals. But these and other experiences suggest that 
executing or otherwise mistreating a1 Qaeda captives may increase this risk. 
341. Id. at  224. 
342. See George H. Aldrich, Some Reflections on the Origins of the 1977 Geneva 
Protocols, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED 
CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOR OF JEAN PICTET 129,131 (Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984) 
(noting that "it was apparent that mistreatment of North Vietnamese prisoners by the 
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happen. During its war with the United States, North Korea and 
China routinely mistreated U.S. soldiers and airmen, violating the 
third Geneva Convention while the United States generally abided by 
it.343 One could readily argue that a terrorist organization like a1 
Qaeda is certain to treat captives harshly no matter how well the 
United States treats arrested a1 Qaeda members (and a t  the moment 
we are not treating them well). On the other hand, a1 Qaeda is a 
loosely structured organization. Who is to say that some people 
associated with that organization might be motivated to treat 
captured Americans humanely but for the fact that captured a1 Qaeda 
members are being mistreated by the United States (most are being 
held incommunicado without trial) and may be subject to 
execution.344 
South Vietnamese undermined our efforts to obtain better treatment for our men 
captured by North Vietnam"). However, there is an opposing view: 
The Geneva Conventions are coming to be regarded less and less as contracts 
concluded on a basis of  reciprocity in  the national interests of  the parties . . . A 
state does not proclaim the principle o f  protection due to prisoners of war 
merely in  the hope of  improving the lot of  a certain number of  its own 
nationals. I t  does so out of respect for the human person. 
111 COMMENTARY, T H E  GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, GENEVA 
CONVENTION 111 RELATIVE TO T H E  TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 20 (Jean S. Pictet 
ed. 1960). In a colloquy between Professor Ruth Wedgwood of  the John Hopkins 
University and Professor Jordan Paust of  the University of  Denver on January 3, 2004, 
Professor Wedgwood argued that humanitarian law is based, to a great extent, on 
reciprocity. In answer to  a question from the audience, Professor Paust argued that 
certain aspects of  humanitarian law, the prohibition against torture being the 
prominent example, are fundamental rights, not founded on the notion of reciprocity. 
The Constitutional and Enemy Combatants, Panel Discussion of the American 
Association of Law Schools' Annual Meeting, Atlanta, Georgia, Jan. 3, 2003 (attended 
by author). 
343. Ralph Michael Stein, "Artillery Lends Dignity to What Otherwise Would be 
a Common Brawl': An Essay on Post-Modern Warfare and the Classification of 
Captured Adversaries, 14 PACE INT'L L. REV. 133, 146 (2002). North Vietnam 
mistreated U.S. captives, but South Vietnam, to  whom we turned over a large 
percentage of  captured Viet  Cong and North Vietnamese fighters generally mistreated 
them i n  turn. See id. By the way, the American Continental Army i n  the War o f  
Independence generally treated British captives well, but the British did not return the 
favor, viewing the Americans as lawless rebels, not so differently from how the United 
States views a1 Qaeda today. See id. at 142. 
344. This is not to suggest that all a1 Qaeda and Taliban are necessarily entitled 
to  the protection of Geneva Conventions as prisoners o f  war. For a discussion of that 
issue, see Paust, supra note 188 at 8 n.16; Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to 
Fight Terrorism, Detentions, Military Commissions, International Tribunals and the 
Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1472-77 (2003). See also, Jonathan D. Glater, 
A.B.A. Urges Wider Rights in  Cases Tried by Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2003, at 
A18 (noting that American Bar Association called upon Congress and White House to 
ensure that all defendants before military tribunals have "adequate access" to civilian 
lawyers). But see Ruth Wedgewood, a1 Qaeda, Terrorism and Military Commissions, 
96 AM. J. INT'L L. 328,330 (2002) (defending detentions i n  Guantanamo Bay and use o f  
military commissions as necessary security measure, noting that "the fabric of 
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In addition, humanitarian law prohibits an armed force from 
killing soldiers who are attempting to surrender, who have given up, 
or who are wounded and otherwise "hors de combat." Thus, a "take no 
prisoners" order is per se illegal. Specifically, 1977 Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of 1949 provides as follows, "It is 
prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors, to threaten an  
adversary therewith or to conduct hostilities on this basis."345 This 
requirement "to give quarter" also appears in the Hague Regulations 
of 1907.346 The United States has never ratified Protocol I, but is a 
party to the Hague Convention of 1907, including the Annex 
containing the Hague Regulations. The requirement "to give quarter" 
is considered binding customary international 
If the United States embarks on a policy of executing a1 Qaeda 
members, it may be viewed by a1 Qaeda members in the field 
essentially a s  refusing to give quarter. This is not to suggest that 
carrying out the death penalty would violate international law or 
would in fact violate the provisions referred to above. (The Geneva 
Conventions expressly authorize criminal prosecution for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.348 These Conventions, including the 
1977 Protocols, permit capital punishment, except for juveniles and 
women with dependent infants.349) Nonetheless, one of the benefits 
gained by the attacking force in giving quarter, aside from potential 
reciprocity, is that  the besieged force has greater incentive to lay 
American liberalism and democracy would be irreparably coarsened i f  government 
proves unable to  provide a reasonable guarantee of life and safety to its citizens."); Lee 
A. Casey, David B. Rivkin, Jr., & Darin R. Bartram, An Assessment of the 
Recommendations of the American Bar Association Regarding the Use of Military 
Commissions in  the War on Terror, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY WHITE PAPERS ON 
TERRORISM, at http: l lwww.fed-soc.org/Publicat ionsPTerrorisesponse.p (last 
visited Aug. 1, 2003) (criticizing some of  ABA recommendations on military 
commissions). 
345. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, opened for 
signature Dec. 12, 1977, art. 40, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3-608, 16 I.L.M. 1391; see also 
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 443 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 1989). 
346. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War  on Land, Annex to 
the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the  Laws and Customs of  War on Land, Oct. 
18, 1907, art. 23(2), 36 Stat. 2199 ("In addition to the prohibitions provided by special 
Conventions, it is especially forbidden . . . (d)  To declare that no quarter will be 
given . . . ."). 
347. L.R. Penna, Customary International Law and Protocol I: an Analysis of 
Some Provisions, in  STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND 
RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOR OF JEAN PICTET, supra note 342, at 212. 
348. See, e.g., 1977 Additional Protocol I ,  supra note 343, art. 75.7, at 465-66 
(implicitly authorizing trial o f  individuals, including prisoners of war, for war crimes or 
crimes against humanity or both). See also Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or 
Global Law Enforcement Operation, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 307,357 (2003). 
349. 1977 Protocol I ,  supra note 345, art. 77.5, at 467 (prohibiting imposition of 
death penalty upon minors, but implicitly authorizing death penalty for adults); id. art. 
7 ,  at 466 (prohibiting execution of death penalty on mothers with "dependent infants"). 
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down their arms. If they know they are going to be killed in any 
event, why not fight to the last? If the besieged force, in this case, 
members of a1 Qaeda, believe that they will face execution anyway (or 
indefinite detention without trial or both),350 they may be more 
motivated to die a glorious warrior's death in battle rather than to go 
quietly.351 
The thundering weight of the crimes of September 11 inevitably 
demands the maximum punishment that  our judicial system allows. 
If anyone deserves the death penalty, then those who planned and 
actively participated in the September 11 conspiracy do. The United 
States will almost certainly execute those, like Mohammed Shaikh 
Khalid, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Abu Zubaydah, assuming, as  
expected, they are found responsible for the attacks. Yet as  we enter 
the third year in the "war on terrorism," the euphoria of the 
seemingly quick victory in the largely unilateral war against Iraq is 
beginning to give way to recognition that  we need the United Nations, 
the help of our allies, and respect for the rule of law. 
Similarly, the natural demand for retribution after a terrorist 
organization has committed mass murder and other heinous crimes 
needs to be tempered by the fact that  carrying out the death penalty 
may strengthen the terrorists. Given the perceived and actual 
grievances that the Arab and the greater Islamic worlds have towards 
the West in general and the United States in particular, carrying out 
such executions will probably tend to inflame the Arab and Islamic 
worlds, increase their support of terrorist movements and thwart 
cooperation with our allies, almost all of whom have abolished the 
death penalty. In addition, assuming the evidence a t  trial fails to 
show that Zacarias Moussaoui directly participated in the conspiracy 
to carry out the September 11 attacks, executing him may be contrary 
to our current death penalty jurisprudence and would appear unjust 
to our allies and the Islamic world alike. Even if the evidence shows 
350. One could add to this list the possibility of captured a1 Qaeda members 
being subject to degrading treatment and torture. See supra notes 320-51 and 
accompanying text. 
351. Furthermore, the failure to give quarter may ultimately strengthen the 
terrorist organization. COOGAN, supra note 220, a t  578. In 1987, Great Britain's Special 
Air Services Unit (SAS) lay in wait for IRA members who had planned to blow up a 
police barracks in Northern Ireland. Id. a t  575-78. Allegedly carrying out a "shoot to 
kill" order, SAS killed nine men, eight IRA members and one innocent bystander who 
happened to be Protestant. Id. at  578. Allegedly, SAS ordered three IRA men to lie on 
the road and then proceeded to kill each of them. One commentator noted that each of 
the eight men's funerals drew enormous crowds and each probably recruited more than 
"fifty replacements for the IRAn while greatly increasing support for Sinn Fein. Id. 
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tha t  Moussaoui directly participated in the September 11 conspiracy, 
executing him will, as  the Kasi case so well illustrates, almost 
certainly make him the twentieth martyr for Muslims. 
Because, however, we routinely carry out executions on 
individuals such as  Paul Hill, the anti-abortion killer, who murdered 
two persons, a physician and his how can we not execute 
one who, a t  the very least, was actively involved in an  organization 
that killed over three thousand innocent people? We should, however, 
learn from the mistakes and the successes of Great Britain in fighting 
the IRA, that executing politically motivated agents of terror is likely 
to spawn greater terrorism.353 Such restraint is a surer path towards 
isolating a1 Qaeda and its allies in the lands of the aggrieved and the 
repressed. The death penalty is a luxury that we can ill afford in this 
international struggle. 
352. See David Royse, Abortion Clinics Safe So Far, Police Say; No Credible 
Threats Since Execution, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 5 ,  2003, at B1, available at 2003 WL 
62530293. 
353. See COOGAN, supra note 220, at 578. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1 
Possible Conspiracy A: 
Osama Bin Laden 1 
, 
High Level Organizers Ayman al-Zawahri, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, 
Abu Zubaydah, and Ramzi Bin al-Shibh 
The Nineteen Hijackers + Moussaoui 
Table 2 
Two Possible Conspiracies B and C: 
Osama Bin Laden 
High Level Organizers Ayman al-Zawahri, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, 
Abu Zubaydah, and Ramzi Bin al-Shibh 
The Nineteen Hijackers Moussaoui I 
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